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Referat
Nuel Belnap schlug 1977 eine vierwertige Logik vor, die { im Gegensatz zur klas-
sischen Logik { die Fahigkeit haben sollte, sowohl mit widerspruchlicher als auch
mit fehlender Information umzugehen. Diese Logik hat jedoch den Nachteil, da
sie Satze der Form wenn : : : , dann : : : nicht ausdrucken kann. Ausgehend von
dieser Beobachtung analysieren wir die beiden nichtklassischen Aspekte, Wider-
spruchlichkeit und fehlende Information, indem wir eine dreiwertige Logik en-
twickeln, die mit widerspruchlicher Information umgehen kann und eine Modal-
logik, die mit fehlender Information umgehen kann. Beide Logiken sind nicht
monoton. Wir untersuchen Eigenschaften, wie z.B. Kompaktheit, Entscheid-
barkeit, Deduktionstheoreme und Berechnungkomplexitat dieser Logiken.
Es stellt sich heraus, da die dreiwertige Logik, nicht kompakt und ihre Fol-
gerungsmenge im Allgemeinen nicht rekursiv aufzahlbar ist. Beschrankt man
sich hingegen auf endliche Formelmengen, so ist die Folgerungsmenge rekur-
siv entscheidbar, liegt in der Klasse 
P
2
der polynomiellen Zeithierarchie und
ist DP-schwer. Wir geben ein auf semantischen Tableaux basierendes, korrek-
tes und vollstandiges Berechnungsverfahren fur endliche Pramissenmengen an.
Daruberhinaus untersuchen wir Abschwachungen der Kompaktheitseigenschaft.
Die nichtmonotone auf S5-Modellen basierende Modallogik stellt sich als
nicht minder komplex heraus. Auch hier untersuchen wir eine sinnvolle Ab-
schwachungder Kompaktheitseigenschaft. Desweiteren studieren wir den Zusam-
menhang zu anderen nichtmonotonen Modallogiken wie Moores autoepistemis-
cher Logik (AEL) und McDermotts NML-2. Wir zeigen, da unsere Logik zwis-
chen AEL und NML-2 liegt.
Schlielich koppeln wir die entworfeneModallogik mit der dreiwertigen Logik.
Die dabei enstehende LogikMK
3
ist eine Erweiterung des nichtmonotonen Frag-
ments von Belnaps Logik. Wir schlieen unsere Betrachtungen mit einem Ver-
gleich von MK
3
und verschiedenen informationstheoretischen Logiken, wie z.B.
Nelsons N und Heytings intuitionistischer Logik ab.
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Preface
No matter what we get of this {
I know, I know, we'll never forget.
Blackmore, Gillan, Glover, Lord, Paice.
I started the work on Belnap's Useful Four-Valued Logic as a consequence of
trying to grasp how existing AI-systems deal with unknown and contradicting
information. Supplying a slightly modied version of Belnap's original logic with
a preferential entailment relation yielded a formal system which is very close to
how the AI-programs behaved (cf. [Weber and Bell, 1994]).
There were, however, some problems with my formal system: it didn't have
any tautologies and as a consequence I did not know how to provide a syntactical
characterisation for my entailment relation. This was not very satisfying since I
had the impression of having dened another entailment relation whose abstract
properties and proof-theory have to remain underdeveloped
1
.
As a consequence I started to reformulate Belnap's modied logic by separat-
ing the part which deals with contradicting information from the one which deals
with unknown information. The rst one is very close to Kleene's strong three-
valued logic and I therefore called it K
3
. I did not have a name for the second
one but when presenting some results on this logic of Unknown at the FAPR'96
conference, I learned from J.J. Meyer that the logic of Unknown is nothing other
than a generalisation of Halpern's and Moses' logic MK; this solved at least the
naming-problem
2
.
While investigating the properties ofMK and K
3
it turned out that both logics
are indeed very close to classical propositional and classical modal logic. Many
important properties like compactness and deduction theorems have weakened
counterparts which do also hold for these logics.
As might be easily seen from looking at the table of contents, K
3
appeared
very attractive to me. In contrast to many other competing approaches which
loose properties like Reexivity, AND-Property, K
3
retains all these aspects from
1
I suspect that this is a common problem in the eld of Knowledge Representation;
new logics are dened but their abstract properties are very often disregarded. As a
consequence, competing formal systems can only be compared by `logic-benchmarks'
which is from a theoretical point not always satisfying. Thus, if the goal is to learn
more about the structure of a certain logic then it is certainly a plus, if the logic
under consideration is very close to classical logic (or any other logic whose properties
have been extensively studied). This yields what Quine called Minimal Mutilation.
2
Joeri Engelfriet gave me very useful references of the usage of Halpern's and Moses'
logic in AI.
vi
classical logic. Of course, in general we had to give up monotonicity, but mono-
tonic inference behaviour can be retained as long as we add information to X
which does not contradict X .
Finally! I could combine K
3
and MK to MK
3
{ my logic for reasoning with
unknown and contradicting information which is an alternative to Belnap's logic;
maybe not the only alternative, but a very useful one. While by no means revo-
lutionary, I hope the reader nds these investigations welcome and reassuring.
I tried to make this text self-contained (which means that if you take the
literature on logic into account then you won't need any additional explanation
;-).
Part of the material presented in this text has been published elsewhere.
1. A three-valued logic for reasoning with unknown information appeared in
the Proceeding of the Workshop on Inductive Logic Programming, 1993,
[Bell and Weber, 1993a], [Bell and Weber, 1993b]. A four-valued variant of
the logic K
3
has been published as a technical report, [Weber and Bell, 1994].
2. Some of the complexity results and a proof-theory restricted to Horn-clauses
for K
3
has been presented at the Extensions of Logic Programming Work-
shop at the International Joint Conference and Symposium on Logic Pro-
gramming, [Weber, 1996b].
3. The Mathematical Properties of K
3
and the sequent-style calculus for K
3
has been presented at the Congress on Paraconsistency, [Weber, 1997b],
[Weber, 1997a].
4. The logic MK, has been presented at the FAPR '96 { Practical Reasoning
Conference, [Weber, 1996a].
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Ever since the achievement of a formal denition of the concepts of knowledge
and belief, much eort has been made in the eld of Philosophical Logic and
Articial Intelligence. One of the seminal works in this eld is Belnap's How a
computer should think and its successor A useful four-valued logic. Belnap tried
to account for two major problems: First, the information in a database is never
complete, and, second it is very likely that this information is contradictory. As
a consequence, the use of classical logic is inappropriate because of the so-called
ex-falso principle, according to which a contradiction sanctions the entailment
of any formula.
Belnap's way out of this disaster was to come up with a four-valued logic.
By choosing an additional designated truth-value, b, Belnap manages fA;:Ag to
have a model and hence, the entailment relation is prevented from trivialisation
1
.
Logics which cannot be trivialised are called paraconsistent logics. Since non-
trivialisability or paraconsistency is nothing other than the failure of the classical
ex-falso principle (EFQ) this concept does not imply a unique logic. There is a
wide variety of paraconsistent logics. This yields dierent opinions about how
a computer should think in the presence of contradictory information. The aim
of the Introduction is to formulate a wishlist for a paraconsistent entailment
relation which might be useful for Computing Science.
1.1 Belnap's approach
[Belnap, 1977] starts with setting up a scenario of a computer which nds itself
in a situation where it has been told, for example, that A holds, B does not hold
etc. Belnap identies two points which represent a major dierence between how
the computer should think and how classical logic operates.
The rst point is the inferential behaviour in the presence of inconsistent
information. As an example, Belnap pictures the situation where Elizabeth tells
the computer that the Pirates won the Series in 1971, while Sam tells it otherwise.
If the computer is a classical logician then the contradicting information on the
1971 Series justies the inference of anything.
The second point is that the computer should also serve as a question-
answering device. It must therefore be able to identify those sentences which
1
Adding a third designated truth-value is a very simple but eective method to in-
validate the ex-falso rule of classical logic. It should be mentioned that a wide class
of many-valued logics developed since the beginning of this century use this trick.
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it does not know. For example, if it does not have any information on the 1966
Series then any question concerning this event should be answered by `I do not
know'.
Belnap stresses that the computer should merely answer questions by what
it has been told. This yields that, basically, we have four possibilities of how a
question can be answered: just told True, just told False, told neither True nor
False, told both True and False. Each possible answer can be associated with a
truth-value: t means just True, f means just False, u unknown, and b both True
and False.
In order to get a formal system out of these ideas, Belnap denes a set-up
2
as
a mapping from the set of atomic formulas to the set of truth-value ft; f; b; ug.
The truth-value of complex formulas can be recursively obtained by means of
the following truth-tables:
t f u b
 f t b u
_ t f b u
t t t t t
f t f b u
b t b b t
u t u t u
^ t f b u
t t f b u
f f f f f
b b f b f
u u f f u
Please note that Belnap has no table for an implicational connective. The
entailment relation is now dened as: a sentence  entails 	 if and only if s() 
s(	) for every set-up s. The relation  is dened by the following lattice:
 
 
 
@
@
@ 
 
 
@
@
@
t
b L4 u
f
Let us call the above logic, i.e. the truth-tables and the entailment relation,
L4. This logic is known to be monotonic and to have a nice and easy proof
theory (see [Wagner, 1994] for a Sequent System for L4). However, it also has a
big disadvantage: one cannot express rules like `if A then B'. The only reasonable
2
A set-up is a synonym for a truth-assignment function.
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way to dene an implicational connective from the above truth-tables is by means
of material implication. Unfortunately, material implication does not work for
L4. Here is what Belnap says:
Your rst thought might be that you could get the eect of `given A and
B, infer C,' or `if A and B, then C,' by feeding the computer ` A _ 
B _ C.' But that won't work: the latter formula will tend to split the
set-up you've got into three, one in which A is marked told False etc.
Thus, if we tell the computer A, B,  A _  B _ C we get at least three
set-ups: one in which A is marked both, true and false, B is just marked true
and C marked false. Another one in which A is just marked True and B is both,
True and False, C is just marked False etc.
To account for this problem, Belnap considers an implication as a mapping
from epistemic states to epistemic states. Thus it reads as: if A is true in some
state s then change s minimally in order to make B true. Hence, an implicational
statement adds extensional information.
Belnap points out several drawbacks of his solution to the problem of impli-
cational input. First, he says that he did not succeed in giving a logic for adding
rules A ! B to the database. Second, the computer cannot answer questions
about the truth-status of implications like A! B. In addition to that, handling
implications in Belnap's logic is a metalogical enterprise. That is, they are read
as inference rules: if A is true, then update the knowledge-base by B. Clearly,
this diers from adding the sentence A ! B to a set X of formulas a letting
the entailment relation do all the work. To me it seems, that an all-in-one logic
could be much more appealing.
1.2 Organisation
1.2.1 Goals
The general goal is to develop a logic which is able to handle implicational
input, and which allows proper reasoning about contradicting and unknown
information. Of course, the term `proper reasoning' needs a careful analysis of
(1) what should be entailed by contradicting information and (2) what does it
mean if computer answers `I do not know A'?
Another important point is to stick to what Quine calls Minimal Mutilation:
we want to stay as close as possible to classical logic. This demand has a lot of
consequences:
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1. If X is consistent, then we wish the paraconsistent consequences of X to be
identical to the classical consequences. This is a property which is required
for so-called Adaptive Logics.
2. We wish to retain as many properties of classical logic as possible. Especially,
{ The paraconsistent consequence relation should be reexive. In my point
of view reexivity is the basic property of a deductive system: you get
at least out what you have put in. Any irreexive relation cannot be a
consequence relation (it's a sort of transformation system which, like a
program, performs state transitions).
{ The connectives _ and ^ should behave normally, i.e. A ^ B is entailed
if and only if A and B are both entailed (AND property). Moreover, if
we can conclude A then we should also be able to conclude A _ B (OR
property).
{ Contraposition should be valid, i.e. from A ! B we wish to conclude
B !A.
{ The consequence relation should (at least for the propositional case) be
recursive, i.e.decidable.
The above characterises our main demands on the behaviour in the presence
of contradicting information. As for the missing information, we wish that rA,
to be read as A is unknown, is entailed by X if and only if neither A nor A is
entailed by X . If rA is provable, then A and A are both not provable. Thus,
r encodes some concept of provability. In order to make the whole thing become
meaningful, we have to require that the consequence relation is decidable. Only in
this case we can compute whether some formula is entailed or not. The computer
can therefore verify if rA holds, or not. Hence, we wish that for formulas of
the type rA the tertium non-datur principle holds, that is each corresponding
semantical structure satises either rA or rA. In other words: we do not wish
to take the impact of paraconsistency so far that rA^ rA has a model.
1.2.2 Summary
Let me give a summary of the main results and an overview of the structure of
this text. The basic plot is to decouple aspects of contradicting and unknown
information. That is, we shall rst introduce a logic which is able to reason
properly in the presence of contradicting information. Next, we shall develop
a modal system for reasoning about unknown information. The last step is to
combine both systems in order to be able to reason about contradicting and
unknown information.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 We shall investigate how a computer should answer questions in the
presence of contradicting information. Starting from a re-denition of the
truth-value semantics for the basic connectives :;_;^;! we obtain a logic
whose entailment relation, which is based on Shoham's preferred model, is
identical to the one given by [Priest, 1991].
We analyse in-depth the properties of this logic. We show that the corre-
sponding consequence operator Cn
3
is a pre-closure operator which satises
various variants of the deduction theorem. However,Cn
3
is not compact even
though several weaker versions of the compactness theorem hold. Moreover,
Cn
3
satises all important properties of Kraus, Lehman and Magidor's Sys-
tem C and P.
We show that the problem of computing a preferred model for X is in
LINTIME
NP[O(log n)]
; whether it is also LINTIME
NP[O(log n)]
-hard is an open
problem. Deciding Cn
3
(X) can be done by a polynomial time bounded TM
which has an NP-oracle. Only a linear amount of NP-oracle calls need to
be made. Thus, retaining inconsistent information is not more expensive
than revising the knowledge-base by means of Belief Revision, which is 
P
2
-
complete for most operators.
Chapter 3 In this chapter we shall discuss the rst-order version FOK
3
of K
3
.
The logic FOK
3
is much more troublesome than K
3
. For example, we cannot
guarantee that every set which has a model does also have a preferred model.
Moreover, Herbrand's theorem does not hold for K
3
. In order to guarantee
basic properties we have to restrict ourselves to universal theories.
Chapter 4 This chapter is devoted to the proof theory for K
3
and FOK
3
. We show
that Cn
3
(X) is 
0
2
-hard, i.e. not even recursively enumerable.We develop the
concept of recursively enumerable approximation to give a proof-theory for
K
3
. We shall present three dierent proof-systems: a Hilbert-style calculus,
a tableau-based calculus and a sequent-style calculus. We show soundness
for each of them.
Chapter 5 Here we account for the problem of unknown information. We dene
a modal operator  such that we can conclude  ^   from X , when-
ever  cannot be inferred from X , provided that X has a unique preferred
model. We further show by providing a syntactical characterisation that this
logic MK perfectly ts in the gap between Moore's autoepistemic logic and
McDermott's NML-2.
Chapter 6 We can now combine K
3
and MK by supplying MK's possible world
semantics by three-valued interpretation functions. We give a xpoint char-
acterisation of a Hilbert-style proof-system for MK
3
. It turns out that MK
3
and Belnap's logic agree on the main aspects. That is, if Belnap's logic judges
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a formula to be unknown, thenMK
3
judges this formula to be unknown, even
though they are in general incomparable. This is mainly becauseMK
3
's lan-
guage is richer. If, however, we restrict ourselves to nonmodal , we can
show that every  entailed by Belnap's logic is also entailed by MK
3
.
1.3 Notation
We shall mostly deal with a propositional language L closed under the usual
connectives :;!;_;^; note, that Belnap's negation operator will be replaced by
:. In Chapter 5 we shall extend L by some modal operators  and . Precisely,
let  = fA;B;C; : : : g be a countable set of propositional variables; we call 
a propositional signature. Every member of  is also called an atomic formula.
The set of well-formed formulas w.r.t a given signature  is the smallest set
Form () such that
1.   Form () and
2. if ; 	 in Form () then :;! 	;  ^ 	;  _ 	 2 Form ().
If it is clear from the context or not important, I shall omit the reference to
a special signature  and then just talk about a language L. If X is a set
of propositional formulas then ATOM(X)=
def
fA j A 2  and A appears as
subformula in some  2 Xg.
Capital letters like A;B;C etc will normally be used to denote atomic for-
mulas, whereas ; 	; etc will be used to denote arbitrary formulas. Letters like
X;Y; Z will be used to denote sets of formulas.
A literal is an atomic formula preceded by an odd number of negation signs
(negative literal) or an even number of negation signs (positive literal).
The degree d() of a propositional formula  is dened as follows
d()=
def
8
>
<
>
:
0 if  is atomic
d(
0
) + 1 if  has the form :
0
max(
0
; 
00
) + 1 if  has the form 
0
^ 
00
or 
0
_ 
00
or 
0
! 
00
The concept of the degree of a formula will mainly be used in inductive
proofs.
Any other conventions shall be introduced when we need them.
CHAPTER 2
Paraconsistency: The Propositional Logic K
3
This chapter discusses how a computer should deal with contradicting infor-
mation. We assume that the computer has been given a set of sentences, also
called the database. We assume further that the user who puts queries to the
database is familiar with classical logic and that he expects the computer to
answer questions according the principles of classical logic. There is, however,
another important presupposition the user makes: he assumes the database to
be consistent. I think any user of a question-answering system assumes that
the information given by system is consistent. For instance, if you consult your
lawyer and ask for an information then you always assume that the information
he gives you is correct; otherwise it would not make sense to ask him.
The same holds for a database system. You assume that the answers are
correct and thus, that the database is consistent. But, what if not? Suppose the
database has been built up by dierent experts. One expert might have asserted
that High taxes will help to lower the unemployment rate while another expert
is quite sure that High taxes will NOT help to lower the unemployment rate. If
the latter wants to update the database by High taxes will NOT help to lower
the unemployment rate, then the computer could reject this input because it is
inconsistent with what he already has been told.
In order to accept the input High taxes will NOT help to lower the unem-
ployment rate, we must prevent the computer from believing the contrary, i.e.
we must remove the information High taxes will help to lower the unemployment
rate.
We are confronted with two problems here: rst, checking consistency is NP-
complete. Checking consistency each time an input occurred could result in a
quite useless system. Second, withdrawing information from the database is non-
trivial, because e.g. High taxes will help to lower the unemployment rate must
not be given explicitly but can be implicitly inferred from the database. We
also might have several possibilities to prevent the inference of High taxes : : : .
Computing all those possibilities is quite complex as well. Even if we nally
manage to compute all the pieces of information, which sanction the belief in
High taxes will help to lower the unemployment rate, which piece should be
removed?
We thus can conclude that maintaining consistency is extremely dicult (it
is in fact 
P
2
-complete for many update operators):
{ Checking for consistency is NP-complete
{ Finding the possible culprits is a nontrivial task.
9{ Deciding which possible culprit should be deleted from the database might
require expert-knowledge and additional user-interaction.
With respect to the above problems, we decide not to remove information
from the database but to remove the classical consequence relation and replace
it by some paraconsistent consequence relation. Since there is great variety of
paraconsistent consequence relations, the question is: How should a useful, para-
consistent consequence relation behave? Especially, how should a paraconsistent
consequence relation handle implicational input?
The very principle is that the truth status of contradicting sentences is quite
doubtful. We therefore do not want to believe any sentence whose justication
relies on contradicting information. For example, assume that we have the fol-
lowing information:
1. If social standards are on the decline, then the government will not be re-
elected.
2. Social standards are on the decline.
3. Social standards stagnate.
We have contradicting information concerning the development of social stan-
dards. A safe way of dealing with contradictions would be to put the contradic-
tion aside
1
and see what follows from the rest. In the above case only 1) would
remain and we cannot conclude that `the government will not be re-elected',
which is reasonable, because it would rely on the information that social stan-
dards decrease (which is quite doubtful since we have also information contra-
dicting this).
Therefore, we have that 1)-3) should ideally not entail that the government
will be re-elected. This means that modus ponens (MP) is not a valid rule of
inference.
It is quite bizarre to have a logic in which modus ponens is not a valid rule
of inference. Clearly, this point requires further explanation. We want to block
the entailment of a sentence B from A;A ! B only if the truth-status of A is
doubtful, i.e. only if we have information contradicting A. Thus, if there is no
contradiction to A, then MP can be applied.
Let us put together a little wishlist for the desired entailment relation:
Paraconsistency: There is a B which is not a consequence of fA;:Ag.
1
Of course, the putting-aside-operation should not be accomplished by means of belief
revision because we have just argued that the attempt to re-establish consistency is
fairly complex. The putting-aside-operation should only serve as a metaphor.
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Conservativity: Whenever X is consistent then the paraconsistent consequences
should coincide with the classical consequences. A special case is the empty
set. Hence, the tautologies of our new logic should be identical to the classical
ones.
Cautiousness: fA;:A;A! Bg should not entail B.
Preclosure: The new entailment operator should be at least inclusive and idem-
potent.
This chapter is structured as follows: we start by dening a three-valued
paraconsistent entailment relation. The corresponding entailment relation has
been independently dened in [Priest, 1991]. Much eort is spent on a mathe-
matical (Section 2.2) and computational (Section 2.4) analysis of the entailment
relation. The main results are:
{ The consequence operator is a preclosure operator for which various versions
of the deduction theorem hold. Moreover, it is conservative, cautious and
enjoys all properties of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor's abstract systems C
and P except for Right Weakening.
{ Our paraconsistent logic is not compact. There are, however, some interesting
weakened versions of the compactness theorem which hold for our logic. For
example, if A ^ :A is entailed by X , then it is already entailed by a nite
subset of X .
{ Computing a preferred model for a nite set X is from the standpoint of
Turing-reducibility as dicult as the corresponding problem for classical
logic. However, deciding whether  is a paraconsistent consequence of X
is in 
P
2
, i.e. on the second level of the polynomial time hierarchy. Thus,
reasoning in our paraconsistent logic is not more complex than revising the
beliefs via a belief revision operation (which is 
P
2
-complete).
{ We isolate a class of tautologies which have the so-called variable sharing
property. This property plays an important role for Relevance Logics.
2.1 Semantical Analysis
From a semantical point of view, the reason for the validity of the ex-falso
principle (EFQ) in classical logic is that the set fA;:Ag does not have a model.
The denition of the entailment relation as `X entails  if and only if every
model of X is a model for ' yields that an inconsistent set (i.e. a set having no
model at all) entails every formula of a given language. The aim is to dene the
concept of a model such that every set (even those which are not satisable by
a classical, two-valued interpretation) will have a model.
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2.1.1 Three-Valued Interpretations
The easiest way to guarantee that the set fA;:Ag has a model is to introduce
an additional designated
2
truth-value. Denote this value by >. Now let I be an
assignment from the set of atomic formulas to the set of truth-values ft; f;>g
(true, false and paraconsistent). Consider the following truth-table for the nega-
tion operator : (note that this table diers from Belnap's negation ):
t > f
: f > t
Since > is designated, we have that I(A) = > satises fA;:Ag. Whenever
some formula A is assigned the value >, this should represent something like
`there is information indicating that both, A and :A have been told'.
The above semantics for : is not merely a technical trick to invalidate EFQ;
it is also reasonable in our case to choose this semantics. We said that the truth-
status of any contradicting sentence is doubtful; hence any sentence which has
been assigned > has a doubtful truth-status. But if the truth-status of A is
doubtful, so is the truth-status of :A. Therefore, :A should also receive the
value >. This justies the above truth-table.
Let us motivate the semantics for the connectives _ and ^. Assume that our
database contains some contradicting sentences, say  and :. We assume that,
even if both  and : have been told to the database, only one of them holds
in the real world. Thus, after some knowledge revision process, the database
either knows  or it knows :. In other words, even if the truth-status of some
sentence is doubtful at some point of time, this sentence will turn out to be true
or turn out to be false sometime in the future.
Consider the sentence A ^ B. If both, A and B receive a truth-value from
ft; fg, then the truth-value of the conjunction is identical to its truth-value in
classical logic. This guarantees that the truth-table for ^ will be a conservative
extension of the classical semantics. Thus,
2
Recall that in a multi-valued setting the set of truth-values is divided into two
subsets: the set of `truth-like' and the set of `false-like' values. The rst set is called
set of designated truth-values whereas the latter is called set of non-designated truth-
values. Designated truth-values generalise the concept of tautology: any sentence
which takes a designated truth-value under every assignment is called a tautology.
In other words, an assignment I satises a formula  if and only if I() is designated.
In the case of classical logic t is the only designated truth-value.
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^ t > f
t t ? f
> ? ? ?
f f ? f
If we want to ll the gaps we have to keep in mind that any sentence which
receives the value > will in the long run turn out to be either t or f . Now,
if I(A) = f and I(B) = >, then no matter what B will turn out to be, the
conjunction A ^ B will always be false. On the other hand if I(A) = t and
I(B) = >, then the truth-value of the compound statement depends on what B
turns out to be; thus A^B receives in this case the value >. A similar argument
holds, if both A and B are assigned the value >. This yields the following truth-
table:
^ t > f
t t > f
> > > f
f f f f
Analogous arguments hold for the connective _. If we dene implication as
material implication, then we get the following truth-tables:
t > f
: f > t
_ t > f
t t t t
> t > >
f t > f
! t > f
t t > f
> t > >
f t t t
The above truth-tables
3
serve as a basis for a satisability relation j. Let
 be a propositional signature, i.e an enumerable set of propositional variables;
3
These tables are identical to the ones Kleene gave for his strong three-valued logic.
[Kleene, 1952] did, however, consider the third truth-value to mean something like
`undened' to account for the non-recursiveness of functions. As a consequence,
Kleene's third truth-value is non-designated which yields a logic where A! A is not
a tautology. Moreover Kleene's logic without a second designated truth-value does
not have any tautologies at all
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a function I :  ! ft; f;>g is called a three-valued interpretation function.
The function I will be extended in the usual way to determine recursively the
truth-value of any  2 L by means of the above truth-tables. We say that I is
a K
3
-model of a formula , denoted by I j if and only if I() 2 ft;>g. The
relation j is naturally extended to sets. A class I of interpretations satises a
set X of formulas if and only if I jX , for every I 2 I. The class of all models
of a given set X is denoted by MOD(X).
The truth-values of a compound formula can be characterised by associating
with each member of ft; f;>g a value from f0; 1; 2g. We assign t the value 2, >
the value 1 and f the value 0. By considering the standard relation  among
natural numbers we obtain a linear ordering which can be visualised by the
following Hasse-diagrams:
t 2
> 1
f 0
Please note that this ordering coincides with Belnap's ordering  mentioned
in Chapter 1. The only dierence is that Belnap uses  to (partially) order his
set of four truth-values, while we excluded the value u from our considerations.
There is a close relationship between the connectives _, ^, : and lattice
operations:
A ^ B = min(A;B)
A _ B = max(A;B)
:A = 2 A
where A;B 2 f0; 1; 2g.
Now that we have dened the semantics for our propositional language, we
can start to dene an entailment relation.
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2.1.2 Cautious Entailment
We identied the classical entailment relation (`every two-valued model of X
is also a two-valued model of ') as the sole culprit for the proliferating set of
consequences in the case of a contradiction (EFQ)
4
. Let us replace the classical
two-valued entailment relation by its three-valued counterpart 
Bolz
. We say that
X 
Bolz
 if and only if every three-valued model of X is also a three-valued model
of . Since entailment relations of the form `every model of X is also a model
of ' are due to Bolzano, we use the subscript `Bolz' for the above three-valued
entailment relation. Note that the only dierence between these two relations is
the type of model they talk about (two-valued or three-valued).
How far can we go with 
Bolz
in order to achieve our goals of the aforemen-
tioned wishlist (paraconsistency, conservativity etc.)? Not too far, unfortunately.
For example, conservativity is violated as shown by the following example:
Example 2.1. Let  = fA;Bg, X = fA;A ! Bg. The following three-valued
interpretations satisfy X :
I
1
(A) = t I
2
(A) = t I
3
(A) = > I
4
(A) = > I
5
(A) = >
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = > I
3
(B) = t I
4
(B) = f I
5
(B) = >
Because there is an interpretation, namely I
4
, which satises X but not B,
we have that X 1
Bolz
B.
The problem is that the above I
4
interprets A to be paraconsistent but {
when looking at X { A cannot be suspected to be paraconsistent at all. There is
nothing which indicates that both A and :A have been told. Interpreting A to
be paraconsistent can be seen as an overdenition of A's truth-value. This holds
for any of the above models, except for I
1
.
In order to force an entailment relation not to care about overdened models
we shall replace 
Bolz
by an entailment relation  which bases on Shoham's
idea of preferred models [Shoham, 1988]. A model is preferred if it does not
overinterpret any sentence of X . The entailment relation is then dened as: X
(preferentially) entails  if and only if every preferred model of X is a model of
'.
4
One might nd the term EFQ inappropriate because the truth-value f does not play
the same role as in classical two-valued logic. In [Wagner, 1994] this is replaced by
ECSQ (ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet) which might be better. Since the EFQ
principle is widely known, I would like to stick to it, though.
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The relative degree of overinterpretation among models can be expressed
by a relation @. In our case, the task of the ordering relation @ is to rule
out all models, in which the truth-value of some atomic formula is unnecessarily
overdened. Consider the following ordering relation to be read as `less-informed'
among truth-values. Note that this semilattice is similar to Belnap's lattice L4
and to the lattice which is induced by the ordering relation  of Section 2.1.1 if
we put it on its side and replace b by >
5
.
 
 
 @
@
@
6
-
Information
Truth
t f
>
According to the above semi-lattice we have that t is less informed than >
and f is less informed than >. In order to express that f and t are both equally
informed we wish that f v t and t v f holds (note that this is not reected by
the above Hasse-diagram. We thus associate with each truth-value a degree of
information i, i.e. a mapping i : ft; f;>g ! f0;1g with i(t) = 0, i(f) = 0 and
i(>) = 1. Consider the linear ordering 0 < 1 and dene the relation @ to be the
set of ordered pairs (a; b) such that i(a) < i(b). Moreover, dene a  b if and
only if i(a) = i(b). We write a v b if a @ b or a  b
6
.
Proposition 2.1. The relation v is a partial ordering on the set of truth-values
ft; f;>g.
Proof. Clearly we have, a v a for every a 2 ft; f;>g (reexivity), and a v b
and b v c implies a v c (transitivity). Moreover, a v b and b v a implies a  b
(anti-symmetry). r
This partial order on truth-values can naturally be extended to three-valued
interpretations I
1
; I
2
of a signature :
I
1
v I
2
if and only if I
1
(A) v I
2
(A) for all A 2 
5
In his paper [Belnap, 1977], Belnap discusses philosophical aspects of both lattices.
6
The above denition of the relations @ and v shows the relationship to Belnap's
ideas. We can also write them is a straight forward manner:v= f(a; b) j a 6= > or b =
>g and @= f(a; b) j a v b and NOT b v ag.
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The relation @ is dened in an analogous way:
I
1
@ I
2
if and only if I
1
v I
2
and I
1
(A) @ I
2
(A) , for some A 2 :
Proposition 2.2. If I v J then for all formulas  we have I() v J().
Proof. By structural induction on the degree d() of . For d() = 0, i.e. for
atomic , the proposition follows immediately from the denition of v. Assume
that the proposition holds for all formulas with degree at most n. For the induc-
tive step we have to consider several cases:
 = :	 Since I(	) v J(	) we have immediately that I(:	) v J(:	).
 = 	 _ 	
0
Assume to the contrary that we do not have I(	 _	
0
) v J(	 _	
0
).
That is we must have I(	 _ 	
0
) = > and J(	 _ 	
0
) 6= >. Hence we have
I(	) = > or I(	
0
) = >:
Now, if J(	 _ 	
0
) = f we have that J(	) = J(	
0
) = f { a contradiction to
the induction hypothesis. Thus, we must have J(	 _ 	
0
) = t. Thus,
J(	) = t or J(	
0
) = t
which contradicts the hypothesis that I(	) v J(	) and I(	
0
) v J(	
0
).
The other cases are similar. r
The above proposition shows that the truth-value of a compound formula
is limited by the truth-value of its subformulas: if I is less informed than, or
equally informed as J w.r.t. atomic formulas, then I is less informed than, or
equally informed as J w.r.t. to compound formulas.
Let us now turn back to our models. In order to prevent the overinterpretation
of formulas by excessive usage of > we wish to consider only those models from
MOD(X) which are minimal according to v. The following denition grasps
exactly those models which do not overinterpret any sentence of X .
Denition 2.1 (Preferred three-valued model). An interpretation I is a
preferred three-valued model for a set of sentence X , I j

X , if and only if I jX
and there is no I
0
such that I
0
@ I and I
0
is a K
3
-model of X .
The following proposition states that the amount of information grows with
the size of the database:
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Proposition 2.3. Let X  Y be a strict subset of Y and consider a preferred
model I of X. There is a preferred model J of Y such that I v J .
The set of all preferred models of X is denoted by PMOD(X). We can now
give an entailment relation based on preferred three-valued models.
Denition 2.2 ( , Cn
3
). Dene the relation   2
L
L, to be read as `K
3
-
entails', as follows: X if and only if every preferred K
3
-model I of X is a
K
3
-model for . The set Cn
3
(X) of three-valued consequences of X is dened as
Cn
3
(X)=
def
f j Xg.
Consider again Example 2.1. I
1
is the only preferred K
3
-model. Thus XB.
The gure below visualises the relation v among I
1
; : : : ; I
5
.
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1
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2
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3
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x
I
4
I
6
Information @
Let us call K
3
the logic which results from taking the above truth-tables
semantics and the preferential entailment relation.
Observation 2.1. The logic K
3
coincides with the logic LP(m) given in [Priest, 1991].
2.1.3 Examples
We shall now present some examples. The rst example shows that Cn
3
is cau-
tious.
Example 2.2. Let X = fA;:A;A! B;C;C ! Dg. This set of formula has two
preferred K
3
-models.
I
1
(A) = > I
2
(A) = >
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = f
I
1
(C) = t I
2
(C) = t
I
1
(D) = t I
2
(D) = t
We have A;D;C 2 Cn
3
(X) but B 62 Cn
3
(X)
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The above example shows that due to the paraconsistency of A the formula
B is not entailed by X and hence, Cn
3
is cautious. In this example it is easy
to identify the formula which caused the inconsistency. The following example
illustrates that a set of formulas can be inconsistent (i.e. it has no two-valued
model) but that we cannot identify a unique paraconsistent formula.
Example 2.3. Let X = fA;A! B;B ! C;C ! :Ag. The following interpreta-
tions are preferred models for X .
I
1
(A) = > I
2
(A) = > I
3
(A) = > I
4
(A) = t I
5
(A) = t
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = f I
3
(B) = f I
4
(B) = > I
5
(B) = t
I
1
(C) = t I
2
(C) = t I
3
(C) = f I
4
(C) = f I
5
(C) = >
We have that A 2 Cn
3
(X) but B;C;:A;:B;:C 62 Cn
3
(X).
2.2 Properties of Cn
3
We shall now prove that the consequence operator Cn
3
does indeed have the
desired properties conservativity, paraconsistency and reexivity. The fact that
Cn
3
is cautious has been demonstrated in Example 2.3. Beside these rather
specic properties, we shall discuss the following questions, some of which are
related to classical, mathematical properties:
1. Which basic properties, like inclusion, idempotency, cumulativity etc. does
Cn
3
have?
2. Does every set X  L have a preferred model?
3. Are there any deduction theorems valid for K
3
?
4. Is K
3
's consequence operator Cn
3
compact?
Some of the properties related to the above questions play an important role
in the area of mathematical logic (inclusion, idempotency, compactness) or in the
eld of nonmonotonic logic (cumulativity). Other properties pave the way for a
deeper understanding of K
3
's treatment of contradicting information (preferred
model existence, deduction theorems).
The plan is as follows: I shall rst discuss some basic closure properties
and deduction theorems (Sec 2.2.1). Next, I shall show that every set X has
a preferred model (Sec. 2.2.3). I shall continue with relating K
3
to systems of
nonmonotonic cumulative inference (Section 2.2.4). In a subsequent step I shall
investigate the question whether Cn
3
is compact (Sec. 2.3).
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2.2.1 Basic Closure Properties
There are two properties which I consider to be fundamental for every logical
operator: inclusion and idempotency. Inclusion means that you are able to ex-
tract at least what you put in. The lack of Inclusion might indicate some sort of
revision or transformation. The second property, idempotency, simply says that
our consequence operator returns all consequences.
Theorem 2.1 (Preclosure). Let X  L, then
1. X  Cn
3
(X)
2. Cn
3
(X) = Cn
3
(Cn
3
(X))
Proof. Follows immediately from the denition of Cn
3
(Denition 2.2). r
Any operator which is inclusive and idempotent is called, in algebraical terms,
a preclosure operator. A closure operator is a preclosure operator which is mono-
tone.
A fundamental theorem of classical propositional logic is the so-called replace-
ment theorem. It says that by replacing equivalent parts we obtain equivalent
propositions.
There are various techniques of proving the replacement theorem. See for
example [de Swart, 1993] for a graphical one, [Hilbert and Bernays, 1934] for a
cryptic one or [Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987] for a lazy one. I would like to adopt
the one given in [van Dalen, 1980]. First, we have to dene what a replacement
exactly is; given  we denote the replacement of A by 	 in  as [A=	 ]. We
dene [A=	 ] recursively. Let A be a variable,  2 f_;^;!;$g
[A=	 ] =
def
(
 if  is atomic and A 6= 
	 if  = A
(
1
 
2
)[A=	 ] =
def

1
[A=	 ]  
2
[A=	 ]
(:)[A=	 ] =
def
:([A=	 ])
Theorem 2.2 (Replacement Theorem). If 	
1
$ 	
2
is a K
3
-tautology then
[A=	
1
]$ [A=	
2
] is a K
3
-tautology.
Proof. By structural induction on . Let d() = 0. We have two cases. If  6= A
we have  = [A=	
1
] = [A=	
2
], hence j $  and we're done. In the case
where  = A we have to show that j	
1
$ 	
2
. But this is guaranteed by the
prerequisite.
Assume that the proposition holds for all  with degree smaller than n. Let
d() = n. Again we have several cases:
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 = 
1
 
2
We have to show
j[A=	
1
]$ [A=	
2
]
, j(
1
 
2
)[A=	
1
]$ (
1
 
2
)[A=	
2
]
, j
1
[A=	
1
]  
2
[A=	
1
]$ 
1
[A=	
2
]  
2
[A=	
2
] (¶)
By the induction hypothesis we have
j
1
[A=	
1
]$ 
1
[A=	
2
]
, I(
1
[A=	
1
]) = > or I(
1
[A=	
2
]) = >, or I(
1
[A=	
1
]) = I(
1
[A=	
2
]);
for any interpretation I
The same holds for 
2
. It follows that for each subformula 
i
[A=	
j
] = >, or
I(
1
[A=	
1
]) = I(
1
[A=	
2
]) and I(
2
[A=	
1
]) = I(
2
[A=	
2
]). It is now easy
to check that for every  2 f_;^;!;$g (¶ ) holds.
 = :
0
Similar to the above case.
r
The following proposition shows that Cn
3
is a useful operator, which allows
reasoning as in classical logic in the case where X is consistent. However, unlike
classical logic Cn
3
does not collapse to triviality in the presence of contradicting
information.
Proposition 2.4 (Conservativity). Let X  L, Cn
cl
the classical two-valued
consequence operator. Then the following holds:
1. If X has a two-valued model, then Cn
cl
(X) = Cn
3
(X).
2. Cn
3
(f;:g) 6= L.
3.  is a two-valued tautology if and only if  is a K
3
-tautology.
Proof. The proof is easy.
Ad 1: The set X has a two-valued model if and only if ever I(A) 6= >, for every
preferred three-valued model I of X and every variable A. Note that this
means, that basically every two-valued model of X is a preferred (three-
valued) model of X .
Ad 2: By example. B 62 Cn
3
(f;:g), for some variable B 2 .
Ad 3: The set of K
3
-tautologies coincides with the set of tautologies of Kleene's
strong three-valued logic with > as a designated truth-value, because both
systems have the same truth-tables. By [Rescher, 1969], p. 341., we know
that the tautologies of Kleene's strong three-valued logic with > a designated
value, coincides with the set of classical tautologies.
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r
The above proposition shows that K
3
is indeed very close to classical logic.
They share the same tautologies and in some cases they even have the same
set of consequences. As a consequence, we shall now see that they also share
several normal forms. Every formula  is semantically equivalent to some 
CNF
in conjunctive normal form. This will be very useful in carrying out proofs.
Proposition 2.5 (Conjunctive Normal Form). Let  be a formula. There
is a semantically equivalent formula 
CNF
such that

CNF
= D
1
^ : : : ^D
n
where each D
i
is a disjunction of literals, i.e. D
i
= L
i;1
_ : : : _ L
i;m
i
.
Proof. By Proposition 2.4 	 is a classical tautology if and only if 	 holds in
all three-valued interpretations, i.e. 	 is a K
3
-tautology. Thus,  $ 
CNF
is a
K
3
-tautology. Therefore, 
CNF
is valid in a three-valued interpretation I if and
only if  is. r
Sometimes we need sets of formulas to be given in a certain normal form
which guarantees that each member of the set is consistent; the conjunction of
all formulas of the set, however, must not necessarily be consistent.
Denition 2.3. A formula  is in implicational normal form (inf) if and only
if it has the form
L
1
^ L
2
^ : : : ^ L
n 1
! L
n
where each L
i
is a literal, i.e. an atomic or negated atomic formula. We call
L
1
^ : : : ^ L
n 1
the body of an inf-formula and L
n
the head of an inf-formula.
As the following proposition shows, inf is not very restrictive.
Proposition 2.6. Let  be a formula. Then there is a nite set X

of inf-
formulas such that for every interpretation I we have: I j if and only if
I jX

.
Proof. We know that  can be transformed into a semantically equivalent for-
mula 
CNF
in conjunctive normal form. Let 
CNF
= D
1
^ : : : ^D
n
where each
D
i
is a disjunction of literals. Then 
CNF
is semantically equivalent to the set
X = fD
1
; : : : ; D
n
g. Clearly each D
i
can be transformed into an inf-formula. r
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The above normal forms imply that for every set X there is a semantically
equivalent set X
0
such that X
0
is in clausal normal form. That is every formula
of X
0
is a clause, i.e. a disjunction of literals. Since every clause has a classical
two-valued model, we can split up any set of clauses into maximal consistent
subsets.
Proposition 2.7. LetX be a set of clauses. There are consistent subsets Y
1
; Y
2
; : : :
of X such that
[
Y
i
= X
In other words: every set of clauses can be cut up into maximal consistent
subsets.
2.2.2 Deduction Theorems
The above properties are quite useful for carrying out proofs. Another useful
tool which is very often used is the deduction theorem (i.e. X [ fg	 i
X ! 	). The deduction theorem shows that the notion of entailment is
fully reected in the object language.
Unfortunately the full version of the deduction theorem does not hold for K
3
.
Despite this fact there are several approximations of the full version which do
hold. To see why the full version fails, substitute  by A ^ (A ! B) and 	 by
B. Then, ! 	 is a tautology. Now, let X = f:Ag. Then,
X! 	 does not imply X [ fg	:
The following weak version of the deduction theorem does hold for K
3
.
Proposition 2.8 (Weak Deduction Theorem). If X[fg	 then X!
	 .
Proof. Let I be a preferred K
3
-model of X . We have to show that I is also a
K
3
-model for ! 	 . We shall distinguish two cases: 1)  is valid in I . It is easy
to see that I is a preferred K
3
-model of X [ fg. Since X [ fg	 we have
that 	 is valid in I ; hence,  ! 	 is valid in I . For the second case 2) assume
that  is invalid in I . Thus, ! 	 is valid in I . r
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The full version of the deduction theorem fails, because the implication does
not full what [Rosser and Turquette, 1952] call `the normalisation condition'
(i.e. ! 	 takes a non-designated truth-value i  takes a designated one and
	 takes a non-designated one):
I j6! 	 , I j; I j6	; for every I (Normalisation Condition, NC)
The set of all K
3
-tautologies which satisfy the normalisation condition are
denoted by Taut
NC
. To see that K
3
's implication does not satisfy the Normalisa-
tion Condition, consider the following counter-example: I() = > and I(	) = f .
Since I j and I j6	 we should according to the Normalisation Condition have
I j6! 	 . But, I(! 	) = > and hence ! does not satisfy NC.
Remark 2.1. There are non-tautological formulas which satisfy NC.
As an example of such a formula, consider :A! A.
The invalidity of the normalisation condition is the sole culprit for the inva-
lidity of the deduction theorem:
Theorem 2.3 (Normalised Deduction Theorem). If ! 	 is a tautology
which satises the normalisation condition then we have
X! 	 i X [ 	
Proof. By assumption, ! 	 is a tautology. Hence, for anyX we haveX!
	 . Thus, we have only to show that X ! 	 implies X [ 	 . But since
! 	 satises the normalisation condition, we have that under any assignment
I where  takes a designated value, 	 takes a designated one. Hence, every
preferred model of X [ fg is also a model for 	 . r
Another consequence of having an implication which does not satisfy the
normalisation condition is that the rule of detachment (modus ponens) is not
valid for K
3
. As we did for the deduction theorem, we can state under which
circumstances we can conclude 	 from ; ! 	 . We shall discuss this issue in
Section 4.2 of Chapter 4, when we shall give a syntactical characterisation of the
set Cn
3
(X).
Let me close this section with another version of the deduction theorem which
will be useful.
Proposition 2.9 (Paraconsistent Deduction Property). Let f'
1
; : : : ; '
n
g
 ^:. Then '
1
^ : : :^ '
n
!  is a tautology which satises NC.
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Proof. By Proposition 2.8 '
1
^ : : :^ '
n
!  is a tautology. It remains to show
that it satises NC. Obviously, '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
is inconsistent. In other words any
K
3
-model for '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
assigns the value > to this formula. We show that 
does also take the value > in any of these models.
We assume the contrary. Let I be a model for '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
and I() 6= >.
Further, let J v I be a v-minimal model for '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
. By Proposition 2.2
we have J() v I(). Since J is a preferred model for '
1
^ : : :^'
n
we have that
'
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
6 ^ : { a contradiction.
Thus  takes the value > in every model of '
1
^: : :^'
n
. Hence '
1
^: : :^'
n
!
 satises NC. r
The Paraconsistent Deduction Property assumes that the set of formulas by
which  ^ : is entailed to be nite. Compared to the Normalised or Weak
Deduction Theorem this might be a disadvantage. We shall see that in the back-
ground of the paraconsistent compactness property (Section 2.3) the limitation
to nite antecedents in the above theorem is not crucial.
2.2.3 Existence of a Preferred Model
The main dierence between our logic and Kleene's strong three-valued logic is
the way the consequence relation is dened. Instead of taking all models into
account we consider only those models which are preferred. The theory of pre-
ferred models makes only sense if the preference relation @ is well-founded, that
is, only if we can guarantee that if X has a model, then it has a preferred model.
Theorem 2.4 (Preferred-Model Existence Theorem, [Priest 1991]). Every
X  L has a preferred model.
Proof. Let I
0
jX . We have to show that there is some J v I such that J j

X .
Consider the chain
I
0
A I
1
A I
2
A : : :
We shall show that this chain has a lower bound. It then follows by Zorn's
Lemma that there is a minimal element J such that J @ I
i
.
By Proposition 2.5 we can assume that X is in clausal normal form. Dene
Inc=
def
fA j I
i
(A) = >, for every I
i
of the above chain.g:
In subsequent step, we extract those formulas from X which do not contain a
literal which takes the value > in every model of the above chain, i.e.
X
0
=
def
f 2 X j ATOM() \ Inc = ?g:
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It follows that there is a model I
n
of the above chain such that I
n
j for every
 2 X
0
. Hence, every nite subset X
n
of X
0
has a classical two-valued model
and by the classical compactness theorem, X
0
has a two-valued model H .
We can now dene a K
3
-interpretation J with
J(A)=
def
(
> if A 2 Inc
H(A) otherwise
J is a lower bound of the above chain. It remains to show that J jX . Let
 2 X ; if  2 X
0
then H() = t. Moreover, for A 2 ATOM() we have
H(A) 6= > and therefore, J(A) 6= >. Hence, J() = t and J j. If  2 X nX
0
there is A 2 ATOM() such that A 2 Inc. Thus, J(A) = >. It follows that
J() 2 ft;>g. Hence, J j. r
Theorem 2.4 shows that the relation @ is indeed well-founded. The following
lemmas will be very useful:
Lemma 2.1. Let I j

X and I j then I j

X [ fg.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that I is not a preferred model of X[fg. Hence,
by Theorem 2.4 there is some J @ I such that J j

X [ fg. But then J jX
and since J @ I , I cannot be preferred { a contradiction. r
Lemma 2.2. Let X  Y and I j

X. Then, for every J j

Y we have J 6@ I.
Proof. Assume that there is J j

Y and J @ I . Since X  Y we have J j

X and
I cannot be a preferred model of X . r
Let me close this section with the remark that even though every set has a
preferred model, there could be innitely descending chains I
0
A I
1
A I
2
A : : : .
For example, let  be innite and X = ?. Consider I
0
such that I
0
(A) = >,
for every A 2 . Then there is an innite chain of models of X such that
I
0
A I
1
A I
2
A : : : .
2.2.4 Systems of Cumulative Reasoning
Nonmonotonic logics are, by name, characterised by a property which they do
not have, namely monotonicity. Even though the lack of monotonicity might be
the most discriminating attribute when being compared to many other logics, it
is quite pessimistic to categorise logics solely by means of missing properties. It
turned out this class of logics can in fact be described by a number of positive
properties. The seminal paper in this eld is [Kraus et al., 1990] who compiled
several classes of properties which are called `systems'.
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The System C and P. We shall relate K
3
to the system C of cumulative
inference as well as to system P of preferential reasoning. Both systems are
characterised by a set of Gentzen-style inference rules and axioms. C is the basic
system. Let j be the meta-symbol separating the antecedent and the succedent
of a sequent. In the case of nonmonotonic logic we wish to read j as if : : : , then
normally : : : . The system C is dened by the following axioms and rules:
System C
7
 j Reexivity
j$   j	
 j	
Left logical equivalence
j!  	 j
	 j
Right weakening
;  j	  j
 j	
Cutty
 j  j	
;  j	
Cumulativity
Reexivity, which is formulated as an axiom, is equivalent to the inclusion
property. That is, an entailment relation is reexive if and only if the correspond-
ing consequence operator is inclusive. Theorem 2.1 states that Cn
3
is inclusive,
hence  is reexive.
7
There are some notational dierences to Kraus, Lehman and Magidor's original
version. For example, Left Logical Equivalence is noted as:
j= $   j	
 j	
where j= denotes the classical satisability relation. However, by Proposition 2.4 we
know that j=  $  is equivalent to ? $  and thus, if we take j to mean
 , we see that both versions are identical. The same argument applies to Right
Weakening. Cumulativity is originally called `Cautious Monotonicity'. The `Cutty'
is originally called Cut in [Kraus et al., 1990]. This rule is, however, much weaker
than Gentzen's Cut rule, which will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4. To avoid
confusion I use Cut for Gentzen's Cut and Cutty for Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor's
Cut.
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Theorem 2.5. The entailment relation  has the following properties:
1. Cumulativity
2. Left logical equivalence
3. Cutty
Proof.
Ad (1) Cumulativity: We have to show that
f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g  and f
1
; : : : 
n
g 	 implies f
1
; : : : ; 
n
; g	:
Let X = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g. Since X we know that every preferred model
I of X is a model of  . Denote the set of all preferred models of X [ fg
by I. By I  fI j I j

Xg we have that 	 is valid in every I 2 I. Hence,
X [ fg	 .
Ad (2) Left logical equivalence: Let  $  be a K
3
-tautology. It follows that 
and  are semantically equivalent, i.e. I j if and only if I j , for every
I . We rst show that this implies
I j

 , I j

; for every I (*)
Assume to the contrary that (*) does not hold. Without loss of generality
we restrict ourselves to the case that there is an I such that I j

 but I j6

.
Since I j6

 we know that there must be an I
0
@ I such that I
0
j. Further,
from I j

 we can conclude that I
0
j6 . This contradicts the condition that
 and  are semantically equivalent.
By (*) we can conclude that
I j

X [ fg , I j

X [ fg; for every I:
That is, the sets X [ fg and X [ fg have the same preferred models.
Thus, they have the same consequences 	 .
Ad (3) Cutty: Let X = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g. We have to show that if X [ f; g	
and X [ fg , then X [ fg	 . From X [ fg we can conclude
that,
I jX [ fg , I j

X [ f; g; for every I
That is, X [ fg and X [ f; g have the same preferred models. Thus,
X [ fg	 .
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r
NB The above proof mentions only nite sets X . This is because Gentzen con-
sidered only nite sets. The proof, however, does not make use of the assumption
that X is nite. It works without modication for innite sets X .
Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 2.1 show that four of the ve properties by which
C is characterised do also hold for K
3
. The last one, Right Weakening
8
, does not
hold and thus K
3
and system C are dierent.
To see that Right Weakening is invalid consider  = A ^ (A ! B). Clearly,
! B is a K
3
-tautology, hence
?! B
Moreover, with 	 = A ^ :A ^ (A! B) we have
	
But we do not have 	 B.
The failure of Right Weakening is an immediate consequence of K
3
's non-
monotonic behaviour and is strongly related to the issue of the normalisation
condition which lead to the invalidity of the deduction theorem.
Remark 2.2. The logic K
3
is dierent from the system C.
How crucial is the failure of Right Weakening? According to Kraus, Lehmann
and Magidor (henceforth denoted by KLM), System C is the rockbottom with-
out which a system should not be considered a logical system. I do not share
this point of view for two reasons. First, KLM consider their system to be the
weakest possible. Gabbay (cf.[Gabbay, 1985]) on the other hand proposes only
three conditions to be essential: reexivity, cutty and cumulativity. Hence, there
is a reasonable, weaker system than C. The second reason is that there is a
version of Right Weakening, called Normalised Right Weakening, which is valid
for K
3
:
j! 
y
	 j
(Normalised Right Weakening)
	 j
The y means: provided that !  satises the Normalisation Condition.
8
Please do not confuse Right Weakening with Right Thinning (to be discussed in
Chapter 4) which is a valid rule of inference for K
3
.
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Proposition 2.10. Normalised Right Weakening is a valid rule of inference for
K
3
Proof. From 	 j we can conclude that  takes designated truth-value in every
preferred model of 	 . Moreover, since  !  is a tautology which satises NC
we know that  takes a designated value whenever  does. Hence,  takes a
designated value in every preferred model of 	 . Therefore, 	 j . r
Replacing Right Weakening by Normalised Right Weakening yields a system
which can be regarded as a normalised version of System C. Apparently, K
3
has
all properties of this normalised version. As said before this system of cumulative
inference is considered to be a very basic one. Beside the system C Kraus,
Lehmann and Magidor dened system P which is nothing other than system C
plus the following rule
 j	  j	
(CA)
 _  j	
System P of preferential reasoning is strictly stronger than C and it assumes
obviously the existence of disjunction in the language.
The following is easy to verify:
Observation 2.2. CA is a valid rule of inference in K
3
.
There are several important rules which are derivable in P and which rely
on the validity of Right Weakening. These derived rules are also valid in K
3
even though only Normalised Right Weakening holds in K
3
. This shows that
Normalised Right Weakening is not a critical restriction at all.
Proposition 2.11 (Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor). Let ; 	;  2 L.
1. In the presence of Reexivity, Right Weakening and Left Logical Equivalence,
the rule CA implies
 ^ 	 j
(S)
 j	 ! 
2. In the presence of Right Weakening,
 j	  j
 j	^
(AND) and S imply Cutty.
3. In the presence of Reexivity, Right Weakening and Left Logical Equivalence,
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(a) CA implies
 ^ :	 j  ^ 	 j
(D)
 j
(b) D implies CA in the presence of AND.
Proof. See [Kraus et al., 1990]. r
Proposition 2.12. The rules S and D are valid for K
3
.
Proof. The validity of S follows immediately from the weak deduction theorem
(Proposition 2.8).
To see that D is valid:
From
 ^ :	  and  ^ 	 
we can get by CA to
( ^ :	) _ ( ^ 	)
and thus
 ^ (	 _ :	)
and
:
r
However, not all derived rules of System C or P are valid in K
3
. For example,
Modus Ponens in the consequent is invalid in K
3
:
 j! 	  j
MPC
 j	
The proof of MPC requires AND and Right Weakening.
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Anyway, the above shows that many properties considered by KLM are valid
for K
3
, even though it should be emphasised that K
3
is certainly not the type
of nonmonotonic logic which KLM had in mind. They draw their attention to
the eld of Nonmonotonic Reasoning (cf.[Brewka, 1991], [Marek and Truszczyn-
ski,1993]. Anyway, logics obtained from dropping monotonicity can indeed be
treated systematically, whatever their original motivation might be (common-
sense or paraconsistency).
Congruence. Another interesting and important property of cumulative sys-
tems is congruence with respect to a monotonic operator. Roughly speaking,
the congruence property says that if the monotonic consequences of two sets are
identical, so are the nonmonotonic consequences. For the nonmonotonic logic K
3
it is natural to choose the following monotonic operator:
Cn
Bolz
(X)=
def
f j I jX implies I jg
It follows immediately that Cn
Bolz
is a closure operator, i.e. embedding,
monotone and idempotent. Note that Cn
Bolz
(X) = f j X 
Bolz
g, where 
Bolz
is the monotonic consequence based on Bolzano's notion of entailment. The fol-
lowing proposition is immediate:
Proposition 2.13. Cn
Bolz
(X)  Cn
3
(X).
Proof. Let  2 Cn
Bolz
(X). Hence MOD(X)  MOD(fg). To see that  2
Cn
3
(X) note that PMOD(X)  MOD(X)  MOD(fg). r
The congruence property can be stated as:
Cn
Bolz
(X) = Cn
Bolz
(Y ) implies Cn
3
(X) = Cn
3
(Y ):
This property plays an important role in theory of inference-frames (cf. [Dietrich,
1995]). I shall explain later why.
Proposition 2.14 (Congruence). Let Cn
Bolz
be the monotonic, three-valued
consequence operator (as dened above). Then for any set X;Y we have Cn
Bolz
(X) =
Cn
Bolz
(Y ) implies Cn
3
(X) = Cn
3
(Y ).
Proof. By Proposition 2.13 and Theorem 2.1 we know that for any set Z we
have Z  Cn
Bolz
(Z)  Cn
3
(Z). Since Cn
3
is cumulative we have Cn
3
(Z) 
Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(Z) [ Z) and since Cn
Bolz
is embedding we have
Cn
3
(Z)  Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(Z)):
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We show: Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(Z))  Cn
3
(Z). Assume to the contrary that there is
 2 Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(Z)) such that  62 Cn
3
(Z). Hence, there must be an I such
that I j

Z and I j6. However, I jCn
Bolz
(Z) and by Lemma 2.1 we know that
I j

Z [ Cn
Bolz
(Z), hence I j

Cn
Bolz
(Z). But then we have  62 Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(Z))
{ a contradiction.
It follows that for all sets Z we have
Cn
3
(Z) = Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(Z)): (O)
Since Cn
Bolz
(X) = Cn
Bolz
(Y ) we have Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(X)) = Cn
3
(Cn
Bolz
(Y )). It
follows from O that Cn
3
(X) = Cn
3
(Y ).
r
Remark 2.3. The classical consequence operatorCn
cl
and Cn
3
are not congruent.
Proposition 2.15. Cn
Bolz
is a deductive basis of Cn
3
, i.e.
1. for all X we have Cn
Bolz
(X)  Cn
3
(X)
2. for all X we have Cn
Bolz
(R(X)) = Cn
3
(X)
3. for all X;Y we have Cn
Bolz
(X) = Cn
Bolz
(Y ) implies Cn
3
(X) = Cn
3
(Y ).
Proof. Part 1 is by Proposition 2.13. For Part 2, note that since Cn
Bolz
is embed-
ding, we have Cn
3
(X)  Cn
Bolz
(R(X)). To see that Cn
Bolz
(R(X))  Cn
3
(X),
assume to the contrary that there is some  2 Cn
Bolz
(R(X)) such that  62
Cn
3
(X). By Proposition 2.13 we have
Cn
Bolz
(Y )  Cn
(
Y ); for all Y:
Hence,  2 Cn
3
(Cn
3
(X)) and  62 Cn
3
(X) which contradicts the fact that Cn
3
is idempotent.
Part 3 is by Proposition 2.14. r
Let me now explain why congruence is so important. Consider a monotonic
operator C such that there is no monotonic operator C
0
such that C(X) 
C
0
(X)  Cn
3
(X). That is, C can be seen as the largest monotonic operator
beyond Cn
3
. It is known that such a largest C must be congruent w.r.t. Cn
3
. An
interesting question is: which is the largest monotonic operator beyond Cn
3
? The
fact that Cn
3
is cumulative guarantees the existence of such a largest operator.
Moreover, the fact that Cn
Bolz
is congruent w.r.t. Cn
3
makes Cn
Bolz
a possible
candidate. However, it is an open question whether Cn
Bolz
is in fact the largest
monotonic operator beyond Cn
3
.
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Monotonic Behaviour. The discussion of the systems C and P shows that {
no matter for what problem our nonmonotonic logic might have been designed
for { there are core properties. Among these core properties cumulativity plays
a special role because it tells us something about the monotonic behaviour of
a nonmonotonic logic: if we add to X a formula  which is (nonmonotonically)
entailed by X , then Cn(X)  Cn(X [ fg), for some (nonmonotonic) operator
Cn.
We shall now give an additional condition to characterise Cn
3
's monotonic
aspects. It basically says that adding  to X does not cause any nonmonotonic
eects as long as  does not cause any new inconsistency.
Proposition 2.16. Let X be a set of formulas,  a formula such that  has
a two-valued model. If  does not take the value > in any preferred model of
Cn
3
(X [ fg), then Cn
3
(X)  Cn
3
(X [ fg).
Proof. It suces to show that
fI j I j

Xg  fI j I j

X [ fgg (*)
We show that there is no A 2  such that J(A) 2 ft; fg and I(A) = > for
any J j

X , I j

X [ fg. Since every arbitrary model of X [ fg is also a model
of X we get then (*).
Suppose such an A exists. Without loss of generality assume that A is unique
and that  is in CNF, i.e.  = D
1
^ : : : ^D
n
. Since  takes the value t in every
preferred model I of X [ fg we have that for every I there is L
i;0
such that
I(L
i;0
) = t, L
i;0
2 D
i
.
We can change A's truth-value from > to either t or f and the resulting
interpretation is still a model of X [ fg: Let J 2 MOD(X) such that
J(B) =
(
I(B) , if B 6= A for every B 2 
2 ft; fg , if B = A
The existence from such a J follows fromMOD(X)  MOD(X[fg). Clearly,
J @ I and J(L
i;0
) = I(L
i;0
), hence J() = t and thus J jX [ fg. Therefore I
cannot be a preferred model of X [ fg { a contradiction.
r
Proposition 2.16 says that the set of theorems grows, when we add informa-
tion which is consistent w.r.t. X (i.e. which does not force us to assign additional
sentences the value >). Or, the other way round: the set of theorems might de-
crease if we add information which produces a new inconsistency.
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2.3 Compactness
The next stop on our tour of algebraical properties is compactness. The com-
pactness theorem for classical logic is, beside the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem,
one of the rst fundamental theorems in model theory. It allows us to reduce
questions about innite sets of formulas to questions about nite sets of formu-
las. Here is what it says (the term `classical' means `classical propositional logic'
or `classical rst-order logic'):
1. If  is classically entailed by X then there is a nite subset of X which
entails .
2. A possibly innite set X has a classical model if and only if every nite
subset of X has a classical model.
The second item is also called `niteness' or `compactness of satisability'.
In classical logic, the compactness of Cn
cl
is proved by showing that if every
nite subset X
n
of X has a model, then X has a model. Thus, compactness is
proved by reduction to niteness, or compactness of satisability. However, every
set X has a (preferred) K
3
-model (at least one which assigns every variable the
value >). Now the question is: is every formula entailed by a set X also entailed
by a nite subset of X?
2.3.1 Compactness of Monotonic K
3
Let us rst consider the monotonic version of K
3
which is built upon Bolzano's
notion of entailment. Recall the denition of Cn
Bolz
,
Cn
Bolz
(X)=
def
f j I jX implies I jg:
Proposition 2.17 (Falsity Finiteness). Let X be a set of formulas,  a for-
mula. If every nite subset X
i
of X has a model in which  takes the value f
then X has a model in which  takes the value f .
Proof. Let M(n) be the proposition `every nite subset of X has a model in
which the variables A
1
; : : : ; A
n
take the value I(A
1
); : : : ; I(A
n
)'.
LetA
1
; : : : ; A
k
be the set of all variables occurring in  and let I(A
1
); : : : ; I(A
k
)
be an assignment such that I() = f . By the prerequisite we have M(k). Now
suppose, M(n), n > k holds. Consider A
n+1
and let I(A
n+1
) = >. We have to
show M(n+ 1).
Suppose there is a nite set X
n
which has no model in which the variables
A
1
; : : : ; A
n+1
take the value I(A
1
); : : : ; I(A
n
);>. Because of M(n) and the fact
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that every set X has a K
3
-model, we know that there must be a model of X
n
in
which A
1
; : : : ; A
n+1
take the value I(A
1
); : : : ; I(A
n
); t or I(A
1
); : : : ; I(A
n
); f .
But then there must also a model in which A
1
; : : : ; A
n+1
take the values I(A
1
);
: : : ; I(A
n
);>.
r
Theorem 2.6 (Compactness of Monotonic K
3
). Cn
Bolz
is compact.
Proof. Suppose there is some  such that  2 Cn
Bolz
(X) but for every nite
X
n
 X we have  62 Cn
Bolz
(X). Then every X
n
has a model I such that
I() = f . By Proposition 2.17 we have that X has a model in which  takes the
value f . Hence,  62 Cn
Bolz
(X) { a contradiction. r
Remark 2.4. Note, that it is possible to strengthen Falsity Finiteness as follows:
If every nite X
n
 X has a preferred model in which  takes the value f ,
then X has a model in which  takes the value f (Restricted Preferred Falsity
Finiteness).
We shall see in the next section that it is not possible to guarantee: if every
nite X
n
 X has a preferred model in which  takes the value f , then X has
a preferred model in which X takes the value f .
2.3.2 Paraconsistent Compactness
Even though every set X has a K
3
-model, it is not the case that if X then
X
n
, for some nite X
n
 X . As a counter-example consider

n
=
n
^
i=0
(A
i
^ :A
i+1
) ^ (:A
0
_ A
n+1
) ^ (:A
0
_ B)
Now let
X = f
n
j n  !g
The innite set X has a unique preferred model I with
I(A
0
) = t
I(A
i
) = > for all 0 < i  !
I(B) = t
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Hence, we haveXB. However, we have thatX
n
6B for every niteX
n

X . To see this, consider an arbitrary X
n
and let N = maxfi j 
i
2 X
n
g. Then
X
n
has the following preferred models:
I
1
(A
0
) = t I
2
(A
0
) = > I
3
(A
0
) = >
I
1
(A
i
) = > 0 < i  N I
2
(A
i
) = > 0 < i  N I
3
(A
i
) = > 0 < i  N
I
1
(A
N+1
= > I
2
(A
N+1
) = t I
3
(A
N+1
) = t
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = f I
3
(B) = t
Since I
2
(B) = f we have X
n
6B for every nite X
n
 X .
Theorem 2.7. Cn
3
is not compact.
There is, however, a weak version of the compactness theorem: for any for-
mula  we have that if X ^ : then there is a nite X
n
 X such that
X
n
 ^ :. In order to prove this we show a variant of niteness called
consistency-niteness: if for every nite X
n
 X there is a preferred model
I
X
fin
such that I
X
fin
() 2 ft; fg, then there is a preferred model I of X such
that I() 2 ft; fg.
Lemma 2.3. Let X be a set of formulas, , a formula. If for every nite X
n

X there is a preferred model I such that I() 2 ft; fg, then there is a preferred
model J of X such that J() 2 ft; fg.
Proof. By Konig's Lemma there is a model H of X such that H() 2 ft; fg. By
the preferred model existence theorem (Theorem 2.4) we know that there is a
preferred model J of X such that J v H . It follows from Proposition 2.2 that
J() 2 ft; fg. r
Theorem 2.8 (Paraconsistent Compactness). If X^: then there is
a nite X
n
 X such that X
n
 ^ :.
Proof. Suppose there is no suchX
n
, i.e. for everyX
n
there is a preferred model
I such that I() 6= >. Hence I() 2 ft; fg. It follows from Lemma 2.3 that 
takes a value from ft; fg in some preferred model of X and thus X 6 { a
contradiction. r
2.3.3 Weak Compactness
[Dietrich, 1995] introduced another version of compactness called weak com-
pactness. Weak compactness requires the existence of an idempotent, monotonic
operator Cn such that for everyX we haveCn(X)  Cn
3
(X) (supradeductivity).
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Again let,
Cn
Bolz
(X)=
def
f j I jX implies I jg
We mentioned earlier that Cn
Bolz
is a closure operator (i.e. embedding, idem-
potent and monotone). Moreover we have Cn
Bolz
(X)  Cn
3
(X).
The operator Cn
3
is said to be weak compact if and only if
 2 Cn
3
(X), ex. nite X
n
 Cn
Bolz
(X) such that  2 Cn
3
(X
n
):
It is known that there are logical systems (e.g. minimal reasoning in two-
valued propositional logic) whose consequence operators satisfy weak compact-
ness. On the other side, minimal reasoning in two-valued rst-order logic does not
satisfy weak compactness (cf. [Herre, 1995]). See [Dietrich, 1995] for a detailed
discussion on weak compactness of nonmonotonic logics.
The following equivalence relation is taken from [Dietrich, 1995]: Let 
n
be a
nite subset of . Dene the following relation '

n
 II between three-valued
interpretation functions:
I
1
'

n
I
2
if and only if I
1
=
n
= I
2
=
n
where I
i
=
n
denotes the restriction of I
i
to 
n
.
The relation '

n
is an equivalence relation. Denote the corresponding equiv-
alence classes by [I ]

n
. For every I
0
 I dene I
0

n
=
def
f[I ]

n
j I 2 I
0
g.
Lemma 2.4. Let X be a set of formulas, 
n
  a nite set of variables. There
is a formula 
X

n
2 Cn
Bolz
(X) such that
[
MOD(X)

n
= MOD(f
X

n
g)
Proof. Since 
n
is nite, there are only nitely many interpretation functions
I
1
; : : : ; I
m
: 
n
! ft; f;>g such that I
i
2 [J ]

n
, for some K
3
-model J of X .
Dene

X

n
=
def
m
_
j=1
n
^
i=1

i
where 
i
=
def
8
>
<
>
:
A
i
if I
j
(A
i
) = t
:A
i
if I
j
(A
i
) = f
A
i
^ :A
i
if I
j
(A
i
) = >
Obviously, if H 2
S
MOD(X)

n
then H j
X

n
. For the converse, suppose
that H j
X

n
. By the above construction 
X

n
has the form 
1
_ : : :_
m
where
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each 
j

V
n
i=1
'
i
. Because of H j
X

n
, there must be 
i
such that H j
i
.
Hence,
H j'
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
:
Each '
i
has one of the following forms:
'
i
 A
i
where A
i
2 
n
'
i
 :A
i
where A
i
2 
n
'
i
 A
i
^ :A
i
where A
i
2 
n
If '
i
 A
i
^ :A
i
we know that the model I
j
by which '
i
is obtained in the
above construction assigns I
j
(A
i
) = >. Since H j'
i
we conclude H(A
i
) = >.
Now, if ' has either the form A
i
or :A
i
we know that I
j
(A
i
) = t or I
j
(A
i
) =
f respectively. There are several possibilities how H can behave: H(A
i
) = t
(H(A
i
) = f , resp.) or H(A
i
) = >. In the rst case we are done because H
coincides with I on A
i
. In the second case it is easy to see that if there is some
I
j
such that I
j
(A
i
) = t (I
j
(A
i
) = f , resp.) then there must be a K
3
-model
J
k
2
S
MOD(X)

n
such that
J
k
(B) =
8
>
<
>
:
I
j
(B) if B 6= A
i
; B 2 
n
> if B = A
i
; B 2 
n
> otherwise
For every 	 we have that if I
j
j	 then J
k
j	 (this can shown by a simple
structural induction on 	).
It follows that there must be a model J in fI
1
; : : : ; I
m
g such that H 2 [J ]

n
and hence, H 2
S
MOD(X)

n
.
r
Theorem 2.9 (Restricted Weak Compactness). Let MOD(X) be nite. If
 2 Cn
3
(X) then there is some X
n
 Cn
Bolz
(X) such that  2 Cn
3
(X
n
).
Proof. Let  be a signature. We rst show that there is some n such that for
every J j


X

n
there is some I j

X with J '

n
I , where 
n
is a nite subset of
 with cardinality n.
Let 
k
  be of cardinality k, k 2 IN such that 
k
contains all atomic
formulas appearing in . By Lemma 2.4 we have for any preferred model I of
X :
I=
k
6@ J=
k
; for all J j


X

k
:
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Now suppose that there is some preferred model of 
X

k
which cannot be ex-
tended to a preferred model ofX . Then there must be a variableB,
k+1
=
def

k
[
fBg such that some preferred model K of 
X

k
cannot be extended to a preferred
model of 
X

k+1
, i.e.
K=
k
6= H=
k
; for every H j


X

k+1
:
In this case we exclude all models of X which coincide with K on 
k
.
Next, we have to check whether there is some H j


X

k+1
which cannot be
extended to a preferred model of X . By extending 
k+1
as in the above case we
can rule out those preferred models H of 
X

k+1
with
H=
k+1
6= I=
k+1
:
SinceMOD(X) is nite, we end up with some set 
n
such that for every preferred
model J of 
X

n
there is some I j

X such that
J '

n
I:
Then,  2 Cn
3
(f
X

n
g): for assume that there is a preferred model of J of

X

n
which does not satisfy . Since 
n
contains all variables appearing in ,
there must a preferred model of X which does not satisfy  { a contradiction. r
This completes our discussion on Cn
3
's mathematical properties for a while.
We have seen that the paraconsistent entailment operator Cn
3
retains many
classical algebraical properties: it is a cumulative, preclosure operator, for which
several weaker versions of compactness hold. This is a plus. But not every clas-
sical positive hallmark can be preserved: the deduction theorem is not valid for
K
3
indicating that the concept of entailment has no proper equivalent in the
object language. This can be seen as an immediate consequence of choosing the
implication to be material; an intensional connective might x this problem but,
on the other hand, would take us too far away from classical logic and might
render other diculties.
2.4 Computational Complexity
How complex is reasoning in K
3
? For classical propositional logic, the entailment
problem is known to be coNP-complete (cf.[Garey and Johnson, 1979]). We shall
see that for the question of computing a preferred model of some set X , it
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depends on the type of reducibility notion whether K
3
is more dicult than
classical logic. As for deciding the set of consequences, we can determine with
help of a non-deterministic, polynomial time bounded Turing machine which has
an NP oracle, whether  62 Cn
3
(X) holds.
The satisability problem (SAT) for classical propositional logic was the rst
problem which was shown to be NP-complete. We shall now investigate the
computational complexity of deciding  2 Cn
3
(X). Like in the classical case we
try to nd a preferred model of X in which  takes the value f . A preferred
model minimises the set of literals taking the value >. If we compare SAT with
a problem like Hamiltonian Path, then nding a preferred model is comparable
to the problem of nding a shortest Hamiltonian Path. Typically, these so-called
optimisation problems are more complex.
Consider the following problem:
PROBLEM: k-Preferred SAT
Instance A set X  L, k 2 IN .
Question Is there a K
3
-model for X in which at most k atomic formulas
take the value >?
Proposition 2.18. k-Preferred SAT is NP-complete.
Proof. For membership in NP note that we can nondeterministically guess a K
3
interpretation I and then verify in polynomial time whether I is a K
3
-model of
X and whether at most k variables take the value >. To show hardness, it is
easy to see that it has SAT (which is NP-complete) as an instance by setting
k = 0. r
We can now show how dicult it is to compute a preferred model of X .
Proposition 2.19. Computing a preferred model I of X can be done in LINTIME
NP[O(log n)]
,
where n is the number of atomic subformulas occurring in the formulas of X.
Proof. We can use k-Preferred SAT as an NP-oracle for testing whether X has
a preferred model with at most k variables set to >. By using binary search we
can nd a minimal k
min
. This requires at most dlog ne queries to the oracle. r
The following results give a lower bound for the complexity of the decision
problem  2 Cn
3
(X).
Proposition 2.20. Deciding Cn
3
(X) is coNP-hard, for nite X.
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Proof. By reduction to 2-Valued-Tautology (2-VT). The problem of 2-VT is:
does  belong to Cn
cl
(?). Clearly, this holds, if : 62 SAT. Since SAT is NP-
complete, 2-VT is coNP-complete. Obviously,  2 2-VT,  2 Cn
3
(?). r
Proposition 2.21. Deciding Cn
3
(X) is NP-hard.
Proof. By reduction to SAT. Suppose we are given a SAT instance, i.e. a set
X = fC
1
; : : : ; C
n
g of clauses
9
. For each clause C
i
= L
1
_ : : : _ L
n
2 X we
construct two clauses:
C
1
i
= L
1
_ : : : _ L
n
_A
C
2
i
= L
1
_ : : : _ L
n
_ :A
where A is a variable not appearing in any clause of X . Dene
Y = fC
1
1
; C
2
1
; : : : ; C
1
n
; C
2
n
g:
Clearly, A takes the value > in some preferred model of Y if and only if X has
no two-valued model. Consider the set Y
0
= Y [ fA _ B;:A _ Bg, where B is
again a fresh variable. We have B 2 Cn
3
(Y
0
) if and only if A does not take the
value > in any preferred model of Y . Hence, B 2 Cn
3
(Y
0
) if and only if X has a
two-valued model. Moreover, Y
0
can be generated from X in polynomial time.
r
We can tighten the above result a little bit. The complexity classes NP and
coNP are contained in a class called DP which was introduced in [Papadimitriou
and Yannakakis,1984] and is dened as follows:
Denition 2.4 (DP). A language L is in the class DP if and only if there are
two languages L
1
2 NP and L
2
2 coNP such that L = L
1
\ L
2
.
Languages in DP can be thought of as being accepted by an oracle TM M
which puts one query to an NP-oracle and another query to a coNP-oracle (cf.
[Papadimitriou, 1994]).
The following problem is known to be DP-complete:
PROBLEM: Critical SAT
Instance A set X  L of clauses
9
A clause C
i
is a set of literals. A clause is satised by an interpretation I if at least
one literal occurring in C
i
is satised.
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Question Is X inconsistent and does the deletion of any clause of X
yield a consistent set?
Proposition 2.22. Cn
3
is DP-hard.
Proof. By reduction to Critical SAT. Suppose we are given X . Let  =
V
'
i
,
'
i
2 X be the conjunction of all clauses appearing in X . We have that X is
inconsistent if and only if  ^ : 2 Cn
3
(X).
Now suppose that fA
1
; : : : ; A
n
g is the set of all atomic formulas appearing
in . Construct in polynomial time a new set Z which is identical to X n fCg,
for some C 2 X . Replace every occurrence of A
i
in the formulas of X by C
i
. In
a subsequent step construct analogous to the proof of Proposition 2.21 a set Y
0
such that
B 2 Cn
3
(Y
0
), Z is consistent.
It follows that we have
( ^ :) ^ B 2 Cn
3
(X [ Y
0
)
if and only if X is a member of Critical SAT. r
The next proposition gives an upper bound for the complexity of Cn
3
.
Proposition 2.23. We can use a polynomial time bounded nondeterministic
TM with an NP oracle to decide  2 Cn
3
(X). Moreover, at most jX j NP oracle
calls must be made.
Proof. In a rst step we guess an assignment I to all the variables appearing in
X [ fg. We can verify in polynomial time whether I satises X and whether
I() = f . We shall now describe how to verify with an NP oracle whether I is
a preferred model of X .
Let Inc(I)=
def
fA j I(A) = > and A is atomic g. If we can assure that there
is no model J of X such that Inc(J)  Inc(I), we can conclude that I is a
preferred model. Consider the following
PROBLEM: Preferred Subset
Instance A set X  L, a set 
0
 .
Question Is there a K
3
-model I for X such that Inc(I) = 
0
?
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It is easy to see that Preferred Subset is NP-complete.
Suppose we have guessed I . Let k = jInc(I)j. There are k subsets of cardi-
nality k   1; denote them by 
1
; : : : ; 
k
. We call the Preferred Subset oracle k
times with parameters X and 
i
. If any of these oracle calls succeeds, we know
that there is a model J of X such that Inc(J)  Inc(I). Therefore, I cannot be
preferred.
Hence, k oracle calls sucient to verify that I is a preferred model of X .
Clearly, our machine accepts if and only if  62 Cn
3
(X). r
Note that if we use Turing-reducibility instead of m-reducibility then com-
puting a preferred K
3
-model is not more dicult than nding a two-valuedmodel
of X .
Summarising, we can say that reasoning in K
3
is very dicult: we need a
nondeterministic machineM with an NP oracle to decide  2 Cn
3
(X). At most
a polynomial number ofNP oracle calls are necessary to decide Cn
3
(X). We shall
see later that this class is located within the second level of the polynomial time
hierarchy (cf. Section 2.6.2). There are many other natural problems which are
of similar complexity, i.e. which are also located in the second level of the polyno-
mial time hierarchy(PH). The second level contains several Travelling Salesman
optimisation problems like, for example, the Master Tour property. But also the
following problem from boolean logic is contained in the second level: given a
propositional formula  in Disjunctive Normal Form and an integer n. Is there
a semantically equivalent formula 
CNF
in CNF which has at most n clauses?
As a last example consider the problem of determining whether a given Default
Theory has an extension. This problem, Default SAT, is also located within the
second level of PH (cf.[Papadimitriou and Yannakakis, 1992]).
2.5 Extracting Consistent Information
This section is a small excursion investigating an interesting property of Cn
3
which appears when we consider sets of clauses. In the eld of Logic Program-
ming one restricts the general question `Is  entailed by X?' to `Is the literal
L entailed by P ?' where P is a set of clauses, which is also very often called a
program.
We shall show that if the literal L is entailed by the program P , then L is
either entailed by a consistent subset P
0
of P (where `consistent' means that no
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element of P
0
takes the value > in a preferred model of P
10
), or fLg 2 P (i.e. L
is explicitly given).
Before going into details we show an important property of sets of clauses
(or, programs) P . Here is what it basically says: let P be a non-redundant set
of clauses (non-redundant means that no clause C of P is entailed by P n C);
further, let C = fL
1
; : : : ; L
n
g be a clause of P . Now, if C takes the value >
in some preferred model of P , then there must be a preferred model I
j
of P in
which L
j
is >, for every L
j
2 C.
In order to picture this, note that every clause C has a two-valued model.
This is because C is nothing but a disjunction of literals. Since only conjunctions
might cause contradictions, P must contain at least two clauses in order to
become contradictory. Consider the following program:
C
1
: L
1
C
2
: L
2
.
.
.
C
n
: L
n
C
n+1
: :L
1
_ :L
2
_ : : : _ :L
n
Clearly, C
n+1
is inconsistent with fC
1
; : : : ; C
n
g. Since we are unable to x a sin-
gle literal which causes the inconsistency, we have several alternatives resulting
in n dierent preferred models for P . Hence there is a preferred model I
1
such
that I
1
(L
1
) = >, another one for which we have I
2
(L
2
) = > and so on.
Let us put this observation in more formal style:
Lemma 2.5. Let P be a non-redundant set of clauses, C 2 P a clause with
I(L
n
) = > for some L
n
2 C, I j

P . Then, for every L
i
2 C there is some
preferred model I
0
of P such that I
0
(L
i
) = >.
Proof. Let C = fL
1
; : : : ; L
n
g and I(L
n
) = > for some preferred model I of P .
Since I is a preferred model and P is nonredundant, we know that there is a
minimal inconsistent subset P
0
 P such that C 2 P
0
.
Assume to the contrary that there is L
1
2 C which does not receive the value
> in any preferred model of P . Hence, the set
P
00
:= P
0
n fCg [ L
1
10
In Chapter 4 we shall use the notion of strongly relatively consistency to denote that
no element of P
0
takes the value > in any preferred model of P . Since no confusion
can arise at the moment, we wish to use the simpler term `consistent', though.
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has a two-valued model. But L
1
C and since P
00
is consistent there must be a
two-valued model of P
00
[C. From P
0
 P
00
[C we conclude that P
0
must have
a two-valued model { a contradiction. r
Now let us come back to our original goal to show that if L 2 Cn
3
(P ) then
L is entailed by a consistent subset (in the above sense) of P , or fLg 2 P .
The basic observation is that if we are given a set P of clauses then we can
transform P to a set P
T
such that
L 2 Cn
3
(P ) implies L 2 Cn
3
(P
T
) or L 2 P: ()
P
T
is obtained from P by deleting each clause C
i
which contains a literal
L
j
such that I(L
j
) = >, for some preferred model I of P . For example, if P
consists of the following clauses
C
0
: D
C
1
: A
C
2
: :A
C
3
: A _ B _ C
then we delete C
1
; C
2
; C
3
. The following theorem states that deletion does not
aect the entailment of literals, i.e. it proves that () holds.
Theorem 2.10. Let P be a set of clauses, P
T
 P obtained from P as noted
above. Then, L 2 Cn
3
(P ) implies L 2 Cn
3
(P
T
) or L 2 P .
Proof. Assume to the contrary L 62 P and that for every P
0
 P with P
0
L
there is some clause which contains a literal taking the value > in some preferred
model of P . Without loss of generality suppose that P
0
is nonredundant, i.e. for
every C 2 P
0
we have P n fCg 6C. From the set of all nonredundant P
0
select
a minimal set P
0
.
Let C = fL
1
; : : : ; L
n
; Lg 2 P
0
; since L 62 P we have n  1. From Lemma 2.5
and the minimality of P
0
we can conclude that for every L
i
2 C there is some
preferred model of P in which L
i
takes the value >. We shall show that there
is a preferred model of P in which L takes the value f which contradicts the
assumption that P L.
To see that there is a preferred model of P which satises :L but not L we
prove the following
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Lemma 2.6. If C = fL
1
; : : : ; L
n
; Lg is nonredundant w.r.t. P and
there is some preferred model I
1
of P such that I
1
jL
1
_ : : : _ L
n
then
there is some I
2
j

P with I
2
j6L.
Proof. For sake of clarity let n = 1. Assume to the contrary that there
is no such I
2
, i.e. for every preferred model I of P we have
I jL
1
) I jL (¶)
Since every preferred model of P satises C we have additionally:
I j6L
1
) I jL (·)
Since C is nonredundant we have that P 6L
1
and hence, there a pre-
ferred model of P which satises L
1
and another one which does not
satisfy L
1
. From this and ¶ and · it follows that L
2
is satised in every
preferred model of P n fCg. Hence, P n fCgL
1
_ L { a contradiction.
r
By the above lemma there must be a preferred model of P in which L takes
the value f . Hence L is not entailed by P and thus, L cannot be entailed by
a set P
0
which contains a clause having a literal L which becomes > under a
preferred assignment. r
Corollary 2.1. Let P be a set of clauses, L 2 Cn
3
(P ) a literal. There is some
P
0
 P such that
1. P
0
has a two-valued model.
2. L 2 Cn
3
(P
0
) (and hence, L 2 Cn
cl
(P
0
))
Proof. Note that the set P
T
has a two-valued model. Thus, let P
0
= P
T
or
P
0
= fLg. r
Theorem 2.10 tells us that the transformation is complete. The following
theorem ensures the soundness of the transformation.
Theorem 2.11. Let P be a set of clauses, P
T
the transformation as described
above. If L 2 Cn
3
(P
T
) then L 2 Cn
3
(P ).
Proof. Since no literal of any clause in P
T
takes the value > in some preferred
model of P
T
we have that no clause of P
T
takes the value > in such a model. It
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follows easily from the construction of P
T
that no formula of P
T
takes the value
> in some preferred model of P . Hence, by Proposition 2.16 Cn
3
(P
T
)  Cn
3
(P ).
r
The above theorem does not only tell us that the transformation is sound.
It also shows that any classical consequence of a subset P
0
of P which is not
involved in any contradiction (i.e. no literal in any clause of P
0
takes the value
> in some preferred model of P ) is also a K
3
-consequence of P
0
.
2.6 Philosophical Aspects
In the sequel I shall discuss properties which might be of interest from the
perspective of Philosophical Logic. The problem of contradicting information is
well-known in this eld and there is a number of dierent approaches:
Relevance Logics These logics are maybe the most famous paraconsistent logics.
The original motivation was to develop and study an implicational connec-
tive to capture the notion of logical causal relationship. These logics have
a property called variable sharing property which expresses the fact that if
 ! 	 is a tautology of a relevance logic, then  and 	 share some sential
variable, thus  and 	 are `connected' by this variable. We shall show that
a similar result holds for K
3
provided that 	 is not a tautology.
Rescher-Based Approaches Rescher dened a notion of paraconsistent consequence
which is based on reasoning about maximal consistent subsets. This idea
has been taken up by Brewka to account for problems in the eld of Default
Logic.
Belief Revision Even though not a bona de paraconsistent approach, many re-
vision operators base on some notion of consistent subsets. Belief revision
is a competitive approach to paraconsistency because it tries to re-establish
consistency.
This section is organised as follows: I shall rst relate Rescher's approach to
K
3
. To my impression, Rescher's approach was the most inuential one for AI.
Subsequently, I shall argue why retaining inconsistencies should be favoured to
the approach of maintaining consistency, as done by belief revision. I shall close
this section with some remarks on Relevance Logic.
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2.6.1 Rescher-Based Approaches
In order to deal with an inconsistent set X , [Rescher, 1964] considers the set
of all maximal consistent subsets of X . He denes two consequence operators
based on Cn
cl
: a sceptical one and a credulous one (also referred to as weak and
strong consequence).
Cred(X)=
def
[
Cn
cl
(X
0
i
) X
0
i
is a maximal consistent subset of X
Scep(X)=
def
\
Cn
cl
(X
0
i
) X
0
i
is a maximal consistent subset of X
Scep(X) is always consistent, whereas Cred(X) in general is not.
Both consequence operators have a big disadvantage: they are not inclusive.
Moreover Cred is not idempotent. To see that they are not inclusive, note that
A 62 Scep(fA;:Ag) and A^:A 62 Cred(fA^:Ag). As for idempotency we have
that A ^ B 2 Cred(fA;Bg) but not in Cred(fC ^ (C ! A);:C ^ (:C ! B)g).
Contrary to this we have
Proposition 2.24. Scep is idempotent.
Proof. Follows easily from the fact that the intersection of all sets closed under
a given relation R is also closed under R. r
There is a close relationship between the intersection of maximal consistent
subsets of a set P of clauses and the set P
T
as constructed in Section 2.5.
Proposition 2.25. Let P be a set of clauses. Then,
P
T

\
P
0
i
P
0
i
is a maximal consistent subset of P:
Proof. Assume that there is a clause C 2 P
T
such that C 62
T
P
0
i
. Hence, there
is a maximal consistent subset P
0
i
such that C 62 P
0
i
. Thus, P
0
i
[ fCg has no
two-valued model, but has a preferred three-valued model I such that I(L) = >,
for some L 2 C. Since P
0
i
[ fCg  P we have by Proposition 2.3 that there is a
preferred model J of X such that J(L) = >. Hence, C 62 P
T
{ a contradiction.
r
The following proposition relates Scep to Cn
3
provided that the set X con-
tains only literals.
Proposition 2.26. Let P be a set of clauses. Then Scep(P )  Cn
3
(P ).
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Proof. For any consistent X
0
i
we have by Proposition 2.4 Cn
3
(P
0
i
) = Cn
cl
(P
0
i
).
Since P
0
i
contains only literals this yields
S
Cn
cl
(P
0
i
)  Cn
3
(P ) and thus, by
denition of Scep we have Scep(P )  Cn
3
(P ). r
The above proposition does not hold for arbitrary X as the following coun-
terexample shows. Let X = fA;:A;A ! B;:A ! Bg. We have B 2 Scep(X)
but B 62 Cn
3
(X). The example shows a behaviour of Cn
3
which might not al-
ways be desired: X is in K
3
semantically equivalent to fA;:A;A _ :A ! Bg.
Since A _ :A is a tautology one might want to conclude B, because no matter
what A turns out to be in the end, true or false, B will be entailed.
This looks like a price we have to pay for having a straightforward entailment
relation. In my opinion the benets of our entailment relation make up for this
little drawback. If, however, one is interested in removing this tiny deciency,
here is a solution: take a given setX and construct Cn
3
(X). If ! 	 is a member
of Cn
3
(X) and  is a tautology, then add 	 to Cn
3
(X); call the resulting set Y .
Finally, apply Cn
3
to Y . This construction yields a new operator:
Cn
+
3
=
def
Cn
3
(Cn
3
(X) [ f	 j ! 	 2 Cn
3
(X) and  is a tautology. g)
The operator Cn
+
3
and Scep are in fact comparable:
Proposition 2.27. Let X be a set of formulas in implicational normal form
(inf). Then, Scep(X)  Cn
+
3
(X).
Proof. Let  2 Scep(X). We have to show that  2 Cn
+
3
(X). Let X
0
1
; X
0
2
: : : be
maximal consistent subsets ofX such thatX
0
i
` , for every i; ` is the provability
relation of classical logic. By compactness and the deduction theorem for classical
logic we have, that for every X
0
i
there is some nite subset f'
1
; : : : ; '
m
g such
that f'
i
1
; : : : ; '
i
m
g ` . Let 	
i
= '
i
1
^ : : : ^ '
i
m
. Hence, for every X
0
i
there is
some 	
i
such that 	
i
!  is a tautology.
We have for every n that
	
1
_ 	
2
_ : : : _ 	
n
! 
is a tautology. We consider now two cases.
Case 1 	
1
 	
2
 : : :  	
n
for all n. Thus, for every maximal consistent subset
X
0
i
it holds that  is entailed by the same set Y  X
0
i
. In other words, there
is some Y 
T
n
i=1
X
0
i
such that Y K
3
-entails . Clearly, no element from Y
takes the value > in some preferred model of X , hence  2 Cn
3
(X [ Y ) =
Cn
3
(X).
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Case 2 
j
6 
n
for some n; j. In this case we have that there are two max.
consistent sets X
0
j
, X
0
n
such that there is no Y  X
0
j
\ X
0
n
with Y K
3
-
entails . Hence 
j
and 
n
must be contradictory. But then the disjunction

j
_ 
n
must be a tautology. Since (
j
_ 
n
) !  2 Cn
3
(X) we have that
 2 Cn
+
3
(X).
r
Let me stress again that although Cn
+
3
allows us to relate an extension of
K
3
to Rescher's Scep, I do not consider Cn
+
3
as an alternative to Cn
3
because
it is a strange mixture of a semantical and a syntactical consequence relation
(remember that we added formulas to Cn
3
(X) only because of their syntactical
structure). Anyway, I think that Cn
+
3
is a good device to compare our approach
with Rescher's.
As for a comparison with Cred, Cn
3
could be more credulous than Cred.
Consider for example the set X = fA;:Ag. We have A ^ :A 2 Cn
3
(X) but
A^:A 62 Cred(X) (which is admittedly somewhat obscure and shows a limit of
Rescher's approach). Thus, we have in general that
Cn
3
(X) 6 Cred(X):
To see that both operators are incomparable, it suces to note that B 62
Cn
3
(fA;:A;A! Bg) but B 2 Cred(fA;:A;A! Bg), hence
Cred(X) 6 Cn
3
(X):
There is, however, a way to relate Cn
3
and Cred on the level of clauses:
Proposition 2.28. Let P be a set of clauses, L a literal. Then the following
holds, L 2 Cn
3
(P ) implies L 2 Cred(P ).
Proof. Since L is a literal, it is consistent. Because P is a set of clauses we have
by Corollary 2.1 that L is already K
3
-entailed by some consistent subset P
0
of P
(i.e. P
0
has a two-valued model). Hence, L 2 Cn
cl
(P
0
) and thus, L 2 Cred(P ). r
The above discussion shows that paraconsistent reasoning by applying Cn
cl
to some consistent subsets is severely limited. We do not only lose important
aspects of any inference operation, namely inclusion and idempotency, but also
inference rules like `if X entails A and B, then X entails A ^ B' are orphaned.
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2.6.2 Belief Revision
In the beginning of this chapter we stated that, in general we have two possibili-
ties when an inconsistency has been detected: we can live with the inconsistency
or we can try to get rid of it. We argued in an informal manner that getting
rid of the inconsistent information is a very complex process. This is because
whenever it occurs that we have ;: 2 Cn(X), for some  and some Cn, then
it is quite dicult to nd out what has caused the inconsistency.
The problem of belief revision (or knowledge-base revision) is to change X to
X
0
in a minimal way such that X
0
no longer entails . The minimality condition
means that there is no set X
00
such that X
0
 X
00
 X where X
00
does not entail
.
Such revision operations can be used to perform a naive form of conditional
reasoning by applying the so-called Ramsey test for conditionals:
Ramsey test: Accept a conditional sentence of the form `If , then 	 '
in a belief state X if and only if the minimal change of X required to
accept  also requires accepting 	 .
The most interesting conditionals are those whose premise  is known to
be false; these are called counterfactuals. Thus, counterfactuals are sentences of
the form `If Bizet was Italian, then he and Verdi were compatriots'. According
to Ramsey, we change our knowledge-base minimally so that it does no longer
entail that Bizet was not Italian. Then we can add the hypotheses that Bizet was
Italian and see whether we can conclude that Bizet and Verdi were compatriots.
Let  be any revision operator. We say that a counterfactual `If , then 	 '
(denoted by  > 	) is true w.r.t. to a given theory X if and only if X  
(classically) entails 	 . Probably the easiest revision operator is the following:
Let
b
X = Cn
cl
(
b
X)
b
X 
FMR
=
def
(
\
Y 2(
b
X
#:)
Y ) [ 
where X # : is the set of all maximal consistent subsets of X which do not clas-
sically entail . Note that
b
X is deductively closed. The relationship to Rescher's
Scep is immediate. Thus, we can have that
b
X 62
b
X 
FMR
, which corresponds
to the failure of inclusion. Of course, failure of inclusion, or in other the loss of
information is intended by revision operators to restore consistency.
The computational complexity of the corresponding operator FMR { full
meet revision { has been analysed in [Nebel, 1992]. Recall the denition of the
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polynomial time hierarchy (cf. [Stockmeyer, 1976]):

P
0
= 
P
0
= 
P
0
= P
and for all k  0

P
k+1
= P

P
k

P
k+1
= NP

P
k

P
k+1
= co-
P
k+1
where P

P
k
denotes the class of all languages accepted by a deterministic, poly-
nomial time bounded TM M with a 
P
k
-oracle.
Proposition 2.29 (Nebel, 1992). FMR 2 
P
2
  (
P
1
[ 
P
1
), provided that
coNP 6= NP.
From the point of Turing reducibility
11
FMR and the problem of two-valued
satisability (SAT) are equal, i.e. FMR 
T
SAT and SAT 
T
FMR. This has
been observed by Nebel.
Instead of considering only deductively closed set (theories), Nebel proposes a
so-called base revision, i.e. revisions on sets of formulas which are not necessarily
deductively closed. The corresponding revision operator is called simple base
revision (SBR):
X 
SBR
=
def
(
\
Y 2(X#:)
Cn
cl
(Y )) [ 
where X # : is the set of all consistent subsets of X which do not entail .
Again, the basic idea is very similar to Scep. The complexity of the revision
operation changes dramatically:
Proposition 2.30 (Nebel, 1992). SBR is 
P
2
-complete.
In other words, SBR is not Turing-reducible to SAT. A nondeterministic
polynomial time bounded machine with NP oracle would, however, accept SBR.
That is, the dierence between SBR and FMR is similar to the dierence between
11
Recall that a set S
1
is Turing-reducible to S
2
, denoted by S
1

T
S
2
, if and only if
there is a deterministic polynomial time oracle machineM such that S
1
= L(M;S
2
)
(cf.[Balcazar et al., 1988], Chapter 4).
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P and NP. This shows that a relative weak revision operation like SBR is fairly
complex.
If we want to know what follows from a knowledge-base revised by , we have
to compute Cn
cl
(X 
SBR
) (or, Cn
cl
(X 
FMR
)). Surprisingly this does not add
complexity as shown in [Eiter and Gottlob, 1992]. Eiter and Gottlob proved that
deciding Cn
cl
(X
SBR
), i.e. deciding whether the counterfactual  >
SBR
 holds
is 
P
2
-complete
12
. Eiter and Gottlob discussed many other revision operators.
For most of them, the corresponding counterfactual problem is 
P
2
-complete.
Theorem 2.12 (Eiter and Gottlob). Deciding if a counterfactual  > 	 is
true w.r.t. to a set X is 
P
2
complete for >2 f>
G
; >
Win
; >
B
; >
S
; >
F
g, and 
P
2
-
hardness holds even if X is atomic and 	 2 X, where >
G
is the counterfactual
based on the revision operation introduced in [Ginsberg, 1986], >
Win
the one by
[Winslett, 1990], >
B
the one by [Borgida, 1985], >
S
the one by [Satho, 1988]
and >
F
the one by [Forbus, 1989].
The above results show indeed that maintaining consistency is more complex
than reasoning in the paraconsistent logic K
3
. More precisely, reasoning in K
3
is coNP hard whereas most operators discussed in [Eiter and Gottlob, 1992] are

P
2
-hard, i.e. one level higher in the polynomial time hierarchy. As for member-
ship in a complexity class, most belief revision operators discussed by Eiter and
Gottlob are also in 
P
2
, thus { taking the above into account { are
P
2
-complete.
But how dicult is reasoning in K
3
when being compared to belief revision?
By Proposition 2.23 we have immediately:
Proposition 2.31. Deciding Cn
3
(X) is in 
P
2
.
Thus, reasoning in our paraconsistent logic is not more dicult than belief
revision. As for practical impact, many revision systems require user-interaction.
Consider for example the following database: X = fA;A ! B;B ! C;C !
:Ag. The set X does not have a two-valued model. Changing X minimally
in order to obtain consistency leads to several alternatives. We can eliminate
A ! B or B ! C or C ! A or A to make X consistent. A minimal change
would require that somebody tells us which formula should be removed.
All in all, we have just shown that living with the inconsistencies is from a
computational point of view not more expensive than revising an inconsistent
knowledge-base each time contradicting information has been entered. This is
what we have suspected. Of course, it would be a little unfair to evaluate the
12
The revision operator 
SBR
is called 
G
in [Eiter and Gottlob, 1992].
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usefulness of belief revision only by means of computational complexity. Both
approaches attack the same problem but yield dierent results. Even Belnap is
about to irt a little with the idea of supplying his reasoner with `some strategy
of giving up part of what it believes'. Belnap drops this idea immediately since
`(he has) never heard of a practicable, reasonable, mechanizable strategy for
revision of belief in the presence of contradiction', [Belnap, 1977]. He concludes
that a part of the complete reasoner should be able to cope with contradicting
information. Another part might be able to revise beliefs.
2.6.3 Relationship to Relevance logics
Relevance logics (cf. [Dunn, 1986]) were developed to avoid certain peculiarities
of material implication. The basic concept is that of relevant deduction. A sen-
tence 	 is relevantly deducible from a set f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g of premises just in case
all the 
i
are actually used. This idea is very close to Ackermann's Begrundung
einer strengen Implikation as well as to C.I. Lewis' concept of a strict implica-
tion, where A strictly implies B if and only if it is not possible (in a modal sense)
that A is true and B is false (note that this is identical to (A! B), where !
is material implication). Thus, the concept of strict implication is an intensional
(not truth-functional) concept.
The treatment of the implication as an Intensional Relation has also been
discussed by L. Nelson. His ideas have then been further developed by Ander-
son and Belnap. In their seminal work Entailment, [Anderson and Belnap, 1975],
they developed the propositional logics E of entailment and R of relevant impli-
cation. Unfortunately these two main systems are motivated from a syntactical
perspective: Anderson and Belnap present E and R as a system of axioms, thus
leaving the question of a semantics open. In fact, the semantics for these logics
are quite complicated and there have been recent attempts by Arnon Avron (cf.
[Avron, 1989], [Avron, 1990a], [Avron, 1990b]) to give a more elegant and intu-
itive semantics for those systems in order to make relevance logic more attractive
for applications in Computing Science.
Despite these promising developments in the eld of relevance logics, there is
a drawback which knocks out all attempts to incorporate these logics faithfully
into practical application: They are even in the propositional case undecidable.
Precisely, Urquhart showed that the systems of relevant implication R, entail-
ment E and of ticket entailmentT are undecidable, [Urquhart, 1984]. This makes
them useless for an application in deductive databases.
I shall briey explain the basic relationship between K
3
's aspects of relevance
and the relevantist's aspects of relevance. In [Norman and Sylvan, 1989] we can
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nd a `working classication of logics'. According to this classication, all logics
which reject Disjunctive Syllogism (see below) are called pseudo relevant.
:;  _ 	
Disjunctive Syllogism (DJ)
	
Thus, from the relevance enterprise's point of view K
3
is at least pseudo-
relevant because a vacuously false statement (in a classical sense) does not justify
everything. Please note that though (A^:A) ! B is a tautology in K
3
, it does {
due to the failure of the general deduction theorem { not hold that fA;:Ag
{
K
3
B,
for every B.
Myhill describes in [Norman and Sylvan, 1989], the relevance system E to
be `designed to formalize the insights of philosophers who oppose to the notion
that a true proposition is implied by everything and a false proposition implies
everything'. Clearly, K
3
accounts for the second problem but not for the rst:
if  2 Cn
3
(X) then 	 !  2 Cn
3
(X), even though there is no real connection
between  and 	 . Anderson and Belnap get rid of this problem by rejecting
the axiom scheme  ! (	 ! ), which is called by the relevantists Positive
Paradox.
In K
3
we do not only have that Positive Paradox is a valid axiom scheme, but
fAg
{
K
3
(B ! A) for every B. Hence, contrary to the situation (A ^ :A) ! B,
we do not get rid of the irrelevance aspects of Positive Paradox. This is clearly
a point where the hardcore relevantists would reject K
3
as a genuine relevance
logic
13
.
Even though K
3
is not a genuine relevance logic, it has the variable sharing
property which is very important for relevance logics. According to Dunn, the
variable sharing condition expresses some commonality of meaning between the
antecedent and the succedent. The variable sharing property is also called weak
relevance.
Proposition 2.32 (Variable Sharing Property). Let  be non-tautological.
If  2 Cn
3
(X) then there is a formula 	 2 X such that  and 	 share some
sential variable.
Proof. Since  is non-tautological, there is a preferred assignment I such that
I() = f . Assume to the contrary that there is no 	 2 X sharing a variable
13
I would like to annotate that Anderson and Belnap, though they refuse Positive
Paradox, admit that if A is true then it is `safe to infer A from an arbitrary B, since
we run no risk of uttering a falsehood in doing so' (Entailment 1).
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with . Then there is a preferred model J of X such that J(A) = I(A) for every
atomic A appearing in X . Hence, J() = f and  62 Cn
3
(X) { a contradiction.
r
Corollary 2.2. If (^:) ! 	 is a tautology which satises the normalisation
condition and 	 is not a tautology, then  and 	 share some sential variable.
Corollary 2.3. If  ! 	 is a tautology which satises the normalisation con-
dition and 	 is not a tautology, then  and 	 share some sential variable.
In addition to the variable sharing property, Theorem 2.10 gives an answer
to the question of what literals L are entailed by X (provided that X is in inf):
the literals L and :L are entailed by X if and only if both have been asserted
explicitly, i.e. L 2 X and :L 2 X . If L is entailed by X and L 62 X , then L must
be based on some consistent argument, i.e. there is a subset X
0
 X such that
no formula of X
0
takes the value > in any preferred model of X and L follows
from X
0
.
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Historical Remarks
We have presented a neo-classical approach to handle inconsistent information:
take Kleene's strong three-valued logic and supply it with a Shoham-like prefer-
ence relation. With Belnap's work in the background, there is nothing spectacu-
lar about this approach and hence, it is no wonder that similar preference rela-
tions were independently discovered by [Priest, 1991], [Kifer and Lozinskii, 1992]
and [Weber and Bell, 1994].
In Kifer and Lozinskii's work, we nd two implicational symbols: one to
denote ontological implication and another one for epistemological implication.
The latter corresponds to our notion of preferred entailment.
Whereas Kifer and Lozinskii are mainly concerned about an inconsistency
handling via annotated logics programs, Priest's logic LP(m) (minimal logic of
paradox) is indeed identical to our logic K
3
.
Quite recently D. Batens suggested a class of logics called Adaptive Logics
[Batens, 1997]. The main aspects are:
{ A given set X is interpreted as consistently as possible. This means that if
X is consistent, then the consequences should be identical to the classical
consequences.
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{ An inconsistency adaptive logic, which { according to Batens { cannot be
monotonic is based on a monotonic paraconsistent logic.
K
3
enjoys the rst and the second property. However, K
3
is not consid-
ered by Batens to be an adaptive logic (personal communication). This is since
fA;:A;A _ :A ! Bg does not K
3
-entail B whereas B should follow from the
above set by means of an adaptive logic (Batens, personal communication).
2.7.2 Open Problems
Let me shortly recall the problems mentioned this chapter which are still open.
1. Is there a complexity class C for which the decision problem  2 Cn
3
(X) is
complete?
2. Is there some restriction of L such that deciding  2 Cn
3
(X) becomes
tractable?
3. Is Cn
3
weakly compact?
4. Which is the largest monotonic logic beyond Cn
3
?
2.7.3 Conclusion
From a pure logical aspect, the Relevance Logics E and R might be the most
desirable systems for paraconsistent reasoning. There are two arguments against
their use in AI: First, they are not decidable and second, they are too far away
from classical logic. As an alternative to these logics one could consider the
paraconsistent logics of da Costa (not to be discussed here) which are perfectly
monotonic and the Rescher-based approaches and their deviants as, for example,
discussed in [Benferhat et al., 1995]. The latter lack many desired properties like
Reexivity and AND. Da Costa's logics on the other hand are not close enough
to classical logic. Their negation operation, for example, does not obey the rule
of double negation.
This is now where K
3
comes into play. K
3
has all the nice mathematical
properties, is very close to classical logic and is also from a computational point
of view not worse than belief revision.
Beside these formal aspects, K
3
reects important principles of its rivals.
Belief Revision systems must satisfy the so-called postulate of Minimal Change;
this has been claimed Gardenfors. This implies that the changes made to an
inconsistent theory in order to become consistent should be minimal. In K
3
Minimal Change is comparable to the cautiousness of Cn
3
.
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In fact, as the analysis of the computational complexity shows: Belief Revi-
sion and reasoning in K
3
are optimisation problems. Belief revision maximises
consistency and K
3
to minimises inconsistency.
Relevance Logics. K
3
can be categorised as a pseudo relevant system with vari-
able sharing property. Even though it is not a genuine relevance logic, it
has some aspects of relevance; given the non-decidability result of relevance
logics, K
3
seems to be a good compromise between the pure logical and the
computational aspects.
Rescher-Based Approaches.Although Rescher does not give us much background
information on his premises, I think it is reasonable to assume that Rescher
wants his conditional entailment to be equivalent to classical entailment if
the set of premises is consistent. This hypothesis stems merely from the
fact that the only problematic conditionals are those whose antecedent has
a doubtful truth-status. The equivalence to classical logic in the consistent
case is also an important feature of K
3
.
Summarising, we have shown that Cn
3
is a reasonable basis for paraconsistent
reasoning. We shall see that it can be combined with a possible worlds approach
to account for contradicting and unknown information.

CHAPTER 3
Paraconsistency: The First-Order Logic FOK
3
We shall now extend the ideas and notions of Chapter 2 to the rst-order case.
As the reader will see, this is merely a technical exercise. However, we shall
obtain some new results and solutions to open problems mentioned by Priest in
[Priest, 1991]. As already mentioned before, Priest gave a proof of the Preferred
Model Existence Theorem. An open problem, questioned by Priest, is whether
the rst-order analogue of this theorem holds. We shall see that there are theories
which do not necessarily have a preferred model. If, however, we restrict ourselves
to universal theories, then we can show that every such theory has a preferred
model. We further investigate whether Herbrand's theorem holds for FOK
3
.
3.1 Terminology and Notations
First-order logic requires the introduction of many additional concepts. If we
want to be precise, it is unavoidable to become technical. However, we assume
the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts and ideas of rst-order logic so
that getting used to my terminology should not be too dicult. The notations
to be presented in this section are very close to those used by [Thiele, 1996].
The rst-step is to extend the language L to a rst-order language L
1
. A
rst-order signature  is a tuple  = (PS; FS; ), where PS is a countable set
of predicate symbols, FS a countable set of function symbols and  is function
which assigns to each predicate or function symbol an arity. If  is a rst-order
signature, V a countable set of variables we can dene the language L
1
(; V )
over  and V as usual. We shall omit the reference to  or V when it is clear
from the context or not important.
Let us now turn to some basic notations of rst-order semantics. A -
algebraic structure A is a tuple A = [;D; F;P], where D is a non-empty set
(also called domain), F an injective mapping which assigns a total function to
each symbol f 2 FS; P = fP
+
;P
-
g where P
+
and P
-
are mappings which assign
to every n-ary predicate symbol a subset from D
n
, i.e. we can think of P
+
and
P
-
as sets which contain relations.
Instead of using the truth-values ft; f;>g we shall now deal with models and
counter-models. This means that for each predicate symbol P 2 PS we have two
interpreting sets: P
+
P
and P
-
P
. The rst set contains all objects from the domain
for which P holds; the latter contains all objects for which P does not hold. It
is not required that P
+
P
and P
-
P
are complementary or even disjunct. We only
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require that P
+
P
[ P
-
P
= D
n
, i.e. there are no truth-value gaps: each tuple is in
P
+
P
or in P
-
P
(or, maybe in both sets).
We shall now explain how terms and formulas are interpreted.
Denition 3.1 (State of a Variable, Interpretation of Terms).
1.  is called A-state of the variables from V if and only if
 : V ! D
2. EL(T;A; ) denotes the element from D which corresponds to the term T :
(a) EL(v;A; )=
def
(v), if v 2 V .
(b) EL(f;A; )=
def
F
f
, if f is a 0-ary function symbol (i.e. a constant).
(c) EL(f(T
1
; : : : ; T
n
);A; )=
def
F
f
(EL(T
1
;A; ); : : : ;EL(T
n
;A; )) if f is a
function symbol of arity at least 1.
Let T be a term of  containing no variables (i.e. T is a ground term ). Let
c 2 D (note that by denition D must be non-empty) and dene 
0
(x) = d, for
all x 2 V . Then T corresponds to EL(T;A; 
0
) =: EL(T;A).
The above denition shows how terms are interpreted. Let us now turn to
the interpretation of formulas. For a given A-state  and a xed v 2 V ,  2 D
we dene
hv := i=
def
(
(v
0
) , if v
0
6= v
 , if v = v
0
Denition 3.2. Let A = [;D; F;P] be a -algebraic structure. We dene a
relation j=
K
3
among -algebraic structures and the rst-order language L
1
(; V )
as follows:
A;  j=
K
3
P =
def
P
+
P
= f?g, for 0-ary predicate symbol P
A; =j
K
3
P =
def
P
-
P
= f?g, for 0-ary predicate symbol P
A;  j=
K
3
P (t
1
; : : : ; t
n
) =
def
[EL(t
1
;A; ); : : : ;EL(t
n
;A; )] 2 P
+
P
A; =j
K
3
P (t
1
; : : : ; t
n
) =
def
[EL(t
1
;A; ); : : : ;EL(t
n
;A; )] 2 P
-
P
A;  j=
K
3
 ^ 	 =
def
A;  j=
K
3
 and A;  j=
K
3
	
A; =j
K
3
 ^ 	 =
def
A; =j
K
3
 or A; =j
K
3
	
A;  j=
K
3
! 	 =
def
A; =j
K
3
 or A;  j=
K
3
	
A; =j
K
3
! 	 =
def
A;  j=
K
3
 and A;  6j=
K
3
	
A;  j=
K
3
8v =
def
for all  2 D we have A; hv := i j=
K
3

A; =j
K
3
8v =
def
exists  2 D such that A; hv := i=j
K
3

A;  j=
K
3
: =
def
A; =j
K
3

A; =j
K
3
: =
def
A;  j=
K
3

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We say that  is valid in A if and only if A;  j=
K
3
, for all . We say that A
is a model of a set X (denoted by A j=
K
3
X) if and only if A j=
K
3
 for every  2 X .
Remark 3.1. If we require that P
+
P
= D n P
-
P
holds for all P 2 PS the above
denition coincides with the satisability relation for classical, rst-order logic.
The above denition allows a formula to be both, true and false. It does
however not allow for any truth-value gap. That is for each formula  we have
that  is true under some assignment or false (or both).
Proposition 3.1. For any structure A and any assignment  we have: A;  j=
K
3

or A; =j
K
3

Proof. Assume that  is atomic; the case of compound follows immediately by
structural induction. By denition a -algebraic structure, we have that
P
+

[ P
-

= D
n
(*)
Assume that  has the terms t
1
; : : : ; t
n
as arguments. By (*) we thus have
(EL(t
1
;A; ); : : : ;EL(t
n
;A; )) 2 P
+

or
(EL(t
1
;A; ); : : : ;EL(t
n
;A; )) 2 P
-

:
Hence, A;  j=
K
3
 or A;  j=
K
3
:. Thus, A;  j=
K
3
 or A; =j
K
3
.
r
Example 3.1. Let  = (fP;Qg; fa; bg; ) be a signature. P and Q are one-place
predicate symbols, and a; b 0-ary function symbols. LetX = fPa;:Pa; Pb;8x(Px!
Qx)g. The following structures are (among others) models of X :
A
1
= [ ;
D = fa
0
; b
0
g;
F(a) = a
0
; F(b) = b
0
;
P
+
P
= fa
0
; b
0
g;P
-
P
= fa
0
; b
0
g;
P
+
Q
= ?;P
-
Q
= fa
0
; b
0
g
]
A
2
= [ ;
D = fa
0
; b
0
g;
F(a) = a
0
; F(b) = b
0
;
P
+
P
= fa
0
; b
0
g;P
-
P
= fa
0
g;
P
+
Q
= fb
0
g;P
-
Q
= fa
0
g
]
As we see in the above example, A
1
does not satisfy Qb. As in the propo-
sitional case, the problem is that A
1
judges too many formulas to be para-
consistent, because it satises Pa;:Pa; Pb;:Pb. The set X , however, does not
mention that Pb should be paraconsistent. What we need is a measure for the
degree of paraconsistency of a structure, i.e. we have to extend the relation @
to -algebraic structures.
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Denition 3.3 (v, j=

K
3
). Let A = (;D; F;P); A
0
= (;D; F;P
0
) be two struc-
tures. Dene
A v A
0
if and only if P
+
P
\ P
-
P
 P
+
P
0
\ P
-
P
0
for every P 2 PS
A @ A
0
if and only if A v A
0
and NOT A
0
v A:
Analogously to the propositional case we say that A is a preferred model for
X (denoted by A j=

K
3
X) if and only if A is a least model for X (according to @)
The structure A
2
of Example 3.1 is less informed than A
1
(i.e. A
2
@ A
1
). It is
easy to see that A
2
is a@-minimal structure which satisesX = fPa;:Pa; Pb;8x(Px!
Qx)g, because minimising the intersection P
+
P
\ P
-
P
would yield the empty set
and thus either Pa or :Pa would not be satised.
Note that the relation @ diers from the substructure relation, which can be
found in any textbook on model theory (e.g. [Chang and Keisler, 1977]) and is
dened as follows:
Denition 3.4 (Substructure, Union). Let A = [;D; F;P
+
;P
-
], A
0
= [;
D
0
; F
0
,P
+
0
;P
-
0
] be two structures. We say that A
0
is a substructure of A, A
0
 A,
if and only if D
0
 D and
1. Each n-placed relation P
0
of P
+
0
or P
-
0
is the restriction to D
0
of the corre-
sponding relation P of P
+
or P
-
, i.e. P
0
= P \ (D
0
)
n
.
2. Each m-placed function f
0
of F
0
is the restriction to D
0
of the corresponding
function f of F, i.e. f
0
= f  (D
0
)
m
A
0
is a strict substructure of A, A
0
 A if and only if the inclusion D  D
0
is
strict.
The union A
0
[ A is dened as [;D [D
0
; F [ F
0
;P
+
[ P
+
0
;P
-
[ P
-
0
].
Proposition 3.2. N M does not imply N vM. Moreover, N vM does not
imply N M.
Proof. Note that the relation v requires that both structures have the same
universe D. This is not required by the denition of a substructure. For the
converse direction, note that if N and M have the same domain and N  M,
we must have N = M. But we do not have that N v M implies N = M even
though the universes of both structures coincide. r
Remark 3.2. Let A
1
@ A
2
be two-structures. Then for every term T and every
state  we have EL(T;A
1
; ) = EL(T;A
2
; ). Moreover, if T is a ground term of
 we have EL(T;A
1
) = EL(T;A
2
) (cf. Denition 3.1)
64 CHAPTER 3. PARACONSISTENCY: THE FIRST-ORDER LOGIC FOK
3
We can now dene a nonmonotonic entailment relation 
{
K
3
Denition 3.5 (
{
K
3
; Cn
K
). Let X  L
1
,  be a rst-order formula. We say
that X K
3
-entails  (denoted by X 
{
K
3
) if and only if every preferred model of
X is a model of . Further, Cn
K
(X)=
def
f j X 
{
K
3
g.
Example 3.1. (continued) The following models are (among others) @-minimal
for X :
A
1
= [ ;
D = fa
0
; b
0
; c
0
g;
F(a) = a
0
; F(b) = b
0
;
P
+
P
= fa
0
; b
0
; c
0
g;P
-
P
= fa
0
; b
0
g;
P
+
Q
= fa
0
g;P
-
Q
= fb
0
g
]
A
2
= [ ;
D = fa
0
; b
0
g;
F(a) = a
0
; F(b) = b
0
;
P
+
P
= fa
0
; b
0
g;P
-
P
= fa
0
g;
P
+
Q
= fb
0
g;P
-
Q
= fa
0
g
]
A
1
contains an object c
0
which is not needed. Thus, A
2
is a substructure of
A
1
. Beside A
1
and A
2
there is another preferred model of X :
A
3
= [ ;
D = fa
0
; b
0
g;
F(a) = a
0
; F(b) = b
0
;
P
+
P
= fa
0
; b
0
g;P
-
P
= fa
0
g;
P
+
Q
= fa
0
; b
0
g;P
-
Q
= ?
]
A
2
and A
3
are up to isomorphism the only preferred models of X . Thus,
Qb 2 Cn
K
(X) but Qa;:Qa 62 Cn
K
(X).
We know that in propositional K
3
, any set of formulas X which is proposi-
tionally consistent, has the same consequences in K
3
as in classical propositional
logic. This guarantees that we get only nonmonotonic eects, if we add to any set
X a formula  which is contradictory to some information in X . This property
does also hold for the 1st-order case, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Let X  L
1
. If X has a classical rst-order model, then
Cn
1st
cl
(X) = Cn
K
(X), where Cn
1st
cl
is the consequence operator of classical rst-
order logic.
Proof. If X has a classical rst-order model, then in any preferred model A of
X we have that P
+
\ P
-
is empty. Since P
+
P
[ P
-
P
= D
n
we must have that P
-
P
is the complement of P
+
P
. Hence, we have X is satised by a classical rst-order
structure if and only if it is valid in some preferred model A of X . r
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From the above proposition it follows that the set of tautologies of classical
rst-order logic coincides with the set of rst-order Kleene tautologies. We thus
have the following
Corollary 3.1. Cn
1st
cl
(?) = Cn
K
(?).
Let us denote the rst-order version of K
3
by FOK
3
.
3.2 Properties of FOK
3
We begin with some properties for the records:
Proposition 3.4. The operator Cn
K
is a nonmonotonic, cumulative preclosure
operator, i.e.
1. X  Cn
K
(X) (Inclusion)
2. Cn
K
(X) = Cn
K
(Cn
K
(X)) (Idempotency)
3. ; 	 2 Cn
K
(X) implies  2 Cn
K
(X [ f	g) (Cumulativity)
4. X  Y does not imply Cn
K
(X)  Cn
K
(Y ) (Nonmonotonicity)
5. Cn
K
is not compact.
Proof. Part 1 and 2 follow immediately from the Denition of Cn
K
. Part 3 is
similar to Theorem 2.5. Part 4 and 5 is by counter-example. r
3.2.1 Herbrand-structures
A structure A = [;D; F;P] is said to be an Herbrand-structure if and only if
1. D is the set of all variable free terms (ground terms) constructible from .
2. for every 0-ary function symbol f 2 FS we have 
f
= f
3. for every n-ary (n > 0) function symbol and every variable free term T
1
; : : : ; T
k
we have 
f
(T
1
; : : : ; T
k
) = f(T
1
; : : : ; T
k
).
We summarise some well-known results on Herbrand-structures.
Theorem 3.1. Let X  L
1
(; V ) be a universal theory.
1. X has a classical model if and only if X has a classical Herbrand-model.
2. X has a classical model if and only if the set fc j x 2 Xg of all ground
instances of X has a classical model.
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3. If  contains at least one constant symbol and 9xx 2 Cn
1st
cl
(X) then there
are constant symbols c
1
; : : : ; c
n
such that c
1
_ : : : _ c
n
2 Cn
1st
cl
(X).
The last point is also called Herbrand's Theorem. The main aim of this
section is to investigate whether Herbrand's Theorem holds for FOK
3
. To see
that this question is not beyond any scope, note that the Herbrand's Theorem
does not hold for minimal reasoning as used in the eld of Logic Programming.
Here one considers only models which are (1) consistent, in a classical sense (that
is for any P 2 PS we have P
+
P
\ P
 
P
= ?) and (2) in which the number of true
propositions is reduced to a minimum. That is two structures A
1
= [;D; F;P
1
],
A
2
= [;D; F;P
2
] are compared via the relation C, where A
1
C A
2
if and only
if for every P 2 PS we have P
1
P
 P
2
P
. Based on this notion we can dene a
consequence operator
Cn
C
(X)=
def
f j if A is a C  minimal model of X;
then A is a model of :g
As a counter-example (which is due to Dix and taken from [Herre, 1990])
consider a signature containing constant symbols f1; 2; 3; : : :g and the set
X = fPi _ Pj j i 6= j i; j  !g
We have that 9x:Px holds in every C-minimal model of X . There is, however,
no nite disjunction '
k
= :Pc
1
_ : : : _ :Pc
k
, where c
i
2 f1; 2; 3; : : :g. Thus,
9xPx 2 Cn
C
(X) but '
k
62 Cn
C
(X), for every k 2 IN .
Unfortunately, there is a counter-example to Herbrand's Theorem for FOK
3
as well.
Theorem 3.2. Herbrand's Theorem does not hold for FOK
3
.
Proof. Consider again a signature containing all natural numbers f1; 2; 3; : : :g
as constant symbols. Let
X =
def
f(:Pi _ :Pj) ^
Pi ^ Pj ^
Pi! Qi ^
Pj ! Qj j i 6= j; i; j  !g
The above set has innitely many preferred FOK
3
-Herbrand-models. For
every such model, there is some constant c such that c 62 P
+
P
\ P
-
P
. Hence,
9xQx 2 Cn
K
(X), but there is no '
k
= Qc
1
_ : : : _ Qc
k
, k < ! such that
'
k
2 Cn
K
(X). r
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We close this section with a proposition which states that if a FOK
3
-Herbrand
structure H satises exactly the same grounded formulas as the structure A, then
H satises also all universal sentences which are satised by A.
Proposition 3.5. Let  be a signature such that the set of ground terms is not
empty. Further, let X be a set of universal formulas and A a model of X. Let
H = [;D; F;P] be a Herbrand structure such that for all quantier-free sentences
 we have A j=
K
3
, H j=
K
3
. Then, H j=
K
3
X.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that H 6j=
K
3
X . Since X contains only universal
formulas, we must have H 6j=
K
3
8x, for some 8x 2 X . Without loss of generality
we can assume that the quantier-free formula  is a disjunction of literals; we
further assume that  consists of exactly one literal '(t
1
; : : : ; t
n
). It follows that
for some H-state  we have
H;  6j=
K
3
'(t
1
; : : : ; t
n
)
Assume that '(t
1
; : : : ; t
n
) is a positive literal. Hence,
[EL(H; ; t
1
); : : : ;EL(H; ; t
n
)] 62 P
+
'
:
Since H is a Herbrand structure, there must be a quantier-free sentence 'c
which is satised by A but not by H { a contradiction. r
We shall now analyse some fundamental properties of our paraconsistent
rst-order extension.
3.2.2 Preferred Model Existence
Priest proved the following weak version of preferred model existence:
Proposition 3.6 (Priest, 1991). Let A be a nite structure, i.e. the domain
is nite, such that A j=
K
3
X. Then there is a A
0
such that A
0
v A and A
0
j=

K
3
X.
For the general case, the existence of a preferred model cannot always be
guaranteed:
Proposition 3.7. There are nite sets of formulas which do not have a pre-
ferred FOK
3
-model.
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Proof. The following counter-example is due to Heinrich Herre. Consider the
theory of dense linear orderings plus the following formulas:

1
:8x8y(Px ^ (x < y))! Py

2
:9Px

3
:Px$ (Qx ^ :Qx)
The set has the following model:
A = [ ;
D = IN;
F = ?;
P
+
<
= f(a; b) j a < b; a; b 2 INg;P
-
<
= ?;
P
+
P
= IN;P
-
P
= ?;
P
+
Q
= IN;P
-
Q
= IN
]
We can restrict P
+
P
, P
+
Q
and P
-
Q
to IN n f0g. This yields a model A
0
with A
0
@ A.
By removing the minimal element of the domain of A
0
we can again get a model
which is less informed than A
0
and so on. Obviously, there is a chain A A A
0
A
A
00
A : : : which has no minimal element. Hence there is no preferred model for
the above theory. r
Fortunately, there are theories, which always have a preferred model:
Theorem 3.3. Let  be a signature containing at least one constant symbol,
X a set of universal sentences and H
0
a Herbrand-model of X. Then, there is a
preferred Herbrand-model H of X such that H @ H
0
.
Proof. Since X is a universal, we know that each element of X has the form
8x
1
8x
2
: : :8x
n
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)
where  is quantier-free. We can transform  to a sort of conjunctive normal
form
8x
1
8x
2
: : :8x
n

1
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) ^ : : : ^ 
k
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)
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where each 
i
is a disjunction of rst-order literals. Distributing the quantiers
yields
8x
1
8x
2
: : :8x
n

1
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)
^ 8x
1
8x
2
: : :8x
n

2
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)
.
.
.
^ 8x
1
8x
2
: : :8x
n

k
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)
We thus can assume that each element of X is a universal formula of the form
8x
i
where 
i
is a disjunction of literals. Consider an Herbrand-model H
0
=
[;D; F;P] of X . Dene for every universal formula  = 8x'x a set Z

= f'c j
'c is a ground instance of g. Let Z = fZ

j  2 Xg. Obviously, for every
structure B = [;D; F; : : : ] we have
B j=
K
3
X , B j=
K
3
X [ Z
Let Z = fZ

j  2 Xg.
Consider now a descending chain H
0
A H
1
A H
2
A : : : of Herbrand-models
of X . Dene
Inc(H
i
; P )=
def
P
+
i;P
\ P
-
i;P
and let Inc(P )=
def
T
Inc(H
i
; P ). Let Y be a subset of Z such that
Y = f' j ' 2 Z for every atomic P (c
1
; : : : ; c
n
) appearing as a subformula
in ' : (EL(c
1
;H
0
); : : : ;EL(c
n
;H
0
)) 62 Inc(P )g
Every nite subset of Y has a classical two-valued model. By compactness
of classical rst-order logic we know that Y has a classical model and by Theo-
rem 3.1 it has a classical Herbrand-model H
Y
= [;D; F; (P
+
Y
;P
-
Y
)]. We extend
H
Y
in order to become a model of Z. Dene H
Z
= [;D; F;P
Z
] with
P
Z
=
def
(P
+
;P
-
), where
P
+
P
=
def
P
+
P
Y
[ Inc(P )
P
-
P
=
def
P
-
P
Y
[ Inc(P )
We have H
Z
j=
K
3
Z: let ' 2 Z be a disjunction of literals; there are two cases:
' 2 Y. Since H
Z
is an extension of H
Y
we have H
Z
j=
K
3
'.
70 CHAPTER 3. PARACONSISTENCY: THE FIRST-ORDER LOGIC FOK
3
' 62 Y. In this case there must be an atomic subformula P (c
1
; : : : ; c
n
) appearing
in ' such that (EL(c
1
;H
0
); : : : ;EL(c
n
;H
0
)) 2 Inc(P ). From the construction
of H
Z
it follows that H
Z
j=
K
3
P (c
1
; : : : ; c
n
) and hence H
Z
j=
K
3
'.
But A
Z
is also a model of X : assume to the contrary that A
Z
6j=
K
3
X . Hence,
there must be  = 8x'x 2 X such that A
Z
6j=
K
3
. Without loss of generality
assume that 'x is atomic. There must be a -state  : V ! D such that
A
Z
;  6j=
K
3
8x'x:
By Denition 3.2 that there is a  2 D such that
A
Z
; hv := i 6j=
K
3
'x:
Since H
Z
is a Herbrand-model there must be a ground instance 'c of 'x such
that H
Z
6j=
MK
'c. This implies H
Z
6j=
MK
Z { a contradiction.
Hence, H
Z
is a model ofX . Moreover,H
Z
@ H
i
, for everyH
i
of the descending
chain. It follows from Zorn's lemma that the above chain has a minimal element.
r
The following proposition is now easy to show:
Proposition 3.8. Let X be a set of universal sentences,  a universal sentence.
If A j=

K
3
X and A j=
K
3
 then A j=

K
3
X [ fg.
Proof. Similar to the propositional case. r
3.2.3 Deduction Theorems
We already saw that the general version of the deduction theorem fails for propo-
sitional K
3
. Hence, we cannot expect that the full version holds for the rst-order
extension FOK
3
. Moreover, the full version of the deduction theorem fails also
for standard rst-order logic, provided that the concept of entailment is dened
as `X entails  if and only if every structure which satises X does also satisfy
'. As a counter-example consider: Px  8xPx which holds in classical logic;
but obviously we do not have that Px! 8xPx is a theorem.
The weak version of the deduction theorem, however, does hold for classical
rst-order logic:
X [ fg  	 implies X  ! 	
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where  denotes standard rst-order validity entailment, cf.[Avron, 1991].
Standard rst-order logic (FOL) satises the following version of the deduc-
tion theorem, which is called `sential' because it deals only with sentences, i.e.
formulas where each variable is in the scope of some quantier.
Theorem 3.4 (Sential Deduction Theorem for FOL). Let  be a sentence,
i.e.  contains no free variables. Then the following holds: X [ fg  	 implies
X  ! 	 .
A analogous version holds for FOK
3
:
Theorem 3.5 (Sential Deduction Theorem for FOK
3
). Let  be a sentence,
i.e.  contains no free variables. Then the following holds: X [fg
{
K
3
	 implies
X 
{
K
3
! 	 .
Proof. We have to show that  ! 	 is valid in every preferred model A of X .
Suppose that A j=

K
3
X . Thus, we have to prove that for every state  we have
A;  j=
K
3
! 	 , i.e.
A; =j
K
3
 or A;  j=
K
3
	:
By Proposition 3.1 we have that for each A; : A;  j=
K
3
 or A; =j
K
3
. In the
latter case we are done. Thus assume that A;  j=
K
3
. Since  is a sentence we have
A j=
K
3
. By Proposition 3.8 we know that A j=

K
3
X , A j=
K
3
 implies A j=

K
3
X [ fg.
Thus, A j=
K
3
	 . Hence, A j=
K
3
! 	 . r
Note, that the restriction to sentences in the above theorem is not dramatical
at all because rst-order logic's entailment relation is invariant w.r.t. general-
isation. That is, X   if and only if GEN(X)  , where GEN(X) is the
generalisation of X , i.e. each free variable occurring in a formula  of X is
bounded by a universal quantier.
Likewise in the propositional case, the converse direction of the sential de-
duction theorem does not hold. However, there is a normalised version which
does hold. The normalisation condition for FOK
3
is analogous to the one for K
3
.
! 	 satises the normalisation condition, if and only if for every A;  we have
A;  6j=
K
3
! 	 , A;  j=
K
3
 and A;  6j=
K
3
	 Normalisation Condition (NC)
Theorem 3.6 (Normalised Deduction Theorem). Let  ! 	 be a rst-
order tautology which satises the normalisation condition. We then have
X 
{
K
3
! 	 if and only if X [ fg
{
K
3
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Proof. Similar to the propositional case. r
The normalised deduction theorem closes our considerations on the purely
mathematical aspects of FOK
3
. Let us now turn to a more philosophical aspect
of FOK
3
.
3.3 Extracting Consistent Information
The propositional logic K
3
has { at least from a philosophical point of view {
an important feature: if a literal L is K
3
-entailed by X , then L is based on a
consistent argument in X or L 2 X , provided that X is a set of clauses. This
consistent argument can be identied with a consistent subset of X .
Selecting the consistent part of a propositional database was done by
1. the prerequisite that X is in clausal normal-form and
2. eliminating all clauses from X in which no literal L takes the value > in
some preferred model of X .
In the rst-order case the situation is somewhat more complicated because
there is nothing like a conjunctive normal-form and hence there is nothing like
inf. Suppose we have 9xPx ^ :Px. The existential quantier glues the sub-
formulas Px and :Px together, so that we cannot generate a proper CNF.
However, it easy to see that the following formulas are tautologies which satisfy
the normalisation condition:
9xPx ^ :Px! 9xPx
9xPx ^ :Px! 9x:Px
In this section we shall show that each consistent formula which is entailed
by an inconsistent formula  is already entailed by a consistent `part' of , i.e.
by a subformula which has a two-valued model.
The following proposition establishes the link between inconsistent informa-
tion and consistent conclusions.
Proposition 3.9. Let  be a sentence, fg
{
K
3
 and  be consistent, i.e.  has
a classical two-valued model. There is a consistent  such that
1. !  is a tautology which satises NC
2.  !  is a tautology.
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Proof. There are two cases: either  has a two-valued model or not. The rst
case is easy. Since  contains no free variables, we have by Theorem 3.4 that
!  is a tautology. Choose  = .
In the second case, we know that  is inconsistent. Let A be a model for .
It is easy to see that there are structures A
1
, A
2
of A with A
1
@ A and A
2
@ A
such that
A
1
6j=
K
3
 and A
2
6j=
K
3

A
1
[ A
2
= A
A
1
j=
K
3

1
and A
1
6j=
K
3

1
A
2
j=
K
3

2
and A
2
6j=
K
3

2
for some 
1
; 
2
. Roughly speaking, A
1
and A
2
extract the consistent parts 
1
and 
2
of A. For example, if   9x(Px^:Px) then any A with P
+
P
= fcg = P
-
P
satises , for some object c. Let A
1
be the same as A except that P
+
P
is empty;
analogously let A
2
be the same as A except that P
-
P
is empty. Clearly, A
1
and A
2
are both less informed than A and neither A
1
nor A
2
satises , but A
1
j=
K
3
9xPx
and A
2
and A
2
j=
K
3
9x:Px. Hence, we have 
1
 9xPx and 
2
 9x:Px.
Since 
1
and 
2
is valid in every structure which satises  we have that
both ! 
1
and ! 
2
are tautologies which satisfy NC.
It remains to show that  !  is a tautology. Assume to the contrary that
for all consistent  such that 
{
K
3
 we have that  !  is no tautology, i.e.
6
{
K
3
. Since 
{
K
3
 it follows that  cannot be consistent { a contradiction. r
The following example illustrates the above proposition.
Example 3.2. Let   A ^ (B ^ :B) ^ (A ! C). Clearly, 
{
K
3
C. By Proposi-
tion 3.9 we know that there must be a consistent formula  such that  
{
K
3

and hence,  !  is a tautology. Moreover, !  must satisfy NC. The choice,
  A ^ A! C is appropriate.
3.4 Discussion
We have seen that the rst-order logic FOK
3
is much more complicated than its
propositional counterpart K
3
. The main drawback is that in general we cannot
guarantee that a theory X has a preferred model even though every X has a
rst-order model. This yields that the entailment relation is explosive, i.e. that
there are theories X for which X 
{
K
3
 is vacuously true. This is clearly not
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desired for a paraconsistent logic. However, if we restrict ourselves to universal
theories, we can guarantee that there is always a preferred model.
Another drawback is that Herbrand's theorem fails for FOK
3
. This might
not be dramatic for applications in Computing Science, for example deductive
databases, because here we only deal with nite sets of formulas. The above
negative results might, however, be crucial, if one has an application of FOK
3
in
Mathematics, e.g. number theory in mind.

CHAPTER 4
Syntactical Characterisation and Proof Theory
We have seen that Kleene's strong three-valued logic can be modied very easily
in order to obtain a logic which treats contradictory information cautiously and
which behaves identical to classical logic, if the information provided is consis-
tent. In this chapter I shall present some systems of deduction for K
3
.
Systems of deduction allow for a mechanisation of a logic, or more precisely:
an entailment relation. This aspect is of great importance for Computing Sci-
ence. There are, however, other important arguments for developing a deductive
system or a proof theory which I would like to account for. For example:
1. A formal calculus which axiomatises a given entailment relation is a `com-
pressed' version of the entailment relation and can facilitate the study of the
logic in question, as for example Hilbert's and Ackermann's calculus did for
classical logic.
2. A formal calculus can reect valid patterns of inference used by mathemati-
cians as well as in the commonsense world. The historical origin of treating
logic as the determination of valid inference patterns are Aristotle's systems
of syllogisms. But also Gentzen's calculi of sequents and natural deduction
belong to this type of calculi.
Since K
3
is nonmonotonic, we cannot expect to obtain the same easy-going
proof theory as in the case of classical logic. Moreover, as the following theorem
shows, the set of K
3
-consequences might not even in the propositional case be
recursively enumerable. In fact, the failure of compactness indicates that the
set Cn
3
(X) might not be recursively enumerable (r.e.) when X is r.e. As the
following theorem shows, Cn
3
(X) is in fact 
0
2
-hard, i.e. not r.e.
1
Theorem 4.1. There is a recursive set of sentences X such that Cn
3
(X) is

0
2
-hard.
Proof. Let   =
def
fn j 9x8y :R(n; x; y)g be a 
0
2
-complete set, where R is a
recursive relation. We shall construct a recursive set of sentences X such that  
is many-to-one reducible to Cn
3
(X).
Let fA
n
j n 2 !g [ fB
hn;xi
j n; x 2 !g be a set of pairwise distinct atomic
formulas. Let
X =
def
fA
n
_ (B
hn;xi
^ :B
hn;xi
) j n; x 2 !g [ f
y
^
i=0

i
(n; x) j R(n; x; y)g;
1
A similar result holds for reasoning with minimal classical models, where f < t
induces the corresponding partial ordering. C.f. [Papalaskari and Weinstein, 1990].
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where each 
i
(n; x)=
def
B
hn;xi
^ :B
hn;xi
. Then the following holds:
1. for each n; x 2 ! we haveB
hn;xi
^:B
hn;xi
2 Cn
3
(X) if and only if 9y R(n; x; y),
and
2. A
n
62 Cn
3
(X) if and only if for all n we have B
hn;xi
^ :B
hn;xi
2 Cn
3
(X).
Hence,
A
n
62 Cn
3
(X), for all x: 9yR(n; x; y)
Thus,
A
n
2 Cn
3
(X), :8x9y R(n; x; y)
, 9x8y:R(n; x; y)
, n 2  :
r
It is an open question whether Cn
3
is also a member of 
0
2
, i.e. whether Cn
3
is

0
2
-complete.
Of course, if we restrict ourselves to nite sets X
n
, then Cn
3
(X
n
) becomes
decidable.
Proposition 4.1. Let X be nite. Then Cn
3
(X) is recursive.
Proof. There are only nitely many models ofX and therefore only nitely many
preferred models. We can thus easily check whether any arbitrary  holds in all
preferred models or not. r
The above discussion shows, that it is highly questionable whether there are
sound and complete r.e. syntactical characterisations for Cn
3
and Cn
K
. However,
there are several non-trivial approximations. By `non-trivial' we mean that the
consequence relation which approximates Cn
3
fulls several requirements. Let
us therefore introduce the concept of recursively enumerable approximation.
Denition 4.1 (R.E. Approximation). Let Cn be a nonmonotonic conse-
quence operator. An operator Cons is a r.e. approximation of Cn if
1. Cons is embedding, idempotent, cumulative and nonmonotonic.
2. For any r.e. X we have that Cons(X) is r.e.
3. Cons(X)  Cn(X).
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4. If X has a two-valued model, then Cn
cl
(X) = Cons(X). In Chapter 2 we call
this property `conservativity'.
Most of the proof systems to be presented in this chapter are r.e. approxima-
tions of Cn
3
or Cn
K
, respectively. Only the tableau-calculus gives us an eective
procedure for deciding  2 Cn
3
(X), provided that X is nite. We shall discuss
the following types of proof-systems:
A Hilbert-System for Monotonic K
3
which characterises Kleene's logic, based
on Bolzano's entailment relation, Cn
Bolz
.
A Hilbert-Style Formalisation which tries to characterise Cn
3
with the help
of a set of axioms and a variant of modus ponens as the only rule of inference.
We shall also discuss a Hilbert-style formalisation of FOK
3
.
A Tableau Procedure which gives us an eective and machine orientedmethod
for deciding Cn
3
(X).
A Sequent-Style Calculus which models Cn
3
with the help of valid patterns
of inference.
As mentioned before, we cannot expect a nonmonotonic deduction operation
to be as straight forward as a monotonic one. As a consequence, nonmonotonic
inference rules have an additional component, called nonmonotonic precondition,
or PC for short. We shall see that the amount of additional information given in
the precondition varies from one deductive system to another. For example, we
can build a sound and complete tableau procedure for K
3
only by changing the
concept of a tableau proof. The Hilbert-style calculus requires the modication
of the Modus Ponens inference rule. The situation becomes a little bit more dif-
cult for the sequent calculus. Let me stress right from the beginning that I do
not consider the sequent calculus for K
3
to be an appropriate reasoning mecha-
nisation of Cn
3
. But: This sequent calculus represents a sound set of principles
showing which inference patterns (in the above sense) are valid.
4.1 A Hilbert System for Monotonic K
3
Recall that
Cn
Bolz
= f j I jX implies I jg
is a compact closure operator. Moreover, every formula  is semantically equiv-
alent to some formula 
CNF
.
We begin with a basic observation of how formulas are entailed.
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Proposition 4.2. Let X be a set of clauses, D a nontautological clause. D 2
Cn
Bolz
(X) if and only if there is some clause D
0
2 X such that D
0
 D.
Proof.
`)' Assume to the contrary that there is no such D
0
. Let D = L
1
_ : : : _ L
n
.
We shall show that there is some model I of X such that I(D) = f . We can
assume that all literals L
i
appearing in D also appear in some clause C of
X (otherwise we can assign I(L) = f , i.e. I(A) = f if A = L or I(A) = t if
:A = L).
By assumption, there is no clause C 2 X such that C consists solely of of
literals from fL
1
; : : : ; L
n
g. That is, for every clause C of X there is some
literal L
C
2 C such that L
C
62 D. Dene an interpretation I such that
I(L
C
) = > i.e. I(A) = >, for A 2 ATOM(L
C
)
I(L
i
) = f i.e. I(A) = f if L
i
= A and I(A) = t if L
i
= :A:
Since D is nontautological I is well dened and I(D) = f . Moreover, I jX .
Hence, D 62 Cn
Bolz
(X) { a contradiction.
`(' Immediately.
r
The above shows that we need only a few rules to describe the entailment of
nontautological sentences 
CNF
from a set of clausesX . However, Modus Ponens
is not a valid rule of inference, though a valid rule of proof. This means: if  and
! 	 are both tautological, so is 	 , whilst we cannot conclude that 	 is valid
in a given interpretation, if both  and ! 	 is valid.
Since Kleene's logic has exactly the same tautologies as classical propositional
logic, we can use a classical Hilbert-system to generate the set of tautologies.
However, we cannot use this system to generate the consequences of a non-
empty set X , i.e. we do not have X `
H
 implies X, where `
H
is Hilbert's
classical provability relation. We shall therefore distinguish between rules of proof
(for generating the set of tautologies) and rules of inference (for generating the
consequences of a given set X).
Consider the following axiomatic system:
Axioms: The set Ax of classical axioms, i.e.
1. A! (B ! A)
2. (A! B)! ((A! (B ! C))! (A! C))
3. A! (B ! (A ^ B))
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4. (A ^ B)! A
5. (A ^ B)! B
6. A! (A _B)
7. B ! (A _ B)
8. (A! C)! ((B ! C)! (A _ B ! C))
9. (A! B)! ((A! :B)! :A)
10. ::A! A
Rules of Proof:
 ! 	
	
(MP)
Rules of Inference:
 	
(^-I)
 ^ 	
 ^ 	
(^-E)
 	

(_-I)
 _ 	
	
(_-I)
 _ 	
We shall write X `
INF
 if there is a proof of  from X which uses only
inference rules.
Theorem 4.2. Let X be a set of clauses,  a nontautological formula in CNF.
X `
INF
 if and only of  2 Cn
Bolz
(X).
Proof. It is easy to check that the above rules of inference are sound. To see that
they are also complete, we have to show that we are able to prove each conjunct
C
i
of  with help of the above rules. I.e. we have to show that XC
i
implies
X `
INF
C
i
, where C
i
is a disjunction of literals. By Proposition 4.2 we know that
C
i
is an element of X or there is a clause C
0
2 X such that C
0
 C
i
(if we treat
the disjunction C
i
of literals as a set). We can apply (_-I) to obtain C
i
.
After we have generated all the C
i
as described above, we use (^-I) to gen-
erate . r
In order to prove for arbitrary sets X and arbitrary formulas  whether
 2 Cn
Bolz
(X) holds, we need to transform X into clausal form and  into
CNF. That is, for an arbitrary ' we have to generate an equivalent formula in
CNF. Transforming ' in CNF can be done with the following rules:
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! 	
(MI)
: _ 	
::
(DN)

:( ^ 	)
(DM)
: _ :	
 _ (	 ^)
(DIS)
( _ 	) ^ ( _)
We wish to add these rules to the inference rules of the above proof-system.
We shall write X `
Bolz
 if there is a proof of  from X using only inference rules
from the above system.
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness and Completeness). Let  be a nontautological
formula. X `
Bolz
 if and only if  2 Cn
Bolz
(X).
Proof. It is easy to see that the rules MI (Material Implication), DN (Double
Negation), DM (De Morgan), DIS (Distributivity) are sound. Moreover the given
rules are sucient to transform any formula into CNF (cf.[Bergmann and Noll, 1977],
p. 75). Hence, we can transform X into clausal normal form and  in CNF. By
Theorem 4.2 we have that the above proof-system is complete. r
4.2 A Hilbert Style Approximation for K
3
We have mentioned in Chapter 2, that, due to the non-normality of the im-
plication, Modus Ponens (MP) is not a valid rule of inference. We shall now
explain how to weaken Modus Ponens in order to become valid; the modied
version of Modus Ponens will, together with a set of axioms, yield a syntactical
characterisation of the semantical entailment operator Cn
3
.
4.2.1 Context-dependent reasoning
The syntactical characterisation of a nonmonotonic entailment relation is not as
straightforward as its monotonic counterpart. This because the applicability of
some inference rules does not only depend on what has been inferred, but on some
context-dependent conditions. For example, in the very beginning of our analysis
of paraconsistent reasoning we said that we wish that 	 should be inferred from
;! 	 provided that there is no doubt about 's real true-status. This means
that we have to guarantee at stage i the deduction process that  will not turn
out to be doubtful at any stage j, j > i. Marek and Truszczynski describe this
behaviour as follows [Marek and Truszczynski, 1993]:
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We use the term `jumping to conclusions' to denote the following infer-
ence technique: if there is no evidence that would contradict ', conclude
'. It should be quite clear that `jumping to conclusions' is not mono-
tonic. [: : : ] This mode of reasoning
2
is based on the concept of context-
dependent proof or derivation. The idea is to relativize the concept of a
proof using a context to control the applicability of rules.
We shall model the context by using the device PC(: : : ). An inference rule,
thus has the following general form:
X ;'
1
; : : : ; '
n
: PC(X;'
1
; : : : ; '
n
)
'
A nonmonotonic inference rule is valid, if '
1
; : : : ; '
n
is valid in every preferred
model of X and PC(X;'
1
; : : : ; '
n
) holds implies that ' holds in every preferred
model of X .
Denition 4.2. Given a set X of formulas, a set R of nonmonotonic inference
rules, we dene the set of nonmonotonic consequences, C
R
(X), to be the small-
est set which contains X and which is closed under the following condition: if
X;'
1
;::: ;'
n
:PC(X;'
1
;::: ;'
n
)
'
2 R, '
1
; : : : ; '
n
2 C
R
(X) and PC(X;'
1
; : : : ; '
n
) then
' 2 C
R
(X).
The above denition coincides with the usual inductive denition of topolog-
ical operators, i.e.
X
0
=
def
X
X
i
=
def
X
i 1
[ f ' j
X;'
1
;::: ;'
n
:PC(X;'
1
;::: ;'
n
)
'
2 R and
'
1
; : : : ; '
n
2 X
i 1
and PC(: : : ) holds g
We have
[
i<!
X
i
= C
R
(X):
The Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style calculi to be presented in this chapter
will base on context-dependent inference rules. For the Gentzen-style calculus
we shall modify only the Modus Ponens rule. This modication is similar to the
restriction of the deduction theorem and Right Weakening. As the discussion
on the deduction theorem and Right Weakening shows, it is possible to restrict
both properties such that their restricted variant holds in K
3
. In both cases the
restriction was to consider only those formulas of the type ! 	 for which the
normalisation condition (NC) holds.
2
[Batens, 1997] calls this dynamic proof-theory.
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4.2.2 Restricted Modus Ponens
Let us start with restricting Modus Ponens by an extra condition (PC(: : : )). The
resulting rule is called restricted Modus Ponens (RMP).
X ;; ! 	 : PC(! 	)
RMP
	
The precondition PC( ! 	) means that  ! 	 2 Taut
NC
i.e.  ! 	 is a
tautology which satises the normalisation condition. Thus RMP is restricted
to formulas  ! 	 which are not satised if and only if the antecedent takes
a designated value and the succedent takes a non-designated one. Note, that
this precondition is not context-dependent, since it does not refer to X . Hence,
RMP lies between classical MP and nonmonotonic inference rules described in
Section 4.2.1. In Section 4.2.4 we shall present a context-dependent variant of
RMP.
As the next proposition states, RMP is not as restrictive as it might seem.
Together with a set Ax of classical axioms, RMP is able to generate all classical
tautologies, and therefore all K
3
tautologies. Let Ax be the set of classical axioms.
Proposition 4.3. Ax and RMP generate all K
3
-tautologies.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is a tautology 	 such that 	 is not
generated by Ax and RMP. Since 	 is a tautology, it can be generated by using
MP instead of RMP. Thus there is a derivation ; ! 	 of 	 , where  ! 	
does not satisfy the normalisation condition. Hence, there is a preferred model
I of f;:g, which satises :	 . Hence, f;:g 6	 . Therefore, 	 cannot be a
tautology { a contradiction. r
4.2.3 Relatively Consistent Modus Ponens
Even though RMP generates together with Ax the set of all tautologies, it is too
restrictive to generate the set Cn
3
(X) when given the set X [Ax. For example,
it is impossible to generate B from fA;A! Bg only by using RMP.
We are in a little dilemma here: RMP is too restrictive (precisely: RMP(X) 
Cn
3
(X)) and MP is explosive (Cn
3
(X)  MP(X), where RMP(X) is the smallest
set containing Ax [ fXg and is closed under the rule RMP; MP(X) is dened
analogously). The solution which resolves the dilemma is to invoke RMP only
in those cases where MP is too explosive. MP becomes invalid, when applied to
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formulas ;! 	 where  is inconsistent w.r.t. the given set X . We shall rst
clarify what we mean by ` is inconsistent w.r.t. X '.
Let X be a set of formulas in clausal normal form. A literal L is consistent
w.r.t. X i and only if there is no preferred model I of X such that I(L) = >.
A clause C is consistent w.r.t. X i  contains at least one literal which is
consistent w.r.t. X . A formula  = C
1
^ : : : ^ C
n
in CNF is consistent w.r.t. X
i every clause C
i
is consistent w.r.t. X .
For any arbitrary set X of formulas and any arbitrary  we say that 
is consistent w.r.t. X if there is a set X
0
in clausal normal form, X and X
0
semantically equivalent such that 
CNF
is consistent w.r.t. X
0
where 
CNF
is
a formula in conjunctive normal form which is semantically equivalent to .
Instead of saying that ` is consistent w.r.t. X ' we shall also say that ` and X
are relatively consistent'.
The concept of relativised consistency expresses that a formula  does not
cause a new inconsistency when added to a set X . To illustrate this concept,
consider the following example.
Example 4.1. Let X = fA;B;C;:Cg.
1. :A _ :B is inconsistent w.r.t. X .
2. C _D is consistent w.r.t. X
3. :A _D is consistent w.r.t. X [ f:A _ :Bg.
We strengthen the concept of relative consistency a little bit.
Denition 4.3 (Strongly Relatively Consistent). A formula  is strongly
relatively consistent w.r.t. X if and only if  takes the value t in every preferred
model I of X [ fg.
Proposition 4.4. If  is strongly relatively consistent w.r.t. X then  is rela-
tively consistent w.r.t. X.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that  is in CNF. Since  is
assigned t in every preferred model I of X [ fg, we have by Proposition 2.3
that  takes a value from ft; fg in every preferred model of X . By the same
argument, each a conjunct D of  takes a value from ft; fg in any preferred
model of X . It follows that for every preferred model I of X there is a literal L
appearing as a disjunct in D such that I(L) 2 ft; fg. Hence, everyD is relatively
consistent w.r.t. X and therefore  is relatively consistent w.r.t. X . r
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The converse of Proposition 4.4 does not hold. For example, A_B is consis-
tent w.r.t. fA;:Ag but not strongly consistent. This reects our intuition: A_B
does not cause a new inconsistency when added to X .
With help of the above concepts we can formulate the following sound rule
of inference (the name `SRCMP' stand for `Strongly Relatively Consistent MP')
X ;;! 	 : PC(X;)
(SRCMP)
	
where the precondition PC(X;) means:  is strongly relatively consistent w.r.t.
X .
Denition 4.4 (R, R-provable). LetR denote the system [Ax; (RMP, SRCMP)],
i.e. R is a Hilbert-style system with Ax as the set of axioms and RMP and SR-
CMP as rules of inference. We say that  is R-provable from X if  can be
generated from X [Ax with help of RMP and SRCMP.
Proposition 4.5. R is embedding and idempotent.
Proof. Immediately by denition of R. r
Proposition 4.6 (Soundness of R). If 	 is R-provable from X, then 	 2
Cn
3
(X).
Proof. It is sucient to show that the application of RMP and SRCMP is sound.
For RMP the soundness follows directly from the Normalised Deduction The-
orem. Thus, we need only to consider SRCMP. Since  and X are strongly
relatively consistent, we know that  takes the value t in every preferred model
of X [ fg. But since X we also have that  takes the value t in every
preferred model of X : for suppose there is a preferred model I of X such that
I() = >. By Lemma 2.1 we have that I is also a preferred model of X [fg in
which  takes the value >, which contradicts the requirement that  and X are
relatively consistent. Hence,  takes the value t in every preferred model X . By
X! 	 , 	 must take the value t or > in every preferred model of X . Thus,
	 2 Cn
3
(X). r
It is an open question whether the system R is also complete with respect to
nite sets X . But R might be a r.e. approximation of Cn
3
. We shall investigate
if this the case. In order to be a r.e. approximation, the set
R(X)=
def
f j  is R-provable from Xg
86 CHAPTER 4. PROOF THEORY
must be r.e., whenever X is r.e. This means, that the precondition in SRCMP
must be decidable. We can force the precondition to be decidable, if we restrict
ourselves to nite sets X of premisses. On the other hand, R must be idempo-
tent. However, if we restrict ourselves to nite sets X , we have to clarify what
idempotency should mean in this context.
A consequence relation is said to be nitely idempotent if and only if for any
nite X , Y with X  Y  Z:
X ` Y and Y ` Z =) X ` Z:
Note that with Cn(X) = f j X ` g we have for any nite Y such that
X  Y  Cn(X):
Cn(X) = Cn(Y ):
Proposition 4.7. Let Cn be an embedding consequence relation. Cn is nitely
idempotent if and only if Cn is cumulative.
Proof.
`)' Let Cn(X) = f j X ` g be nitely idempotent. Let ' be a formula such
that X ` '. Since Cn is embedding, ` is reexive and we have X ` X [ f'g
and by nite idempotence we have for any  such that X ` : Cn(X) =
Cn(X [ f'g). Hence, X [ f'g ` . But this means that X ` ' and X ` 
implies X [ f'g ` , which is nothing other than cumulativity.
`(' We have to show that if Cn is cumulative then Cn(X) = Cn(X [ fg), for
any  2 Cn(X). Let  2 Cn(X). By cumulativity we have
f' j X ` 'g = f' j X [ fg ` 'g
and hence
Cn(X) = Cn(X [ fg):
r
Denition 4.5 (Finite R.E. Approximation). Let Cons be an arbitrary con-
sequence operator. We say that Cons is a nite r.e. approximation of Cn, if Cons
satises all requirements for a r.e. approximation except that idempotency is
replaced by nite idempotency, i.e. if for any nite Y with X  Y  Cons(X)
we have
Cons(X) = Cons(Y ):
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Theorem 4.4. Let X be nite. The system R = [Ax; (RMP, SRCMP)] is a
nite r.e. approximation of Cn
3
.
Proof. Let
R(X) = f j  is R-provable from Xg:
Inclusion. By denition of R.
Nonmonotonicity. To see that the operator R is nonmonotonic consider the
following counter-example to monotonicity: X = fA;A! Bg. We can apply
SRCMP and thus B is R-provable from X . If we extend X by :A we can no
longer apply SRCMP since A is not strongly consistent w.r.t.X
0
= X[f:Ag.
Because RMP is too weak to generate B fromX , we haveB 62 R(X
0
). Hence,
R is nonmonotonic.
Cumulativity. We have to show that if  and 	 are both R-provable from X ,
then 	 is R-provable from X [fg. From Proposition 4.6 we know that  2
Cn
3
(X). Therefore, by Lemma 2.1 we have PMOD(X) = PMOD(X [ fg).
Hence, a formula ' is strongly consistent w.r.t. X if and only ' is strongly
consistent w.r.t. X [ fg. Therefore 	 is R-provable from X [ fg.
Recursively enumerable. Since we restricted ourselves to nite sets X , the
validity of the preconditions in each rule is recursive. Hence R(X) is r.e.
R(X)  Cn
3
(X). Follows from Proposition 4.6.
Finite Idempotence. By equivalence to cumulativity (Proposition 4.7).
Conservativity. Assume that X has a two-valued model. Hence, no atomic
formula takes the value > in any preferred K
3
-model of X . In this case any
application of SRCMP to X is identical to an application of Modus Ponens
to X . Hence, R(X) coincides with Cn
cl
(X).
r
The following proposition shows that R generates at least all consequences
of the monotonic version of Kleene's logic.
Proposition 4.8 (Supradeductivity). Cn
Bolz
(X)  R(X).
Proof. By Theorem 4.2 we have only to show that we are able to simulate the
eects of the rules (_-I), (^-I) and (^-E). Since the axioms ! (_	), (^	) !
 and (^	)! 	 are all in Taut
NC
we can simulate (^-I) and (^-E) with help of
RMP. To see that we can also handle (^-I), note that the axiomA! (B ! A^B)
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is in Taut
NC
. Consider the following RMP-proof:
	
 ! (	 !  ^ 	)
(RMP)
	 !  ^ 	
(RMP)
 ^ 	
r
As already mentioned in Section 2.2.4, congruence plays an important role
in the theory of inference frames. Recall that Cn
Bolz
denotes the monotonic
operator which was syntactically characterised in Section 4.1. We shall not only
show that R and Cn
Bolz
are congruent but that Cn
Bolz
is a deductive basis of
R.
Proposition 4.9. Cn
Bolz
is a deductive basis of R, i.e.
1. for all X we have Cn
Bolz
(X)  R(X)
2. for all X we have Cn
Bolz
(R(X)) = R(X)
3. for all X;Y we have Cn
Bolz
(X) = Cn
Bolz
(Y ) implies R(X) = R(Y ).
Proof. The rst two points follow from supradeductivity (Proposition 4.8). For
the third point, congruence, we rst show that for arbitrary Z we have
R(Cn
Bolz
(Z)) = R(Z): (O)
For the inclusion R(Cn
Bolz
(Z))  R(Z), we know that Z  Cn
Bolz
(Z)  R(Z).
Because R is cumulative we have R(Z)  R(Cn
Bolz
(Z)[Z) and since Cn
Bolz
is
embedding we getR(Z)  R(Cn
Bolz
(Z)). The converse direction does also follow
from supradeductivity (Proposition 4.8) and idempotency (Proposition 4.5) of
R. Hence O .
Since Cn
Bolz
(X) = Cn
Bolz
(Y ) we have R(Cn
Bolz
(X)) = R(Cn
Bolz
(Y )). It
follows from O that R(X) = R(Y ). r
4.2.4 Relativised Normalisation
The concept of an implicational tautology which satises the normalisation con-
dition can be generalised as follows:
Denition 4.6 (Relativised Normalisation). Let X be a set of formulas.
 ! 	 is said to satisfy the normalisation condition (NC) w.r.t. X if and only
if for every preferred model I of X we have:
I j6! 	 , I j ; I j6	:
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The set of all implicational formulas which satisfy NC w.r.t. X is denoted by
NC(X). Clearly, for any X we have Taut
NC
 NC(X). Moreover, Taut
NC
=
NC(?).
Consider the following inference rule, RNMP - Relativised Normalisation
MP:
X ;;! 	 : PC(X;! 	)
(RNMP)
	
where PC(X;! 	) means: ! 	 2 NC(X).
Proposition 4.10. RNMP is sound.
Proof. Since  is valid in every preferred model of X , we know that  takes a
designated truth-value in every preferred model of X . Since ! 	 2 NC(X) we
also know that 	 takes a designated value in every preferred model of X . Thus,
X j	 . r
With help of the rule RNMP, we can dene another Hilbert-style inference
system:
Denition 4.7 (R
NC
, R
NC
-provable). Denote byR
NC
the system [Ax;RNMP].
We say that  is R
NC
-provable from X if and only if  can be generated from
X [Ax by means of RNMP.
Proposition 4.11. If 	 is R-provable from X then 	 is R
NC
-provable from X.
Proof. By induction on the length l of the proof. If l = 0 we have that  2 X .
Assume that l = k + 1. We have two cases:
	 is generated by RMP. We know that there are formulas ; ! 	 with a
proof-length of at most k. Since Taut
NC
 NC(X) we have that  ! 	 2
NC(X). Hence, RNMP is applicable and 	 is R
NC
-provable from X .
	 is generated by SRCMP. We know that there are formulas ;! 	 with
a proof-length of at most k. By the precondition of SRCMP, we know that 
takes the value t in every preferred model of X [fg. Since  is R-provable
we know by soundness of R that  takes the value t in every preferred model
of X . Moreover ! 	 is R-provable. Hence, 	 takes a value from ft;>g in
every preferred model of X . Therefore, ! 	 2 NC(X).
r
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Proposition 4.12 (Supradeductivity). Cn
Bolz
(X)  R
NC
(X).
Proof. By Cn
Bolz
(X)  R(X) (Proposition 4.8) and R(X)  R
NC
(X) (Propo-
sition 4.11). r
The above propositions show that the rule RNMP is indeed very powerful.
This is due to the extremely strong precondition. Of course, there is no general
restriction on the type of preconditions that should be allowed for syntactical
characterisations and which type of characterisation contains too much seman-
tical information.
We close our small discussion on RNMP with the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Let X be nite. The system R
NC
= [Ax;RNMP] is nite r.e.
approximation of Cn
3
.
Proof. Let
R
NC
(X) = f j  is R
NC
-provable from Xg:
The inclusion X  R
NC
(X) is immediate.
Nonmonotonicity. By our standard counter-example: let X = fA;A ! Bg
from which B is R
NC
-provable. However, we have B 62 R
NC
(X [ f:Ag).
Cumulativity. Assume that  2 R
NC
(X). We show that every 	 which is
derivable from X at stage i is derivable from X [ fg at stage i. If i = 0 we
have 	 2 X and hence,  2 X [ fg. For i > 0 we have to show that
'! 	 2 NC(X) implies '! 	 2 NC(X [ fg):
Thus, it suces to show that PMOD(X) = PMOD(X [ fg). But since
RNMP is sound we have by  2 R
NC
(X) that X. Hence, by Lemma 2.1
we have PMOD(X) = PMOD(X [ fg).
Recursively enumerable. By niteness of X .
R
NC
(X)  Cn
3
(X). By soundness of RNMP.
Finite Idempotence. By cumulativity.
Conservativity. We have to show: ifX has a two-valuedmodel, then Cn
cl
(X) =
R
NC
(X). Since  2 Cn
cl
(X) we know that there is a classical MP proof of
. We shall show that RNMP can simulate the eect of MP. Consider an
application of MP
'; '! 	
(MP)
	
By the consistency of X we know that the set PMOD(X) coincides with the
set of classical two-valued model of X . Thus, '! 	 2 NC(X).
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r
4.2.5 Paraconsistent Extensions
It is quite convenient to think of a nonmonotonic reasoner as an agent who has
several beliefs about the world. In our case, the agent has some beliefs about
what he or she knows consistently and what might be contradictory. Sometimes
it is quite clear which information is consistent and which is not. For example,
when given
fA;:A;B;B ! Cg
the agent believes that the information about A is contradictory, whereas the
information on C is not. However, when given
X = fA;B;A! :B;B ! :Ag
the agent has no clear idea whether the information A is non-contradictory or
not. If our agent minimises the contradictory information, he or she could either
believe that A is not contradictory and B is, or that B is not contradictory and
A is. Thus, the above information gives raise to attribute two plausible epistemic
states to the agent.
Suppose the agent infers additional information on the basis of the following
rule: if you know ,! 	 and you do not believe that :, then infer 	 . Let us
write this rule in a rst step as:
X j ;! 	 : PC(X j6 :)
(MP*)
X j 	
Do not be confused by the sloppy presentation of the above rule; especially
not by the reference to something like non-deducibility. It should just serve as
an illustration. Suppose the agent acts on the basis of MP* and has been given
the above set X . This yields two dierent paraconsistent epistemic states:
State 1 He or she can ap-
ply MP* to A;A ! :B.
Thus, B becomes contra-
dictory and we cannot ap-
ply MP* to B;B ! :A.
State 2 He or she can ap-
ply MP* to B;B ! :A.
Thus, A becomes contra-
dictory and we cannot ap-
ply MP* to A;A! :B.
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When constructing an epistemic state, the agent does only refer to what he
already knows but also to what he or she does not know. E.g. when constructing
State 1 the agent assumes that A is consistently known.
Instead of characterising the construction of an epistemic state E by some-
thing like non-deducibility, we refer to E itself and reformulate MP* as follows:
(X;E) j ;! 	 : PC(;E)
(MP*)
(X;E) j 	
where PC(;E) means:  62 E.
This is very similar to Reiter's Default Logic (cf. [Brewka, 1991]). Like in
Default Logic, we only have a so-called quasi-inductive xpoint denition of an
extension. Technically, this means that we (nondeterministically) guess a set E
and verify whether E is an extension.
Denition 4.8 (Paraconsistent Extension). Let X be a set of formulas. A
set E  X is said to be a paraconsistent extension of X if and only if E =
  (X;E) where
 
0
(X;E)=
def
X [Ax
 
i
(X;E)=
def
 
i 1
(X;E) [ f	 j ;! 	 2  
i 1
(X) and if : 2 E then
! 	 2 Taut
NC
g
  (X;E)=
def
1
[
n=0
 
n
(X;E)
The inductive step corresponds to the application of the following rule, which
is in fact a combination of RMP and MP*. This rule is called Cautious Modus
Ponens:
(X;E);;! 	 : PC(E;; ! 	)
(CMP)
	
where PC(E;; ! 	) means: : 2 E implies ! 	 2 Taut
NC
Let us illustrate how the above xpoint construction works:
Example 4.2. Consider againX = fA;A! B;A! :Bg. We have just seen that
the set of preferred models of X can be partitioned into two sets each judging
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dierent formulas to be paraconsistent. There are two paraconsistent extensions:
E
1
= X[fA;:A;A^:A : : : g and E
2
= X[fA;B;:B; : : : g. Moreover,B;:B 62
E
1
and :A 62 E
2
.
It is easy to see that B;:B 2   (X;E
2
): since :A 62 E
2
we can infer B from
A;A! B. After contraposing B ! :A we can infer :B from A;A! :B.
To see that A;:A 2   (X;E
1
) is more dicult: we have to show how :A
can be derived, i.e. we have to show that there is   (X;E
1
) which contains :A.
One possibility how :A can enter   (X;E
1
) is by the fact that (A! B)^ (B !
:A):!::A is a tautology. Unfortunately, this tautology does not satisfy the nor-
malisation condition, so we have to show that the negation of the antecedent, i.e.
:((A! B) ^ (B ! A)), is not contained in E
1
. The negation of the antecedent
is semantically equivalent to (A ^ :B) _ (B ^ A). But since neither B nor :B
is contained in E
1
we can conclude that the negation of the antecedent is not
contained in E
1
. Further, there is  
i 1
(X;E
1
) which contains X and the above
tautology. Hence, :A 2  
i
(X;E
1
).
Proposition 4.13. Let I j

X and E=
def
f j I jg. Then,   (X;E)  E.
Proof. We show by induction on the construction of   (X;E) that for all i we
have
 
i
(X;E)  E:
For i = 0 the proposition is immediately clear. Suppose that the proposition
holds for i = n. Consider  2  
n+1
(X;E). If  was already a member of  
i
(X;E)
we are done. Suppose  62  
i
(X;E). If 	 has been inserted by applying RMP we
are done. Assume that 	 has been inserted by MP*. Since  2 E and : 62 E
we have that I() = t. Thus, I(	) = t. This proves the soundness of MP* and
therefore the soundness of CMP. r
4.3 A Hilbert-Style Approximation for FOK
3
The preclosure operator Cn
3
of propositional K
3
can be syntactically approxi-
mated by means of R = [Ax; (RMP, SRCMP)]. As we have seen in Corollary 3.1
FOK
3
has the same tautologies as classical rst-order logic. This gives rise to the
question, whether we can just add quantier-handling rules and axioms to R
in order to obtain a syntactical characterisation of FOK
3
. In classical rst-order
logic, quantiers are handled by the following rules:
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! 	
A Gen
8x! 	
! 	
y
S Gen
! 8x	
The y is the Eigenvariable-condition (i.e. x does not belong to the set of A's
free variables). Beside the above rules we have the following rules for substituting
variables:
V Rep Suppose we are given . If the formula 	 results from  by substituting
each bounded variable x in  by some x
0
, then we can conclude 	 .
T Sub Suppose we are given  and x=t is the result substituting simultane-
ously each occurrence of the variable x by the term t, then we can conclude

x
=t.
It is known that the axiom schemes Ax and the rules (A Gen, S Gen, V Sub,
T Sub, MP) axiomatise classical rst-order entailment. It is also easy to see that
the rules A Gen, S Gen, V Rep, T Sub are sound w.r.t. FOK
3
. Moreover RMP
is sound w.r.t. FOK
3
.
Lemma 4.1. Let A be a structure. Then
1. If A j=
K
3
 and  ! 	 is a tautology which satises the normalisation condi-
tion, then A j=
K
3
	 .
2. If A j=
K
3
! 	 then A j=
K
3
8x! 	 .
3. If A j=
K
3
! 	 and x does not belong to 's free variables then A j=
K
3
! 8x	 .
4. If A j=
K
3
 and 	 is the result of substituting one of 's bounded variables x
by x
0
then A j=
K
3
	 .
5. If A j=
K
3
 and 
x
=t is the replacement of x by the term t, then A j=
K
3

x
=t.
Proof. Part 1 is by Theorem 3.6. Part 2-5 is immediately by denition of validity
(Denition 3.2). r
Proposition 4.14. The system [Ax; (RMP, A Gen, S Gen, V Rep, T Sub)] gen-
erates all classical rst-order tautologies and therefore all FOK
3
tautologies.
Proof. Analogously to the propositional case (Proposition 4.3). r
R
FO
does not generate all FOK
3
-consequences of the set X . There is no
procedure which recursively enumerates all elements of Cn
K
(X), for any X .
This is, like in the propositional case, due to failure of compactness. However,
in the propositional case we could restrict X to be nite in order guarantee that
Cn
3
(X) is r.e. Unfortunately, this trick does not work because there are nite
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sets of rst-order formulas, which have FOK
3
-models but no preferred FOK
3
-
models. But even if we guarantee that a nite set X has a preferred model,
there is no guarantee that Cn
K
(X) is r.e. In order to obtain this result, we need
an additional concept. Let  be a formula, P a unary predicate symbol. The
relativisation of  to P , denoted by 
P
, is inductively dened as follows:

P
=
def
P if  is atomic
(
1
^ 
2
)
P
=
def

P
1
^ 
P
2
(
1
_ 
2
)
P
=
def

P
1
_ 
P
2
(:)
P
=
def
:(
P
)
((9x))
P
=
def
(9x)(Px ^ 
P
)
((8x))
P
=
def
(8x)(Px! 
P
)
It is easy to see that the denition of the 9- and the 8-case comply with the
equivalence 9x  :8x:. Literally speaking, 
P
is interpreted as  with all
quantiers restricted to P . The book [Chang and Keisler, 1977] shows how to
axiomatise Bernays' Set Theory with help of relativisation.
Proposition 4.15. There is a nite set X such that for every I j=
K
3
X there is
I
0
v I, I
0
j=

K
3
X with Cn
K
(X) is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. Consider Peano's formal number theory Arith, i.e. the axioms
f 8x8y8z[x = y ! (x = z ! y = z)];
8x8y[s(x) = s(y)! x = y];
8x8y[x = y ! s(X) = s(y)];
8x[:(s(x) = 0)];
8x[x+ 0 = x];
8x8y[x+ s(y) = s(x+ y)];
8x[x  0 = 0];
8x8y[x  s(y) = x  y + x];
g
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Let Ax(P;Q) denote the following set of axioms:
f P0 ^ :P0;
8x[Qx$ (Px ^ :Px)];
8x[Qx! Qs(x)];
Q0
g
Let T = Arith [ Ax(P;Q). Since T is universal, it has by Theorem 3.3 a
preferred model A = [;D; F;P] such that P
+
Q
= IN . Let N be a standard model
of number theory. Then, for any sentence ' we have N j= ' if and only if
'
Q
2 Cn
K
(T ). Since the set f j N j= g is not recursively enumerable, we have
that Cn
K
(T ) is not r.e. r
Nevertheless we can try to nd nonmonotonic approximation of Cn
K
. Con-
sider the following rule
X ;;! 	 : PC(X;)
SRCMP
FO
	
where PC(X;) means: there is no preferred model A of X such that A j=
K
3
^:.
Let R
FO
denote [Ax; (RMP, SRCMP
FO
, A Gen, S Gen, V Rep, T Sub)].
Proposition 4.16 (Soundness of R
FO
). If  is R
FO
-provable from X, then
 2 Cn
K
(X).
Proof. Soundness of RMP and the quantier rules is immediate. It thus remains
to show that SRCMP
FO
is sound. Assume that ;! 	 holds in every preferred
model A of X . By the precondition it is assured that : is invalid in every such
A. Hence, A j=
K
3
	 . r
The question is now, whether the deductive system R
FO
is a r.e. approx-
imation of Cn
K
. The properties of Nonmonotonicity, Inclusion, Idempotence
are immediate. The most important question is whether R
FO
is r.e. The rule
SRCMP
FO
requires that we check whether no preferred model of X satises
 ^ :. However, the set of formulas, which are not paraconsistent in any pre-
ferred model A of a given set X are not recursively enumerable. For example if
X is empty this set coincides with the satisable formulas of rst-order logic.
This set is known not to be recursively enumerable (otherwise, rst-order logic
would be decidable).
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Theorem 4.6. The set of formulas which are R
FO
-provable is not r.e.
Proof. By the above discussion. r
4.4 Tableaux Systems
The Hilbert-style characterisations are not well suited for a mechanisation of
answering the question whether  can be inferred from X . We shall now discuss
a constructive method to decide whether  is entailed byX , or not. This method
is called tableau method, or tableau procedure and has gained enormous popularity
during the last decades. Tableaux systems were independently discovered in the
mid-fties by Beth, Hintikka and Schutte.
3
A tableau system is a refutation system, i.e. in order to prove that  follows
from X , we show systematically that there is no (preferred) model of X in which
 takes the value f .
Even though the idea is quite simple, it requires that we introduce a new
type of formula as well as a concept of validity for these formulas.
Denition 4.9 (Signed Formula, Tableau). Let  2 L be a formula. A
signed formula is an expression of the form :t, : f or :T. A tableau is a
tree whose nodes are signed formulas.
The intended meaning of :t is that ` is true' (: f and :T correspondingly).
We shall decompose a signed formula like (A ^B):t by a tableau decomposition
rule in order to determine the possible truth-values of its subformulas A and B.
We have two kinds of tableau decomposition rules: -rules and -rules which
have the following form:


1
; 
2


1
k
2
An -rule extends the tableau by adding two nodes 
1
, 
2
without generating
a new branch. A -rule extends a tableau by generating a branch containing 
1
and another branch containing 
2
.
3
For classical logic, the corresponding tableaux systems can be seen as a variant of
the Sequent Calculus presented by Gentzen. Like the resolution method, tableaux
systems can be understood `as attempts to exploit the power of CUT-elimination
theorems in Gentzen-type calculi' ([Avron, 1993]).
98 CHAPTER 4. PROOF THEORY
We have the following set R of tableau decomposition rules.
( ^ 	):t
(^t)
:t; 	 :t
( ^ 	): f
(^f)
: f k	 : f
( _ 	):t
(_t)
:t k	 :t
( _ 	): f
(_f)
: f ; 	 : f
(! 	):t
(! t)
: f k	 :t
(! 	): f
(! f)
:t; 	 : f
::t
(:t)
: f
:: f
(:f)
:t
At the moment, there are no rules for modifying formulas which have a T sign.
We shall introduce them later. For an introduction we wish to stick to the two-
valued propositional case. As an illustrating example, of how tableaux systems
work, assume we want to prove that A! (B ! A) is a tautology. We start with
the initial formula A! (B ! A): f , i.e. we try to nd an interpretation in which
A ! (B ! A) takes the value f . If we succeed, A ! (B ! A) cannot be a
tautology. On the other side: if we fail, then A! (B ! A) must be a tautology.
We apply (! f) to the initial formula A! (B ! A): f . This yields A:t and
(B ! A): f . The tableau-prooftree is given in the gure below.
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(A! (B ! A)): f
A:t
(B ! A): f
B:t
A: f
The formula A occurs in the above path with two dierent signs. This means
that we failed to nd an assignment under which A! (B ! A) takes the value
f . Therefore A! (B ! A) must be a tautology.
As a more complex example consider the formula ((A ! B) ! A) ! A
(Peirce's law). Again we start with (((A ! B) ! A) ! A): f . Application
of (! f) yields ((A ! B) ! A):t and A: f . Now, rule (! t) tells us that if
((A ! B) ! A):t then A:t (i.e. A must be true) or (A ! B): f (i.e. A ! B
must be false). The or is coded by k. In this case our prooftree branches, i.e. we
generate several alternatives by applying a rule of type .
 
 
 
 
 
@
@
@
@
A:t
A:t
A: f
(A! B): f
(((A! B)! A)! A): f
((A! B)! A):t
A: f
Each alternative branch in the above prooftree contains a formula which has
two dierent truth-signs. In other words: each branch contains a contradiction
and hence, there is no assignment under which ((A ! B) ! A) ! A gets the
value f .
Branches containing a contradiction are also said to be closed. Consequently,
a tableau is said to be closed if and only if all of its branches are closed.
Denition 4.10 (Closed, Open). A branch is closed if and only if it contains
a formula with at least two dierent signs. A tableau is closed if and only if each
branch is closed. A tableau or a branch is open if and only if they are not closed.
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We can now dene what a tableau-proof is:
Denition 4.11. A tableau-proof for  is a closed tableau containing : f as the
initial formula.
We shall now show that  is a classical, propositional tautology if and only
if there is a tableau-proof for . The tableau-proof procedure operates on sets
of signed formulas. Similar to the satisability relation between interpretation
functions and propositional sentences, we can dene when an interpretation func-
tion satises a set of signed formulas. This notion enables us to talk about the
soundness (and later, completeness) of the tableau modication rules R.
Denition 4.12 (Satisability of Signed Formulas). A signed formula :s
is satisable if and only if there is an interpretation I such that I() = v(s) where
v : ff ; t;Tg ! ff; t;>g is dened as follows
v(s) :=
8
>
<
>
:
t; if s = t
f; if s = f
>; if s = T
Similarly, a branch is satisable if and only if each of its nodes is satisable;
a tableau is satisable if and only if it contains at least one satisable branch.
It is easy to see that the above rules are sound, i.e. whenever we have a
satisable tableau  and apply rule R to  , then R() is satisable.
Proposition 4.17 (Soundness (Fitting)). Any application of rule R to a
satisable tableau yields a satisable tableau.
Corollary 4.1. If  has a tableau proof, then  is a classical tautology.
On the other hand, the above tableau-system is complete.
Proposition 4.18 (Completeness (Fitting)). If  is a classical tautology,
then  has a tableau proof.
We shall skip the proofs because they are a special case of the soundness
and completeness proofs of the tableau procedure for K
3
. The reader who is
interested in the completeness proofs for the above calculus may nd them in
[Fitting, 1990].
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Let us now turn to a tableau proof procedure for our nonmonotonic para-
consistent logic. Since there is an elegant tableau procedure for Kleene's strong
three-valued logic with Bolzano's entailment relation, we have only to modify
this procedure to account for our preferential entailment relation. The tableau
procedure for Kleene's strong three-valued logic given in [Bloesch, 1993] is a
straight forward extension of the classical propositional procedure presented in
the preceding section.
4.4.1 Bloesch's Tableau System
Bloesch extends the set of truth-signs to ft; f ; t; fg with t meaning `at least true',
f meaning `at least false', t meaning `denitely true' and f meaning `denitely
false'. Thus, a signed formula :s is satisable if and only if there is an interpre-
tation I such that I() 2 v(s) where v(s) : ft; f ; t; fg ! 2
ft;f;>g
is dened as
follows:
v(s) :=
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
ftg; if s = t
ffg; if s = f
ft;>g; if s = t
ff;>g; if s = f
Note that the truth-signs denote sets of truth-values. This approach is also
called sets-as-signs strategy.
( ^ 	):t
(^t)
:t; 	 :t
( ^ 	): f
(^f)
: f k	 : f
( ^ 	):t
(^t)
:t; 	 :t
( ^ 	): f
(^f )
: f k	 : f
( _ 	):t
(_t)
:t k	 :t
( _ 	): f
(_f)
: f ; 	 : f
( _ 	):t
(_t)
:t k	 :t
( _ 	): f
(_f )
: f ; 	 : f
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(! 	):t
(! t)
: f k	 :t
(! 	): f
(! f)
:t; 	 : f
(! 	):t
(! t)
: f k	 :t
(! 	): f
(! f)
:t; 	 : f
::t
(:t)
: f
:: f
(:f)
:t
::t
(:t)
: f
:: f
(:f)
:t
The number of rules may seem too inationary, but a closer look yields that
for example, the rule ^t is almost identical to its overlined counterpart ^t.
Because truth-signs denote a set of truth-values, we need other closing con-
ditions than in the classical case where the fact that two formulas had dierent
truth-signs was sucient; cf. Denition 4.10.
Denition 4.13 (Closed). A branch is closed if and only if there is a formula
 such that
1. :t and : f , or
2. :t and : f , or
3. : f and :t is contained in the sequent or branch.
As usual, a tableau is closed if and only if every branch is closed.
It is easy to check that the above conditions correspond to the case where
the signed formula  is not satisable.
The following Lemma is taken from Bloesch.
Lemma 4.2 (Bloesch, 1993).
1. Every application of a tableau modication rule to a satisable tableau yields
a satisable tableau.
2. If there is a closed tableau for a set of signed formulas X, then X is not
satisable.
Theorem 4.7 (Bloesch, 1993).  is true in every model of X if and only if
every tableau  for X :t; : f is closed.
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4.4.2 Extending Bloesch's Tableau Procedure
Instead of nding an arbitrary model of X in which  is false, we have { in order
to characterise Cn
3
{ to nd a preferred model of X in which  is false. If the
search for such a model fails, then we know that  2 Cn
3
(X).
Suppose we are given the initial tableau containing the signed formulas :t,
: f ( is the conjunction of all elements of X). Clearly, :t is satisable. In
order to nd a preferred model for :t it suces to proceed as follows:
1. Expand every tableau branch completely. If the tableau cannot be further
expanded, then
2. Determine which branches of the complete tableau are @-minimal, where
S @ S
0
holds by denition if and only if
fA j A:t 2 S and A: f 2 Sg  fA j A:t 2 S
0
and A: f 2 S
0
g
for all atomic A.
3. Delete all branches which are not @-minimal; call the resulting tableau nal.
Example 4.3. Let us prove that fA;:A;A! Bg 6B.
 
 
@
@
A ^ :A ^A! B:t
B: f
A:t
:A ^ A! B:t
:A:t
A! B:t
B:t
A: f
A:t
:A: f
OPEN CLOSED
The above prooftree contains two branches S
1
; S
2
each of which is @-minimal
because fA j A:t 2 S
1
; A: f 2 S
1
g = fA j A:t 2 S
2
; A: f 2 S
2
g = fAg. Since
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there a @-minimal branch which is open, the above tableau shows that B is not
provable from fA;:A;A! Bg.
As another example consider the proof of fA;A! BgB:
 
 
@
@
A ^ (A! B):t
B: f
A: f
OPEN
B:t
CLOSED
A! B:t
A:t
Again we have two branches. The left one, S
1
overinterprets A. It is therefore
ruled out by Step 3 in the above procedure. Thus only the right branch remains.
Since it is closed we have a tableau for B from fA;A! Bg.
Consider now a branch S of the nal tableau resulting from the last step.
There is a preferred model I of  such that: I(	) = > i :t and : f appears
on the branch S. Moreover, if the nal tableau is open, then it contains an open
branch which corresponds to some preferred model of  in which  is false. To
establish this result, we need the notion of signed Hintikka sets.
A signed Hintikka set H is a set of signed formulas such that for every atomic
A we have that neither A:t; A: f nor A: f ; A:t nor A:t; A: f is contained in H .
Moreover, if ( ^ 	):t 2 H then :t 2 H and 	 :t 2 H . The rest is according
to the modication rules. The clue about signed Hintikka sets is that (1) each
open, complete branch corresponds to some Hintikka set and (2) each Hintikka
set has a model. The last point is also called model existence theorem.
The following Lemma is fairly obvious:
Lemma 4.3. Let S @ S
0
be two complete and open branches of a tableau  for
X and I
S
be a preferred model of S. Then the following holds: for every preferred
model I
S
0
of S
0
we have I
S
@ I
S
0
.
Proof. It is easy to verify that the set of all nodes from S is a Hintikka set; the
same holds for the set of nodes of S
0
. Moreover, S is satised by the following
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assignment:
I
S
(A) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
t , if A:t 2 S;A: f 62 S
f , if A: f 2 S;A:t 62 S
> , if A:t 2 S;A: f 2 S
t , if A:t 62 S;A: f 62 S
The mapping I
S
0
is dened analogously. Moreover, I
S
0
is a model for S
0
and
for any model J of S
0
we have I
S
0
@ J and J @ I
S
0
. By denition of satisability
of signed formulas, it follows that I
S
@ I
S
0
and hence I
S
@ J for every model J
of S
0
. r
A BF-tableau proof of  from X is any tableau  such that
1.  contains the initial tableau X :t; : f and
2. every branch of  is complete and
3. every @-minimal branch of  is closed.
Theorem 4.8 (Soundness and Completeness for BF-proofs). LetX be -
nite.  is BF-provable from X if and only if  2 Cn
3
(X).
Proof. First note that by Theorem 4.7 we know that I is a preferred model of X
if and only if there is a branch S in the tableau construction for X :t such that
I satises S.
For the direction from right to left, assume that  is BF-provable from X . It
follows from Lemma 4.2 and the denition of a BF-tableau proof that X :t; : f
is not satisable by any preferred model of X . Hence, X 
{
K
3
.
For the opposite direction, assume to the contrary that  2 Cn
3
(X) but 
is not BF-provable from X . This implies that X :t; : f produces a tableau in
which some @-minimal branch is open and complete. Thus, there is a preferred
model I of X which satises X :t; : f { a contradiction. r
The above tableau procedure for Cn
3
has several advantages and disadvan-
tages. It is certainly a plus that the procedure can be obtained easily from the
one Bloesch gave for Kleene's logic with Bolzano's entailment relation. The brute
force search for a preferred model is easy to implement and thus, the strong ma-
chine oriented character of tableau systems is preserved. In [Weber, 1996b] you
may nd an enhancement which constructs @-minimal branches in a bottom-up
manner (instead of generating all branches in a brute force manner and then
deciding which ones are @-minimal).
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Even though tableaux procedures are very natural for a machine oriented
proof theory, they do not give us much insight into the valid patterns of inference.
For example, if we know that X entails A and B, then we also know that X
entails A^B. Whereas the rules for treating disjunction and conjunction might
be fairly obvious
4
, the situation becomes complicated in the case of implication
and negation. This is because Modus Ponens is not a valid rule of inference. The
following section is thus devoted to question: Which rules of inference are needed
to characterise the inferential behaviour of K
3
?
4.5 A Sequent Calculus
A classical sequent, or short CL-sequent, is a pair (X;Y ) of nite sets of formulas.
We denote sequents by X`Y , where ``' is a new metalogical symbol which
should not be confused with any provability symbol. We shall omit the CL if it
is clear from the context. The intended meaning of a sequent is very close to
the notion of provability: a CL-sequent X`Y is valid if and only if every two-
valued interpretation which satises all the elements of X does at least satisfy
one element of Y . Thus, the sequent X`Y is valid if and only if

1
^ : : : ^ 
jXj
  
1
_ : : : _  
jY j
holds, where X = f
1
; : : : ; 
jXj
g; Y = f 
1
; : : : ;  
jY j
g.
For example, for every formula , the sequent ` is valid. The task of a
Sequent Calculus is to produce all valid sequents.
Sequent Systems have been introduced by Gentzen in his dissertation where
he presented a sequent calculus called LK for classical logic and one for intu-
itionistic logic as well as their rst-order versions.
Let me now briey introduce Gentzen's sequent calculus LK for classical
propositional logic.
Notational convention We write X;Y for X [ Y and X; for X [ fg to
improve readability.
Axioms: All sequents of the form `.
Logical Rules:
X`; Y
NEA
X;:`Y
X;`Y
NES
X`Y;:
4
In fact we already have them implicitly in our set of tableau rules, if we read the
rules upside down.
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X;`Z X;	`Z
OEA
X; _ 	`Z
X`Y; 
OES 1
X`Y;  _ 	
X`Y; 	
OES 2
X`Y;  _ 	
X;`Y
UEA 1
X; ^ 	`Y
X; 	`Y
UEA 2
X; ^ 	`Y
X`Y;  X`Y; 	
UES
X`Y;  ^ 	
X`X
0
;  Y; 	`Y
0
IEA
X;Y; ! 	`X
0
; Y
0
X;`Y; 	
IES
X`Y; ! 	
Structural Rules:
X`Y
VL
X;`Y
X`Y
VR
X`Y; 
Cut:
X`;X
0
Y; `Y
0
Cut
X;Y `X
0
; Y
0
The rules IEA and IES are originally called FEA and FES in [Gentzen, 1934].
The following two results are due to Gentzen:
Theorem 4.9. [Gentzen, 1934]
1. The above calculus LK is sound and complete w.r.t. classical propositional
logic.
2. Any sequent provable in the above calculus is also provable without using the
Cut-rule.
The second point of Theorem 4.9 is the famous Cut-elimination theorem.
Some of the above rules become invalid for K
3
, others remain valid. For
example, the twoOES rules seem to be unproblematic whereas Cut can obviously
not be sustained.
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Denition 4.14 (K
3
-Sequent, Validity). A K
3
-sequent is a pair (X;Y ) of
nite sets of formulas, denoted by X `
K
3
Y . A K
3
-sequent X `
K
3
Y is valid if and
only if each preferred model of X satises at least one element of Y .
The proof theory for K
3
relies on the following observation which is another
(weakened) version of the deduction theorem called ultra normalised, because it
requires that the antecedent always takes the truth-value t in every preferred
model of a given set X [ fg.
Theorem 4.10 (Ultra Normalised Deduction Theorem). If X ! 	
and  does not take the value > in any preferred model of X [ fg then X [
fg	 .
The validity of the above theorem is immediate. Corollary, the following
version of the CUT rule is valid for K
3
X `
K
3
 X
0
; `
K
3
	 : PC(X;)
Cut
X;X
0
`
K
3
	
The precondition PC(X;) means `provided that  does not take the value
> in any preferred model of X [ X
0
'. In the following we shall denote ` does
not take the value > in any preferred model of X ' by X # .
Using the above condition, we can now give the axioms and rules of the
calculus LK
3
.
4.5.1 The Calculus LK
3
The calculus LK
3
has the following axioms and rules:
Axioms: All sequents of the form ;X `
K
3
.
Logical Rules: (the names are derived from Gentzen's original terminology).
X;`
K
3
Y
NES
X `
K
3
Y;:
X;`
K
3
Y; ; 	
OES
X;`
K
3
Y;  _ 	
X `
K
3
Y;  _ 	
OBS
X `
K
3
Y; ; 	
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X;; 	 `
K
3
Y
UEA
X; ^ 	 `
K
3
Y
X `
K
3
; Y X `
K
3
	; Y
UES
X `
K
3
 ^ 	; Y
X `
K
3
Y;  X
0
; 	 `
K
3
Y
0
: PC(X [X
0
# :)
IEA
X;X
0
; ! 	 `
K
3
Y; Y
0
X; `
K
3
Y; 	
IES
X `
K
3
Y; ! 	
X; ^ 	 `
K
3
Y
UBA
X;; 	 `
K
3
Y
X `
K
3
Y;  ^ 	
UBS
X `
K
3
Y; ; 	
X `
K
3
Y; ! 	 : PC(X [ fg # :)
IBS
X;`
K
3
Y; 	
Structural Rules:
?`
K
3

Inclusion
X `
K
3

X `
K
3
Y
VR
X `
K
3
Y; 
X `
K
3
 X `
K
3
	
Cumulativity
X;`
K
3
	
Weak Cut:
X `
K
3
 X
0
; `
K
3
	 : PC(X [X
0
# :)
Weak Cut
X;X
0
`
K
3
	
We say that  is LK
3
-provable from X if and only if the sequent X `
K
3
 can
be generated.
NB. The axioms of LK
3
are more general than the axioms for Gentzen's calculus.
They represent the inclusion property of the semantical entailment relation  .
Comments on the rules: there are three rules, namely NEA, VL, and Cut, of
the classical sequent calculus LK which do not hold for K
3
. The failure of CUT
is obvious. To see that NEA, which is
X `
K
3
Y; 
NEA
X;:`
K
3
Y
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is invalid, consider the application of NEA to the valid sequent A;A^B `
K
3
B;A
would yield :A;A;A ! B `
K
3
B which is invalid. The rule NEA corresponds to
the reductio ad absurdum principle which is invalid in K
3
.
The rule IBS, which is a version of Weak Cut, can be obtained from the other
rules. We wish to list it explicitly in order to make the proofs simpler.
The rule UBS has no analogue in Gentzen's calculus, though being valid for
classical propositional logic. The reason is that it can be obtained quite easily
in LK:
X `  ^ 	
 ` 
(UEA 1)
 ^ 	 ` 
(Cut)
X ` 
In the calculus LK
3
we can simulate the eect of UEA 1 but not the full
power of Gentzen's Cut. We therefore list the UBS explicitly.
Theorem 4.11 (Soundness). Let X be a set of formulas. Then, for any ,
X `
K
3
 implies X.
Proof. It is easy to check that the above rules are sound. The logical rules NES,
UEA, IES, UES and UBA are immediate. Soundness of Weak Cut, IEA and IBS
follows from Theorem 4.10. Soundness of Inclusion and VR is immediate. r
Theorem 4.12. If  is a (K
3
-)tautology, then the sequent ?`
K
3
 can be gener-
ated.
Proof. It is easy to see that if  is an axiom of the classical propositional calculus
then ?`
K
3
 and by Inclusion X `
K
3
 can be generated. For the inductive step we
will simulate modus ponens. Suppose we have generated?`
K
3
	 and ?`
K
3
	 ! .
Then we can prove ?`
K
3
 as follows (we use `
K
3
 as a shorthand for ?`
K
3
):
`
K
3
	
`
K
3
	 ! 
(IBS)
	 `
K
3

(Weak Cut)
`
K
3

The rules IBS and Weak Cut can be applied, because by soundness of LK
3
we
know that if `
K
3
	 holds then 	 has a two-valued model. Thus, we have shown
that if  is a tautology, then the sequent `
K
3
 can be generated. r
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Example 4.4. Let us show that A ^ B is provable from fA;:A;A! B;C;C !
B;E;:E;F ! Eg. Let X
0
:= fA;:A;A! B;E;:E;F ! Eg, X
00
:= X n fAg.
X
00
; A`
K
3
A
X = X
00
[ fAg
X `
K
3
A
X
0
; C `
K
3
C B `
K
3
B
(IEA)
C does not take
the value > in any
pref. model of X
0
[
fCg
X
0
; C; C ! B `
K
3
B
X `
K
3
B
(UES)
X `
K
3
A ^ B
Proposition 4.19. If X is nite, then the set of formulas which are LK
3
-
provable from X is recursively enumerable.
Proof. It is sucient to note, that for each rule, the precondition PC(: : : ) { if
there is any { is decidable. But since X is always nite, this must be the case. r
Theorem 4.13. LK
3
is a nite recursively enumerable approximation of Cn
3
(X).
Proof. By soundness of LK
3
's rules we have inclusion w.r.t. to Cn
3
. Moreover
by the Proposition 4.19 we have that LK
3
's provability relation is r.e.
Inclusion. By axiom.
Nonmonotonicity. We can use our standard counter-example to monotonicity.
Let X = fA;A! Bg. We can generate X `
K
3
B by using IEA. It is simple to
check that IEA is the only rule which admits the introduction of ! in the
antecedent. However, the application of IEA is blocked when augmenting X
by :A. Hence, B is not LK
3
-provable from X [ f:Ag.
Cumulativity. By the corresponding rule.
Finite Idempotency. Follows by Proposition 4.7 from inclusion and cumula-
tivity.
Conservativity. We have to show that if X has a two-valued model, then f j
X 
{
K
3
g = Cn
cl
(X). The inclusion from left to right follows from soundness
of LK
3
(Theorem 4.11). For the converse direction, we know that since  2
Cn
cl
(X), there is a classical Modus Ponens proof of  from X . It suces to
show that if X has a two-valued model, then from X `
K
3
 and X `
K
3
! 	
we can infer X `
K
3
	 . We apply the same argument as in Theorem 4.12:
X `
K
3
	
X `
K
3
	 ! 
(IBS)
X;	 `
K
3

(Weak Cut)
X `
K
3

It is easy to see that IBS andWeak Cut are applicable becauseX is consistent
and X `
K
3
 is valid.
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r
The following proposition is the analogue of Proposition 4.8.
Proposition 4.20 (Supradeductivity). If  2 Cn
Bolz
(X) then X `
K
3
.
Proof. Like in the proof of Proposition 4.8 it suces to show that the rules (^-I),
(^-E) and (_-I) of the calculus for Cn
Bolz
given in Section 4.1 can be simulated.
(^-I) can be handled by UES and (^-E) by UBS. r
The above sequent-style calculus shows which patterns of inference are legal
for K
3
. It gives us a good insight into how contradictory information is treated
in our paraconsistent logic: in the very moment in which some formula can be
reasonably suspected to be paraconsistent, i.e. as soon as there is at least one
preferred model in which this formula takes the value >, some inferences are not
valid. This shows again the extreme cautious character of the inference relation.
However, testing whether  can take the value > is clearly of semantical nature
and it is debatable whether the above calculus is completely in the spirit of
Gentzen's sequent calculi or not.
Gentzen did pay special attention to a formal system which `is as close as
possible to mathematical reasoning'. We can now ask how close the rules of
LK
3
are to common-sense reasoning. I have got no knocking down philosophical
arguments, but I think that our reasoning in the presence of contradictions
is only cautious if we are aware of these contradictions { no matter how we
found out about them. This does also hold for mathematical reasoning. For
example, assume that number theory or set theory is not consistent. Our whole
reasoning within and about these formal theories is not aected by fact that they
are inconsistent as long as we do not know about this. Once we are conscious
of inconsistencies we are extremely careful about which sentences they should
justify. This is reected by the rules with the extra condition X # . Thus, I
would conrm that LK
3
reects the patterns of a certain type of common-sense
reasoning.
Another interesting point has been brought up by Priest in his paper on
Minimally Inconsistent LP. Priest asks whether a logic like K
3
can be used
to model mathematical reasoning. For example, if number theory is inconsistent
then reasoning with K
3
prevents us from sanctioning the belief in every sentence.
Hence, the argument for using K
3
instead of classical logic is similar to the one
which favours intuitionistic logic to classical logic: if a theory is decidable, then no
intuitionist would reject an indirect proof. If, however, a theory is not decidable,
then indirect proofs will be rejected. As for K
3
we could say that if we know that
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a theory is consistent, then there is no problem with classical logic. If, however,
we cannot guarantee the consistency of a theory (e.g. number theory), then it is
safer to reason in a K
3
-manner.
4.6 Conclusion
We investigated K
3
's proof-theory. We have shown that the set of consequences is

0
2
-hard. i.e. not recursively enumerable.We thus introduced the concept of a r.e.
approximation. We then discussed three proof-systems: Hilbert-style, semantical
tableaux and Gentzen-type.
The Hilbert-style and Gentzen-type systems were all r.e. approximations of
Cn
3
, whereas the tableau-system is a sound and complete procedure for deciding
whether  is entailed by a nite set X . This suggests that the tableau procedure
is the most appropriate device for a mechanisation of K
3
. We have, however,
argued that the other proof-systems do not become obsolete: the Hilbert-style
systems show how to modify the modus ponens rule in order to obtain a syntac-
tical approximation of K
3
and the Gentzen-type system shows which patterns
of inference are valid for K
3
. It is an open question, whether the Hilbert- and
Gentzen-like systems are also complete.
CHAPTER 5
Reasoning About Unknown Information
Up to now we have discussed the problem of how to deal with contradictory
information. Contradictory information means that we have too much informa-
tion. On the other side we can also have the situation where we have a lack of
information or data. This means that the database has neither information on
 nor on :.
The problem is how to nd out whether the database (which has a certain
deduction mechanism) has information of  or not? The easiest way would be
to put the query ? If this query fails (i.e. if the database answers `No.'), we
could ask for :? If both queries fail, then we know that the database does not
have information on .
This procedure enables us to check whether there is information on  or not.
But can we say that the database itself has information on whether  is known
or unknown? The answer is `No', because there is no sentence like `unknown '
contained in the database. If the language of the database is a classical rst-order
or propositional language, then the database cannot even represent a fact like
`unknown ' because there is no operator `unknown'.
The mission to be accomplished in this chapter is to develop a logic which
enables a database to reason about its own content or data. Assume that we
have enriched our language by an operator  with the intended meaning that
 should represent something like `it is known to the database that ' or `
can be derived from the database' (by means of its deduction mechanism). The
intended meaning of  is similar to that of  if none of them is negated: there
should be no dierence between telling the database that ` holds' or telling it
`you know that  holds'. If, however, the database has no information on , for
example when it is empty, then : should be entailed. This is dierent from
a database which entails :, because in general such a database could not be
empty.
A logic which enables a database to reason about its own content and iden-
ties the sentences which are not known has a great impact on AI applications.
For example, machine learning algorithms, could really improve when having
the explicit information that A is unknown. This has been reported by, e.g.
Hirsh [Hirsh, 1990] (cf. also the transcript of the discussion on meta-reasoning
in [Brazdil and Konolige, 1990]). Moreover, there are machine learning systems
and knowledge-acquisition systems whose inference engine provide an unknown
operator (cf. [Morik and Wrobel, 1933], [Emde, 1991]). Unfortunately there is a
severe theoretical drawback of these systems: they lack a clear semantics. One
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part of the semantics is algebraical or set theoretical while the semantics for
the unknown operator is given in a proof theoretical manner. For example, the
semantics for the unknown-operator in [Morik and Wrobel, 1933] is described as
(: : : )unknown [A] evaluates to true if and only if the proposition A (: : : ) cannot
be proved. This is a reading rather than a semantics. The logic presented in this
chapter will x this problem.
The plot is as follows: after having presented some preliminaries we will
investigate what is meant by ` is unknown', thus developing a formal semantics
which eliminates the aforementioned problems with earlier approaches. In the
ensuing section we shall study fundamental properties of our logic. Again, closure
properties and compactness will play an important role. We will then start to give
a syntactical characterisation of our entailment relation. This characterisation
enables us to compare in Section 5.4 to Moore's autoepistemic logic and the
nonmonotonic logic NML-2 of McDermott. It will turn out that our logic, which
was originally intended to model the semantics of an unknown-operator used
by some AI-systems, is located between autoepistemic logic and McDermott's
nonmonotonic S5.
5.1 Semantical Investigations
5.1.1 Terminology
We will extend the propositional language L by the modal operators  and .
A formula preceded by  or  is called a modal formula. A nonmodal formula
is a formula which has no modal subformula. Again, we shall omit the reference
to a special propositional signature  when it is clear from the context or not
important and then just talk about L
M
.
As usual, a two-valued propositional interpretation function of a signature 
is a mapping I :  ! ft; fg. A Kripke structureM is a tuple (M;V )
1
where M
is an index set (also called set of possible worlds or states) and V = fI
1
; I
2
; : : : g
is a set of two-valued propositional interpretation functions such that there is a
bijection between V and M . Throughout this chapter we shall only deal with
two-valued functions I . We shall thus omit the attribute `two-valued'. The set
of all Kripke structures interpreting a signature  is denoted by STRUCT().
1
Normally, Kripke structures have an accessibility relation R M M . Throughout
this chapter we assume R to be complete (i.e. R = M M); it follows that M is
also universal (this implies that it is reexive, symmetric and transitive).
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5.1.2 Unknown Means Satisability
Let us return to our database. We say that the database X  L
M
does not
have any information about a sentence  2 L
M
if and only if neither  nor :
can be proved from the database
2
. A careless transformation of this idea into
the denition of validity could yield the potpourri semantics mentioned in the
beginning of this chapter. The key idea to obtain an appropriate semantics is
that if neither  nor : is provable from X , then  as well as : is satisable
with respect to X . Thus,  is unknown w.r.t. the database X if both, fg [X
and f:g [X are satisable. Such an unknown-operator could be modelled by
using Kripke structures as interpreting structures. The validity relation j=
MK
is
identical to the validity relation of modal S5.
Denition 5.1 (Validity, Kripke-model). Let ; 	 2 L be formulas, M =
(M;V ) a Kripke structure,  2M
M j=
MK

 for an atomic  if I

() = t
M j=
MK

 ^ 	 i M j=
MK

 and M j=
MK

	
M j=
MK

! 	 i M 6 j=
MK

 or M j=
MK

	
M j=
MK

 i there is  2M such that M j=
MK


M j=
MK

: i M 6 j=
MK


The connectives _ (disjunction),  (exclusive or) and the operator  are
dened as abbreviations in the usual way.
M is a (Kripke-) model for , alternatively  is valid in M, (M j=
MK
) if for
all  2 M , we have M j=
MK

. We extend the relation j=
MK
in the usual way to
sets of formulas.
The next step is to dene the concept of MK-entailment (denoted by the
relational symbol 
{
MK
). As said before, the goal is to have an entailment relation

{
MK
such that X 
{
MK
:: (or shorter,X 
{
MK
), whenever  is satisable w.r.t.
X or, in other terms, whenever X [ fg has a model. However, if we allow  to
be an arbitrary sentence, this could yield counter-intuitive results: let X = fBg;
there is a Kripke-structure M such that M j=
MK
X [ fCg. Thus, X [ fCg is
2
An alternative would be to restrict the non-provability condition to , i.e. to say
that we don't have any information on  if and only if we cannot prove . We judge
this to be a matter of taste.
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satisable and we should have X 
{
MK
C. But C is semantically equivalent
to C. Hence, X 
{
MK
C. This contradicts our intuition because the conclusion
`C is known' is entailed by a database which had no information about C. We
will therefore restrict  to be a nonmodal sentence
3
.
We have to nd out whether there is a modelM of X such that  2 L is true
in at least one of M's possible worlds. Fortunately, we can restrict the search
for such a model to those models of X which contain a maximal set of possible
worlds. To see why, note that if X[ has a model then X[ is valid in some
model M
max
of X which contains a maximal set of possible worlds (remember
that  is nonmodal). Generally,
Intuitively, X MK-entails 	 if 	 is valid in each structure M = (M;V ) with
1. M j=
MK
X and
2. M is maximal, that is V contains as many two valued interpretations as
possible, that isM makes as many formulas of the form A valid as possible,
where A is a nonmodal formula.
To ensure that we consider only maximal models (in the above sense), we
must be able to compare arbitrary Kripke structures to nd out which structure
is a maximal model. This can be done by correlating all structures via the S5-
substructure relation. The idea behind S5-substructures is that, M = (M;V ) is
a S5-substructure of N = (N;W ) if N `extends'M, i.e if M  N (and V W ).
However, since M and N could be arbitrary index sets (i.e. M could be a set of
natural numbers, while N could be a set of characters), we have to ensure, that
they are `comparable'. This will be guaranteed by existence of an isomorphism.
Denition 5.2 (S5-Substructure). Two structuresM = (M;V ); N = (N;W )
are isomorphic (denoted byM

=
N) if and only if there is a bijection I :M ! N
such that V

=W
I()
, for every  2M .
We say that M = (M;V ) is an S5-substructure of N = (N;W ), denoted by
M4N, if and only if there is N
0
= (N
0
;W
0
) such that N
0
 N , W
0
 W and
N
0
is isomorphic toM. We say that M is a strict S5-substructure of N, denoted
by MN, if and only if there is N
0
= (N
0
;W
0
) such that N
0
 N , W
0
 W
and N
0
is isomorphic to M.
We can use  as a preference relation in the sense of [Shoham, 1988] and
dene preferred models on the basis of this preference relation.
3
This restriction can practically be justied by the fact that in the aforementioned
AI systems the operator unknown can only be applied to propositions which do not
already contain this operator.
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Denition 5.3 (Preferred model). Let  2 L
M
, X  L
M
. Dene a relation
j=

MK
 j=
MK
such that
1. M j=

MK
 if and only if M j=
MK
 and there is no M
0
such that MM
0
and
M
0
j=
MK
; we say that M is a preferred or maximal model for .
2. M j=

MK
X if and only if M j=
MK
X and there is no M
0
such that MM
0
and
M
0
j=
MK
X ; we say that M is a preferred or maximal model for X
4
.
Following Shoham [Shoham, 1988] we dene an entailment relation 
{
MK
as
follows:
Denition 5.4 (
{
MK
,Cn
MK
). X 
{
MK
 if and only if, M j=

MK
X implies M j=
MK
.
Cn
MK
(X) is the set of all formulas entailed byX , i.e. Cn
MK
(X)=
def
f j X 
{
MK
g
5
.
The following examples illustrate the above denitions
Example 5.1. Let  = fA;Bg be a signature, X = f:A! Ag. There are two
preferred models M
1
= (f; g; I
1
) and M
2
= (f; g; I
2
) for X :
I
1

(A) = t I
1

(A) = t I
2

(A) = f I
2

(A) = t
I
1

(B) = t I
1

(B) = f I
2

(B) = t I
2

(B) = t
Thus, we have X 
{
MK
B ^ :B but X 6
{
MK
A and X 6
{
MK
:A.
Example 5.2. Let  = fA;Bg be a propositional signature, X = ?. Then fA;
B; :A; :Bg  Cn
MK
(X).
The following lemma states a basic property of the preferential validity rela-
tion and will be useful in a number of proofs.
Lemma 5.1. If M j=

MK
X and X 
{
MK
 then M j=

MK
X [ fg.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is A
0
A such that A
0
j=
MK
X [ fg.
Hence A
0
j=
MK
X which contradicts the assumption that A is a preferred model of
X . r
Let us denote the logic based on the above entailment relation by MK, for
minimal knowledge.
4
Please note that the extension from formulas to sets of formulas in the above deni-
tion is not equivalent to `M j=

MK
X if and only if M j=

MK
, for every  2 X'.
5
The idea of taking maximal S5 structures already appeared in [Lifschitz, 1991] who
called his system a logic of Minimal Knowledge (MK). To exploit the relationship
between his work and mine, please see the section on related work at the end of this
chapter.
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5.2 Properties
In this section we shall discuss some properties of our logic. The main questions
we have in mind are: what general properties, which we know from classical logic,
e.g. closure properties, do hold for our logic?
5.2.1 Basic Properties
Proposition 5.1. Cn
MK
is a nonmonotonic, cumulative, preclosure operator.
Proof. Clearly, Cn
MK
is a preclosure operator. To see that it is cumulative, we
have to show that
X 
{
MK
; 	 implies X [ fg
{
MK
	
Let A j=

MK
X . We then know that A j=
MK
; 	 and thus by Lemma 5.1 we have
A j=

MK
X [ fg and hence X [ fg
{
MK
	 .
The nonmonotonicity follows easily from a counter-example to monotonicity:
?
{
MK
:A but fAg6
{
MK
:A.
r
Theorem 5.1 (Preferred Model Existence). If X has anMK-modelM then
X has a preferred MK-model N such that M4N.
Proof. Consider the following chain of models of X :
MM
0
M
1
 : : :
with M
i
= (M
i
; V
i
). We shall show that this chain has an upper bound N.
Without loss of generality we can assume that M
i
M
i+1
. Dene, N =
def
S
M
i
and W =
def
S
V
i
. Let N = (N;W ). We have N j=
MK
X : let  2 X we show by
induction on the degree of  that if M
i
j=
K
3
 then N j=
K
3
. Let  be atomic.
Suppose that for everyM
i
we haveM
i
j=
K
3
 but N 6j=
K
3
. Since N is not a model
, there must be a state  2 N such that V

() = f . By construction of N , there
must be a set M
i
such that  2 M
i
and hence, M
j
;  6j=
K
3
. For the inductive
step, we have several cases:
 = ' . For every M
i
there must be a state  2 M
i
such that M
i
j=
K
3

'. By
construction of N and the induction hypothesis we have N j=
K
3

' and hence,
N j=
K
3
'.
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 = '
1
_ '
2
By induction hypothesis.
 = :' For every M
i
and every  2 M
i
we have M
i
6j=
K
3
'. Suppose that there
is some world  2 N such that N j=
K
3

'. By the construction of N and the
induction hypothesis we have that there must be some model M
i
of the
above chain such that M
i
6j=
MK

' and hence M
i
cannot be a model for '{ a
contradiction.
The other connectives can be reduced to one of the cases above.
Moreover, we have M
i
4N, for all M
i
of the above chain . Thus N is an
upper bound of the chain. It follows from Zorn's Lemma that there is a maximal
element. r
Lemma 5.2. Let X be a set of formulas, M a model of X and L a literal such
that M 6j=
MK
L. There is a preferred model N of X, M4N such that N 6j=
MK
L.
Proof. Let M = (M;V ) and N = (N;W ). Without loss of generality we assume
that M  N . SinceM 6j=
MK
L, there is a state  such that V

(L) = f . By M  N
we have that there is W

such that W

(L) = f . Hence, N 6j=
MK
L. r
The following corollary follows by an easy structural induction proof from
Lemma 5.2.
Corollary 5.1. Let X be a set of formulas, M a model of X and  a nonmodal
formula such thatM 6j=
MK
. There is a preferred model N of X,M4N such that
N 6j=
MK
.
Note, that Proposition 5.2 does not hold for reasoning with minimal propo-
sitional model, i.e. where f is preferred to t. For example we have that I with
I(A) = t and I(B) = t satises fAg but is no minimal model for fAg. The
minimal model for fAg is J with J(A) = t and J(B) = f . We have I 6j= :B and
J j= :B even though J is preferred to I .
Remark 5.1. The deduction theorem fails for MK. It does, however, already fail
for the modal logics S4, S5.
5.2.2 Other Properties
Let us now state some closure properties.
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Proposition 5.2. Dene Th
S5
(X) to be the smallest set containing X, all clas-
sical axioms, as well as all instances of the axiom schemes Ax
(! 	)! (! 	) K
!  T
!  4
!  5
which is closed under application of modus ponens and the rule of necessita-
tion, i.e. =.
Let M be a structure and T
M
=
def
f j M j=
MK
g. Then, T
M
is closed under
Th
S5
Proof. Easy (omitted). r
Let us now turn to an important property, namely compactness. The fact
that j=
MK
is compact follows from [Chellas, 1980], who calls it compactness of
consistency. If Cn
MK
were monotonic, then the compactness of entailment would
follow immediately. However, in the presence of nonmonotonicity, compactness
of entailment is a nontrivial property.
Theorem 5.2 (Compactness of Consistency). Let X  L
M
be a possibly
innite set of formulas. X has a model if and only if every nite subset of X
has a model.
Proof. See e.g. [Chellas, 1980] r
Theorem 5.3 (Nonmodal Compactness). LetX 
{
MK
 for some X and some
nonmodal . Then there is a nite set X
n
 X such that X
n

{
MK
.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that for all X
n
 X we have X
n
6
{
MK
. Hence
by [Chellas, 1980], Theorem 2.16 (15), for all X
n
there is M j=
MK
X
n
[ f:g.
Thus, by Theorem 5.2, there is A = (M;V ) such that A j=
MK
X [ f:g, hence
A 6j=
MK
. Now, either A is a preferred model of X , or there is A
0
, A4A
0
such that
A
0
is a preferred model of X . But by Corollary 5.1 neither A nor A
0
can be a
model of . This contradicts the assumption that X 
{
MK
.
r
Corollary 5.2. Let X be a set of sentences such that X 
{
MK
, for some non-
modal . There is some nite subset X
n
 X such that X
n

{
MK
.
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Let me briey state what we have got so far: we have dened a cumulative,
nonmonotonic entailment relation 
{
MK
and an operator  such that for any non-
modal sentence A the database X entails A if and only if X 6
{
MK
A (provided
that X has a unique preferred model). Moreover, the consequence operator Cn
MK
is inclusive, idempotent. A weakened version of the compactness theorem holds.
It is an open question whether Cn
MK
is compact.
5.3 Adequacy of the Entailment Relation
Now that we have dened the entailment relation 
{
MK
and discussed some of its
basic properties let us examine the question whether this entailment relation does
really express our intuition about `unknown'. That is, does X 
{
MK
 whenever
X 6
{
MK
: and X 6
{
MK
 hold? The answer is `yes' if X has a unique preferred
model and `no' otherwise. The reason that, in general, we could have X 6
{
MK

even if X 6
{
MK
 and X 6
{
MK
: is that the concept of satisability can be expressed
in the object language itself: let X = fABg (literally, either A is satisable
or B is satisable). X has two preferred models, one satisfying A and :B and
the other one satisfying B and :A. Clearly, we haveX 6
{
MK
A and X 6
{
MK
:A but
also X 6
{
MK
A.
I shall present two solutions to the problem of multiple preferred models: the
rst one is to identify sublanguages of L
M
which always admit unique preferred
models, i.e. whenever X is a subset of one of the sublanguages, then X has at
most one preferred model. Of course, it could happen that X does not have any
model at all.
The identied sublanguages, however, are not strong enough to express things
like `A is unknown implies B'. This leads us to second approach, where we do
not restrict the language but use a lter to select only a subset of the preferred
models. This lter allows us to read implicational formulas like inference rules.
5.3.1 Sublanguages which allow for unique preferred models
The following states an important and basic fact about formulas already having
a unique preferred model.
Proposition 5.3. Let X  L
M
,  2 L
M
such that both X and  has a unique
preferred S5-model. X [ fg has a unique preferred S5-model if and only if
X [ fg has an S5-model.
5.3. ADEQUACY OF THE ENTAILMENT RELATION 123
Proof. We show that for any two formula  and 	 which both have a unique
preferred model, we can construct a unique preferred model of f; 	g (provided
that  ^ 	 has indeed a model). Let A
1
= (A
1
; V
A
1
) (resp. A
2
= (A
2
; V
A
2
)) the
unique preferred model of  (resp. 	). Dene A = (A; V
A
) as
A=
def
A
1
\ A
2
V
A
=
def
V
A
1
\ V
A
2
We claim that A is a unique preferred model for f; 	g. By assumption, ^	
has a model and, hence, it has a preferred model, say M = (M;V ). Assume to
the contrary, that A 6=M. This yields the following two cases:
M 6 A In this case there must be a state  2 M such that  62 A
1
\ A
2
. That
is,  62 A
1
or  62 A
2
. Assume without loss of generality that  62 A
1
. By
the preferred model existence theorem, we are able to expand M to obtain
a preferred model M
0
= (M
0
; V
0
) of  (in the case of  62 A
2
we have to
expandM to a preferred model of 	). But then we have  2M
0
and  62 A
1
.
Hence, M
0
6= A
1
. Since both, M
0
and A
1
are preferred models of  we have
a contradiction to the assumption that there is only one preferred model of
.
A 6M In this case there is  2 A
1
\ A
2
and  62 M . Again, we extend M to
a preferred model M
0
of, without loss of generality, . Obviously,  is no
state of any extensionM
0
(otherwise this would yield a contradiction to the
assumption that M is a preferred model of  ^ 	). Therefore,M
0
6= A
1
and
thus, we have a contradiction to the assumption that A
1
is the only preferred
model of .
It follows from the above that for any two setsX;Y which both have a unique
preferred model, we have that X [ Y has at most one preferred model.
r
Proposition 5.3 is a very powerful tool, since it says that once we have iden-
tied sublanguages L
i
of L
M
each admitting unique preferred models, then the
union of L
i
admits unique preferred model. Of course, in order to be relevant
for practical usage, we have to nd sublanguages which admit unique preferred
models.
Proposition 5.4. The following subsets X of L
M
have at most one unique
model:
1. X  L
2. X  L
NT
=
def
f j   
1
_ : : : _ 
n
and 
i
= :A where A 2 L
M
g
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Proof. (1) is immediate. To verify (2) note that as soon as we have a disjunct
saying `A is not necessary' we can take the maximal S5 structure A
Max
= (M;V )
where V is the set of all propositional valuations and M is large enough to refer
to each valuation. Clearly, A
Max
is a preferred model for :A and hence for
any  2 L
NT
. It follows by Proposition 5.3 that each X  L
NT
has a unique
preferred model. r
The languages mentioned in the above proposition are quite unrealistic. They
are either only propositional or nearly trivial (NT). However, by Proposition 5.3
we have that we can combine these languages, i.e.
Corollary 5.3. Any X  L
NT
[ L has at most one preferred model.
We shall now describe a language L
D
such that  has a unique preferred
model if and only if  is equivalent to some sentence of L
D
. To establish this
result we need an additional concept.
Denition 5.5 (M-literal, Modal Horn). Let  2 L
M
be a formula.  is
said to be an M-literal if and only if  has the form A or :A where A is any
nonmodal formula
An M-literal is said to be positive if and only if it has the form A. A negative
M-literal is an M-literal of the form :A.
 is said to be modal Horn if and only if  has the form

1
_ 
2
_ : : : _ 
n
where each 
i
is an M-literal and at most one 
i
is a positive M-literal.
We can now dene the language L
D
, which is a sublanguage of the language
L
MCNF
, i.e. of the set of all formulas in Modal Conjunctive Normal Form. A
formula  = 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
is in L
MCNF
if and only if each 
i
is a disjunction
such that each disjunct is either (a) an M-literal or (b) a formula from L
0
. It is
known that for each modal formula  there is 
MCNF
such that $ 
MCNF
is
an S5-tautology. Even though, L
MCNF
restrict the syntactical appearance of a
formula, it does not restrict the expressibility.
Dene L
D
 L
MCNF
as follows: L
D
is the set of all formulas  = 
1
^ : : :^
n
where each 
i
1. contains at most one positive M-literal and
2. if 
i
contains a positive M-literal, then no disjunct from 
i
is an ordinary
propositional formula.
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The following formulas are in L
D
(:A _ B) ^ ((:C ^D) _ E ! F )
(A _ :B _ :C)
The following formulas are not in L
D
(:A _ B) ^ ((C ^D) _ E ! F )
(A _B _ :C)
Proposition 5.5. Let  2 L
M
be an arbitrary modal formula. The class of
models for  is nite.
Proof. Let 
n
be the set of all variables occurring in . There are only nitely
many propositional interpretation functions I : 
n
! ft; fg. Let I be the class of
all these functions. Clearly, I is nite and hence, the power set 2
I
is nite. Thus,
there are only nitely many Kripke-structures over 
n
. It follows that there
are only nitely many Kripke-models for  and only nitely many preferred
Kripke-models for . r
The following lemma is similar to the well-known result that any non-Horn-
clause has two minimal models.
Lemma 5.3. Let  be a formula with preferred models M
1
; : : : ;M
n
(we know
by Proposition 5.5 that this class is nite) such that M
i
6

=
M
j
, i 6= j, i.e. the
models are pairwise not isomorphic. There is a formula
' = A
1
_A
2
_ : : : _A
n
such that
1. 
{
MK
'
2. 6
{
MK
A

1
_ : : : _ A

n 1
such that A

i
= A
j
, for some disjunct A
j
of '.
3. A
1
6 A
2
6 : : : 6 A
n
Proof. Consider an arbitrary modelM
i
of . Assume to the contrary that for any
nonmodal A
i
with M
i
j=
MK
A
i
there is some M
j
, M
i
6

=
M
j
such that M
j
j=
MK
A
i
.
Since M
i
and M
j
are not isomorphic there is at least one  2M
j
such that for
all  2M
i
it holds that V
j

6= V
i

. Dene
M
0
i
=
def
M
i
[ fg
V
0
i
=
def
V
i
[ fV
j

g
M
0
i
=
def
(M
0
i
; V
0
i
)
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For all nonmodal A we have
M
i
j=
MK
A implies M
0
i
j=
MK
A
and hence, for all 	
M
i
j=
MK
	 implies M
0
i
j=
MK
	:
Thus, M
i
cannot be preferred. Hence, there must be a nonmodal formula A
i
such that
M
i
j=
MK
A
i
and for all M
j
: M
j
6j=
MK
A
i
; i 6= j:
Thus,
M
i
j=
MK
A
i
and for all M
j
: M
j
6j=
MK
A
i
; i 6= j:
Therefore there are nonmodal formulas A
1
; : : : ; A
n
, which are not semanti-
cally equivalent, such thatM
i
j=
MK
A
i
,M
i
6j=
MK
A
j
, j 6= i Since theseM
1
; : : : ;M
n
are the only preferred models of  we also have that

{
MK
A
1
_ : : : _A
n
and
6
{
MK
A

1
_ : : : _A

n 1
with A

i
= A
j
, for some disjunct A
j
of A
1
_ : : : _A
n
. r
Theorem 5.4.  has a unique preferred model if and only if there is 
D
2 L
D
such that $ 
D
is an S5-tautology.
Proof.
Part 1 `If ' By Lemma 5.3 we have that if  has more than one preferred model,
then there is a formula ' = A
1
_ : : : _A
n
such that

{
MK
A
1
_ : : : _A
n
6
{
MK
A

1
_ : : :A

n 1
where A

i
= A
j
for some disjunct A
j
of ':
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There is, however, no formula 
D
2 L
D
with these properties (if there were
such a formula, then there would be a formula from L
D
which is semantically
equivalent to ').
Part 2 `Only if ' We have to show that if there is no syntactically equivalent
formula 
D
2 L
D
, then  has at least two preferred models. Assume without
loss of generality that  is in MCNF. If  62 L
D
, then  has some conjunct 	
i
such that
	
i
= '
1
_ : : : _ '
n
and
'
i
; '
j
are both positive M-literals; i 6= j or (1)
'
i
is a positive M-literal and '
j
2 L
0
; i 6= j (2)
If every MCNF-formula 
0
which is semantically equivalent to  contains
some disjunct in which two positive M-literals A, B appear, then there are
preferred models M;N of  such that M j=
MK
A ^ B ^ :B and N j=
MK
B ^
A ^ :A. Clearly M 6

=
N. Hence,  has at least two preferred models. This
proves the case (1).
For the the case (2) the argumentation is nearly identical, because any S5-
structure which satises A also satises A (by soundness of the Rule of Ne-
cessitation). Hence, A _ B has two preferred models because A _ B has
two preferred models. Thus, if every MCNF formula 
0
which equivalent to 
contains A _B in some conjunct, then  has at least two preferred models.
r
It might be worth noting that even though  = :A^ (A_B) 62 L
D
, there
is an L
D
formula which is syntactically equivalent to , namely : ^ B.
Theorem 5.4 identies a sublanguage L
D
whose subclasses always have at
most one preferred model. This implies that as long as a database language is
identical to (or a subset of) L
D
, then the entailment relation 
{
MK
appropriate
w.r.t. the analysis of the meaning of unknown, i.e. does it hold for all nonmodal
A that
X 6
{
MK
A and X 6
{
MK
:A implies X 
{
MK
A and X 
{
MK
:A?
How appropriate is the language L
D
w.r.t. our aim of reasoning about un-
known information? Does it allow us to express all the things we would like to
express? Just think of an expression like `if A is unknown then B'. This can
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be translated as (A ^ :A) ! B which equivalent to the MCNF formula
:A_A_B. Since this is the only information in the database, the database
cannot be transformed to some L
D
-formula and by Theorem 5.4 has no unique
preferred model.
Even if we transcribed `if A is unknown then B' as :A ! B we would get
A_B as MCNF formula. Again, it is easy to see that there is no syntactically
equivalent formula in L
D
. This is somewhat disappointing, especially if one has
practical applications in mind for which such a reasoning pattern might be quite
useful. A solution is to apply the following ltration method.
5.3.2 Treating Implicational Formulas as Rules
Consider the database X = fA ! Ag. This set has two preferred models,
yielding A 62 Cn
MK
(X) and :A 62 Cn
MK
(X). This is a consequence of treat-
ing ! as material implication. Nevertheless, sometimes formulas like A ! A
are used to express \If A is consistent with your formulas, then assert A" (cf.
[Emde, 1991]). The point is that even though ! is given the semantics of ma-
terial implication, as in [Emde, 1991], [Morik and Wrobel, 1933], it is used or to
be read as an inference rule.
Lukaszewicz described a cunning trick to rule out A
1
= (f1g; fV
1
(A) = fg
as a preferred model for X . Thus, the only preferred model which remains is
A
2
= (f1g; fV
1
(A) = tg) (cf. [Lukaszewicz, 1990]). We will adapt this trick for
our needs. In order to make it work, we have to ensure that each formula in our
database has a certain normal form.
Denition 5.6 (Ordered MCNF). A formula 
1
^
2
^ : : :^
n
is said to be
in ordered conjunctive normal form if and only if each 
i
is of the form
:B _C
1
_ : : : _C
k
_ A
where B;C
1
; : : : ; C
k
; A 2 L
0
.
It is known that each modal formula can be reduced in S5 to ordered MCNF
(cf. [Hughes and Cresswell, 1968]). Please, note that we can write each conjunct

i
as (B ^ :C
1
^ : : : ^ :C
k
)! A.
Denition 5.7 (Applicable [Lukaszewicz, 1990]). Let  2 L in ordered
MCNF, T = Th
S5
(T ) a set of formulas. A conjunct 
i
= (B ^ :C
1
^
: : : ^ :C
n
) ! A of  is said to be applicable w.r.t. T if and only if B 2 T ,
C
1
; : : : ; C
n
62 T ; otherwise, 
i
is said to be inapplicable w.r.t T .
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Denition 5.8 (Strongly preferred model). Let X  L be a set of formu-
las, A a Kripke structure and T
A
=
def
f j A j=
MK
g. Dene
X
0
=
def
Xnf j  is inapplicable w.r.t T
A
g
A is a strongly preferred model for X if and only if
A j=

MK
X Cond. A
A j=

MK
X
0
Cond. B
We say that X 
S
 if and only if every strongly preferred model of X is a
model of . Clearly, X 
{
MK
 implies X 
S
.
Example 5.3. Let  = fAg, X = fA ! Ag. There are two preferred models
M
1
;M
2
for X but only one them is strongly preferred. LetM
1
= (f1g; fI
1
(A) =
tg) andM
2
= (f1g; fI
1
(A) = fg). A! A is applicable w.r.t T
M
1
but not w.r.t
T
M
2
. Thus we have to check whether Cond. B holds.
1. M
1
j=

MK
Xn? (there are no inapplicable formulas w.r.t T
M
1
) and
2. M
2
6j=

XnX (every formula of X is inapplicable w.r.t T
M
2
).
Hence, X 
S
A.
The strong consequence operator Cn
S
(X)=
def
f j X 
S
g inherits all closure
properties of Cn
MK
. It does, however, not always yield a unique preferred model.
Consider the following example:
Example 5.4. Consider the following set X = fA! B;:B ! :Ag. We have
the following preferred models for X :
A
1
: I
1
(A) = t I
2
(A) = f
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = t
A
2
: I
1
(A) = f I
2
(A) = f
I
1
(B) = f I
2
(B) = t
Theorem 5.5. Cn
S
is not compact.
Proof. Consider the following formula:

n
=
def
n
^
i=0
A
i
^ (:A
n+1
! B)
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and dene
X = f
n
j n  !g
The set X has the following preferred model:
A : I
1
(A
i
) = t I
2
(A
i
) = t i  !
I
1
(B) = f I
2
(B) = t
Moreover, this model is strongly preferred and hence, we have :B 2 Cn
S
(X).
However, for every nite X
n
 X we have B 2 Cn
S
(X
n
): let k = maxfn j

n
2 X
n
g. X
n
has the following two preferred models:
A
1
: I
1
(A
i
) = t I
2
(A
i
) = t ; i  k
I
1
(A
k+1
) = t I
2
(A
k+1
) = f
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = t
A
2
: I
1
(A) = f I
2
(A) = f ; i  k
I
1
(A
k+1
) = t I
2
(A
k+1
) = t
I
1
(B) = f I
2
(B) = t
The formula :A
k+1
! B is applicable w.r.t. T
A
1
but not w.r.t. T
A
2
because
A
2
2 T
A
2
. Moreover, A
2
is no strongly preferred model of X f:A
2
! Bg.
Hence, A
1
is the only strongly preferred model of X
n
and we have :B 62
Cn
S
(X
n
), for every nite X
n
 X . r
5.4 Relationship to Nonmonotonic Modal Logics
We shall now relate our logic to some nonmonotonic modal formalisms. One
of the earliest attempts to attack the problem of nonmonotonic reasoning was
by means of modal logic. In 1982 McDermott introduced some nonmonotonic
versions of well-known monotonic modal logics such as S4 and S5. But unfor-
tunately, it turned out that the most promising formalisation of nonmonotonic
reasoning based on modal S5 collapses to monotonic S5. Then, in 1983, Moore
decided to develop a new formalism called autoepistemic logic, which is a recon-
struction of an earlier proposal by Doyle and McDermott. Autoepistemic logics
are nowadays the most prominent nonmonotonic modal formalisms.
From a syntactical point of view, autoepistemic logic can be regarded to be
a weaker
6
system than a nonmonotonic formalism based on modal S5, because
6
Please note that the terms stronger (containing more axioms) and weaker (containing
less axioms) are somewhat meaningless within nonmonotonic logics, because the
addition of axioms does not guarantee that we get more theorems.
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autoepistemic logic is based on a system which is called weak S5 (i.e. K45). The
main result of this Section is that our logic lies between nonmonotonic K45 and
S5, that is, it can be seen as an extension of autoepistemic logic towards McDer-
mott's ideas. Thus, we will rst compare our logic with Moore's autoepistemic
logic and then with McDermott's Nonmonotonic Logic II (NML-2).
5.4.1 Extensional Entailment
Many nonmonotonic formalisms for example, Default Logics and Autoepistemic
Logics do not discuss consequence operators. They rather make use of the
notion of an extension. The main dierence between the set of (nonmonotonic)
consequences and an extension is that if we are given a set X of sentences, then
the set of (nonmonotonic) consequences is unique while X may have dierent
extensions.
In order to provide a basis for a comparison between logics based on the no-
tion of extension and our logic, we have to say what corresponds to an extension
in our logic. According to Stalnaker, an extension can be regarded as a nal belief
set; thus, containing a maximal set of beliefs
7
. One property which reects the in-
tuition about nal beliefs sets is that they should be stable (cf.[Stalnaker, 1993]).
Denition 5.9 (Stable). A set X 2 L of sentences is stable if and only if it
meets the following requirements:
1. X is closed under classical (nonmodal) propositional consequence Cn
cl
2. if  2 X then :: 2 X
3. if : 62 X then  2 X
We propose to regard every preferred model of X as a nal belief state. The
set of formulas which are valid in a preferred model of X is a nal belief set.
This motivates the following denition.
Denition 5.10 (Extensional entailment). Let X;Y  L; we say X exten-
sionally entails Y (denoted by X 
E
Y if and only if there is a structure M such
that M j=

MK
X and Y = f jM j=
MK
g. Y is said to be an S5-based extension of
X (because the validity relation j=
MK
is that of modal S5).
7
Stalnaker talks about autoepistemic extensions, but I think his interpretation does
also apply to every other nonmonotonic formalism which makes use of the term
`extension'
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Please note that the relation 
E
is only dened between sets of formulas.
Further, Cn
MK
(X) =
T
fT j X 
E
Tg.
It has already been observed by Konolige, Moore and Fitting (cf. [Konolige, 1988])
that if we have the validity relation of modal S5, then the set of all sentences
valid in an S5 structure is stable.
Proposition 5.6 (Konolige, Moore, Fitting). Let M be a structure. Then
the set T
M
=
def
f jM j=
MK
g is stable.
Extensions can be characterised by self-referential equations. We shall now
give such an equation for S5-based extensions.
Theorem 5.6. X 
E
T if and only if T = Th
S5
(X [ fA j :A 2 LnTg).
Proof. Let RHS denote the right hand side (i.e Th
S5
(X [ fA j :A 2 LnTg))
of the above equation.
`)'
RHS  T X 
E
T implies that T is stable and consistent. From stability we can
conclude that :A 62 T implies A 2 T , thus T contains all formulas which are
added to the right hand side (RHS) of the above equation via the condition
fA j A 2 L and :A 62 Tg. Moreover, T is closed under Th
S5
.
T  RHS It holds that Th
S5
(X)  RHS and since X  T and T is closed
under Th
S5
we have Th
S5
(X)  T . It remains to show that TnTh
S5
(X) 
RHS. But this can be reduced to showing that each formula of the form
 2 TnTh
S5
(X) is in RHS. The proof can be carried out by induction on
the degree of ; we have to distinguish the following cases:
 2 L In this case  is added to the RHS via the condition fA j A 2
L and :A 62 Tg
  
0
In this case we must ensure that 
0
is added to the RHS. By
induction hypothesis we have 
0
2 RHS, thus by 	 ! 	 (Axiom
5) we have that 
0
2 RHS. Since RHS is closed under Th
S5
we have

0
2 RHS.
  
0
We have to show that 
0
2 RHS. By induction hypothesis,

0
2 RHS and, again, since 	 ! 	 is a theorem of S5 and RHS is
closed under Th
S5
, we have 
0
2 RHS.
`(' We have to show that there isM such thatM j=

MK
X and T = f j A j=
MK
g.
It is sucient to prove that Th
S5
(T ) 6= L
M
because then such anM exists. It is
clear that for any T we have: A 2 T i :A 62 LnT . Thus T is consistent or it
does not exist. r
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The above theorem gives a syntactical characterisation of the sentences valid
in a preferred model of X . It can be easily modied to characterise those sen-
tences which are valid in a strongly preferred model of X (cf. Denition 5.8).
Remember that a preferred model A is said to be a strongly preferred model of
X if and only if A is a preferred model of all applicable formulas in A.
Theorem 5.7. Let X be in ordered MCNF. T
A
is the set of all formulas valid
in some strongly preferred model A of X if and only if
T
A
= Th
S5
(X
0
[ fA j :A 2 LnT
A
g) = Th
S5
(X [ fA j :A 2 LnT
A
g)
where X
0
= X n f j  is inapplicable w.r.t. T
A
g
Proof. By Denition 5.8 we have A j=

MK
X , A j=

MK
X
0
and by Theorem 5.6 this
yields
A j=

MK
X , A j=

MK
X [ Th
S5
(X
0
[    ), A j=

MK
X
0
, A j=

MK
X
0
[ Th
S5
(X
0
[    )
With X  Th
S5
(X [    ) and X
0
 Th
S5
(X
0
[    ) this yields
A j=

MK
Th
S5
(X [    ), A j=

MK
Th
S5
(X
0
[    )
and hence, Th
S5
(X [    ) = Th
S5
(X
0
[    ) = T
A
. r
The notion of extensional entailment as well as the syntactical characterisa-
tion of extensions provide the basis for a comparison between our logic and two
other nonmonotonic modal formalisms.
5.4.2 Autoepistemic Logics
Autoepistemic logics (AEL) can be considered as a semantical approach to com-
mon sense reasoning (contrary to syntactical approaches like Default Logic or
the logics by Doyle and McDermott).
As already mentioned, autoepistemic logic uses the concept of extension to
characterise the possible belief states. A set of sentences T  L
M
is an AE-
extension of a set (of initial premises) X if and only if
T = Cn
cl
(X [ f j  2 Tg [ f: j  62 Tg)
Cn
cl
denotes the consequence operator of classical propositional logic.
AE-extensions can be characterised by stable sets which have the additional
property of being grounded.
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Denition 5.11 (Grounded). A set T is grounded in X if and only if
T  Cn
cl
(X [ f j  2 Tg [ f: j  62 Tg):
Groundedness guarantees that the only beliefs an agent has are those from
his initial premises and those required by the stability conditions. The following
proposition can be found in [Lukaszewicz, 1990].
Proposition 5.7. T is an AE-extension of X if and only if
1. T is grounded in X
2. T is stable
3. X  T
Proof. see [Lukaszewicz, 1990], Theorem 4.62. r
The main result of this subsection is that if T is an autoepistemic exten-
sion of X and T contains all instances of the modal axiom scheme T, then
X 
E
T (Theorem 5.8). We already know by Proposition 5.6 that the set of all
sentences which are valid in a structure A is stable. Note, that the converse of
Proposition 5.6 does not hold because there are stable sets T  L
M
() (e.g.
an AE-extension of fA;:Ag) which do not have a model from the set of all
S5-structures STRUCT(). However, if T contains all instances of the modal
axiom scheme T and is closed under the application of modus ponens and the
rule of necessitation, then the converse of Proposition 5.6 does hold.
Denition 5.12 (T
A
;T
X
). Let  be a signature, A 2 STRUCT(), X 
L
M
(). Dene
T
A
=
def
f j A j=
MK
g and
T
X
=
def
fT
A
j A 2 STRUCT() and A j=
MK
Xg
Lemma 5.4. Let  be a signature, X  L
M
() and S
X
be the set of all con-
sistent stable theories T which contain X, every instance of the axiom scheme
T and which are closed under the rule of necessitation. Then, T
X
= S
X
.
Proof. T
X
 S
X
is immediately clear, since every T
A
2 T
X
is a stable theory
containing X . For the converse direction, assume that there is T 2 S
X
such that
T 62 T
X
. Thus, for all A such that A j=
MK
X we have A 6j=
MK
T . This means that
T [X does not have a model. Hence, T cannot be consistent, because X  T {
a contradiction. r
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Theorem 5.8. Let X;T  L
M
. T is an AE-extension of X which contains all
instances of the axiom scheme T and which is closed under the rule of necessi-
tation if and only if X 
E
T .
Proof. `)': We assume that X is consistent (for inconsistent X we have imme-
diately X 
E
T ).
T is an AE-extension
) T is stable (by Proposition 5.7)
) T 2 S
X
(S
X
is dened in Lemma 5.4)
) T 2 T
X
by Lemma 5.4
) ex. A such that A j=
MK
X and T = f j A j=
MK
g ¶ :
We have to show that there is also a preferred model with the above property
(¶ ). We assume the contrary, i.e. we assume that for every A for which (¶ )
holds there is A
0
, AA
0
and A
0
j=
MK
X . Thus,
) ex.  2 L such that A j=
MK
 and A
0
j=
MK
:
) ; 2 T and X [ f:g is consistent
) T cannot be grounded in X
) T is no AE-extension of X (by Proposition 5.7) { a contradiction.
Hence, there is a preferred model of X in which T is valid. Since T is stable
it follows that T is the set of all formulas being valid in this preferred model.
Therefore X 
E
T .
`(': We have X 
E
T . Thus T is stable by Proposition 5.6. It remains to show
that T is grounded in X , i.e. we have to show
T  Cn
cl
(X [ f j  2 Tg [ f: j  62 Tg):
By the prerequisite we know that T contains all instances of T. Hence we have
T  Cn
cl
(X [ : : : ). Therefore, T is an AE-extension of X . r
Theorem 5.8 relates AEL to our logic via semantical terms like extensional
entailment. Let us now look at the syntactical aspects which become clearer
when looking at a syntactical characterisation (like the one of Theorem 5.6)
of autoepistemic logic. Konolige showed that there is a close correspondence
between AEL and the modal system K45. Let Th
K45
be the syntactical conse-
quence operator of modal K45 (cf. Proposition 5.2). We say that  ( 2 L
M
)
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is strongly K45-provable from a set X  L
M
if and only if there are formulas

1
; : : : ; 
n
2 X such that 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
!  2 Th
K45
(X); denote the set of
all sentences which are strongly K45-provable from X by Th
S
K45
(X). T is an
autoepistemic extension of X if and only if
T = Th
S
K45
(X [ fA j :A 2 LnTg [ fA j A 2 T \ Lg)
If we compare the above characterisation with Theorem 5.6 we can see that
the main dierence between our logic and autoepistemic logic is the absence of
the axiom scheme T. Interestingly, both logics add only all nonmodal sentences
which are consistent with the initial set X .
5.4.3 Nonmonotonic Logic II
McDermott's notion of an NML2-S5-Extension can be written as
Denition 5.13 (NML2-S5-Extension). Let X;T  L
M
. T is an NML2-S5-
extension of X if and only if
T = Th
S5
(X [ f j  2 L
M
and : 62 Tg)
In the above denition of an extension,  plays the role of something like
`it is S5-consistent, that : : : ' where  is S5-consistent with X means that : 62
Th
S5
(X). This is exactly the drawback we discussed when trying to nd a def-
inition of the entailment relation in Section 5.1.2. This deciency leads to the
collapse of nonmonotonic S5 to monotonic S5:
\
fS j S is an NML2-S5-extension of Xg = Th
S5
(X);
If we compare the syntactical characterisation of NML2-S5-extensions of X
with syntactical characterisation by Theorem 5.6, then we see that the only
dierence is that McDermott forces all sentences which are consistent with an
extension to enter the extension, i.e.  2 L
M
and : 62 T , whereas we do only
require that T contains all nonmodal sentences which are consistent with T .
Theorem 5.9. Let X;T  L
M
. If X 
E
T then T is an NML2-S5-extension.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5.6 and by the fact that L  L
M
. r
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5.5 Historical Remarks and Related Work
The idea of maximising S5 structures to obtain a logic of minimal knowledge (or
maximal ignorance) originates in the work of Halpern and Moses (1984). They
restrict themselves to sets of formulas with exactly one preferred model. These
sets are called honest. To see why they are said to be honest consider the set
X = fA_Bg, i.e. an agent claims that he knows A or that he knows B. But
then we would expect at least A or B to be in the agent's inferential closure.
Since A;B 62 Th
S5
and A;B 62 Cn
MK
we say that the agent is dishonest because
he claims to know A or to know B but actually he does not. Halpern and Moses
therefore chose 
E
as entailment relation.
In 1991 Lifschitz picked up the ideas of Halpern and Moses and related full
MK to Logic Programming and Default Logic. He showed that logic programs
can be seen as MK-theories if we extend the language by a negation-as-failure
operator.
Again several years later, in 1996, del Cerro, Delgado and Herzig developed a
theory to talk about consistency , [del Cerro et al., 1996] . The basic aim of their
logic is quite similar to that ofMK. But in order to guarantee that the unknown-
operator works correctly they restrict the inference relation to be relation among
propositional formulas and modal formulas. As we have seen in Proposition 5.4
this yields that there is always a unique preferred model. Hence, their logic is a
special case of MK.
5.6 Conclusion
We showed that the unknown-operator, as used for example in practical AI sys-
tems, can be given a semantics which is based on a subset j=

MK
of S5's validity rela-
tion j=
MK
. The resulting logicMK is a generalisation of [Halpern and Moses, 1984].
We solved the problem of multiple preferred models by showing that there is a
modal language such that X has a unique preferred model if and only if X is se-
mantically equivalent to some subset of this language. Moreover we proved that
Cn
MK
is a nonmonotonic preclosure operator, for which several weaker versions
of the compactness theorem holds.
The relation to Moore's Autoepistemic Logic (AEL) and McDermott's NML-
2 is given by showing that there is a syntactical characterisation of Cn
MK
which
is located exactly between NML-2 and AEL. We thus have reached our goal to
provide a reasonable formal basis for a semantics of reasoning systems which
supply an unknown-operator.
CHAPTER 6
Combining K
3
and MK
I shall now combine the paraconsistent logic K
3
with the logic MK of minimal
knowledge. The resulting logic MK
3
should serve as a tool for reasoning with
paraconsistent and unknown information. The main results of this chapter are
{ MK
3
is a faithful reformulation of Belnap's ideas of how a computer should
answer questions.
{ Contrary to L4 the logicMK
3
handles implications by means of the material
conditional.
{ If the input contains only literals, then the answers generated by MK
3
are
identical to the ones generated by L4. However, in general L4 and MK
3
are
incomparable.
This chapter is organised as follows: we shall rst investigate the semanti-
cal entailment relation for MK
3
. Next we shall discuss properties for MK
3
. We
shall pay a special attention to normal forms and to the notion of a stable set.
We conclude with relating MK
3
to Belnap's L4 and to the problem of logical
omniscience.
6.1 Semantical Entailment
The basic idea is to replace the two-valued interpretations in the logic MK by
three-valued ones. There are, however a few points which deserve special atten-
tion. First, since every subset of our propositional language L has a three-valued
model we cannot simply say that A is unknown w.r.t. the database X if A is
satisable in some K
3
model of X . That is we have to reformulate our concept of
`unknown' for the paraconsistent case. Second, we have also to think about the
concept of knowledge in the presence of contradicting information. For example,
when given fA;:Ag is it reasonable to accept A and :A, i.e. can we say that
we know A or :A? In other words, do we accept the Rule of Necessitation as a
legal pattern of reasoning in the presence of contradictions?
We claimed in Chapter 2 that the truth-status of contradicting information
is extremely vague. Therefore, when given X = fA;:Ag the reasoner should
admit that he or she does not really know much about A, because she cannot
say anything denite about A's truth-status after a revision process. We therefore
intend that A should be entailed by X if and only if A is true in every preferred
model of X . Hence, `knowing A' (A) means A holds and that it cannot be
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suspected to be paraconsistent. This ensures that A will still be known after a
revision process.
As for `unknown', we simply could have taken the opposite of `known' which
would yield that A is unknown w.r.t. to the above X , because A is not con-
sistently known. This means that A holds in the very moment where we can
imagine a state where A holds, no matter whether A holds consistently in this
state.
It is important to note that even though this semantics for  might be de-
batable
1
, it has two advantages. First, the operator  and  are interdenable
as in classical modal logic and second, if X contains no contradiction then the
above will still yield the same consequences as Cn
MK
.
Denition 6.1 (Three-valued Kripke Structure, Validity). A three-valued
Kripke structure A is a tuple (M;V ) where M is a nonempty index set and V
is a family of three-valued valuation functions such that for each  2 M there
is some I

2 V with I

: ATOM()! ft; f;>g.
A j=
MK
3

A for atomic A if I

(A) 2 ft;>g
A =j
MK
3

A for atomic A if I

(A) 2 ff;>g
A j=
MK
3

 ^ 	 i A j=
MK
3

 and A j=
MK
3

	
A =j
MK
3

 ^ 	 i A =j
MK
3

 or A =j
MK
3

	
A j=
MK
3

 i there is  2M such that A j=
MK
3


A =j
MK
3

 i A 6j=
MK
3


A j=
MK
3

 i A j=
MK
3

 and A 6j=
MK
3

: for all  2M
A =j
MK
3

 i A 6j=
MK
3


A j=
MK
3

: i A =j
MK
3


A =j
MK
3

: i A j=
MK
3


We say that A j=
MK
3
 if and only if A j=
MK
3

 for all  2M .
The connectives !, _ are introduced by dening
! 	 =
def
: _ 	
 _ 	 =
def
:(: ^ :	)
1
An alternative would be to require that  holds, if there is at least one state in
which  holds consistently. Another one would be to require that  does in every
state take a value from t or f . In both cases,  and  are no longer interdenable.
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Remark 6.1 (Interdenability). For any , A j=
MK
3
 if and only if A j=
MK
3
::.
The denition of a preferred three-valued Kripke model is a little bit more
complicated in this case. In a rst step, we consider only three-valued Kripke
models which are maximal with respect to the S5-substructure relation 4 (note
that Denition 5.2 denes a substructure relation between three-valued Kripke-
structures). Consider for example X = fA;A ! Bg and  = fA;B;Cg. The
following is a 4-maximal model for X : A = (f1; : : : ; 12g; fI
1
; : : : ; I
12
g) with
I
1
(A) = t I
2
(A) = t I
3
(A) = t I
4
(A) = > I
5
(A) = > I
6
(A) = >
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = t I
3
(B) = t I
4
(B) = f I
5
(B) = f I
6
(B) = f
I
1
(C) = f I
2
(C) = t I
3
(C) = > I
4
(C) = f I
5
(C) = t I
6
(C) = >
I
7
(A) = > I
8
(A) = > I
9
(A) = > I
10
(A) = > I
11
(A) = > I
12
(A) = >
I
7
(B) = t I
8
(B) = t I
9
(B) = t I
10
(B) = > I
11
(B) = > I
12
(B) = >
I
7
(C) = f I
8
(C) = t I
9
(C) = > I
10
(C) = f I
11
(C) = t I
12
(C) = >
In order to select a preferred three-valued Kripke model, we take all 4-
maximal substructures A
0
from A such that no world in A
0
overinterprets a
sentence in X . That is A
0
= (M
0
; V
0
) where M M
0
and
V
0
= fI

j there is no I

2 V such that I

@ I

g
In the above example this yields that A
0
= (f1; 2g; fV
1
; V
2
g) is the only
preferred model of X .
Let us formulate the above ideas more precisely. Consider the following rela-
tion  among Kripke-structures.
Denition 6.2 (). Let M = (M;V ) and N = (N;W ) and dene
M  N=
def
M  N and for every I 2 N there is some J 2W such that I v J:
As usual we write M < N if and only if M  N and NOT N M.
Clearly,  is a partial ordering, i.e. reexive, transitive and anti-symmetric.
Consider again the above example. Here we have that A
0
< A. Moreover, A
0
is
<-minimal.
We shall now dene a partial ordering relation among three-valued Kripke
structures:
Denition 6.3 (b). LetM, N be two models of a given set X . We say thatM
is preferred over N, denoted by M b N, if and only if
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1. there is a 4-maximal model A of X such that N4A and M < A is <-
minimal, or
2. M is isomorphic to N.
The relation b is a partial ordering.
We say that M is a preferred three-valued Kripke model of X , denoted by
M j=

MK
3
X if and only if M j=
MK
3
X and there is no three-valued Kripke model N of
X such that N bM.
Note, that the partial ordering b is very sparse: if for any two MK
3
models
M, N of X we have M b N, then M is isomorphic to N or M is a preferred
model. Any preferred model of X can be seen as containing only the @-minimal
states of A, where A is the 4-maximal model of Denition 6.3.
The following lemma is the three-valued Kripke analogue of Lemma 5.1 and
for the records.
Lemma 6.1. Let A j=

MK
3
X, A j=
MK
3
. Then A j=

MK
3
X [ fg.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 5.1. r
As usual we build up the entailment relation by means of preferred models.
Denition 6.4 (MK
3
-Entailment). We say that X MK
3
-entails , denoted
by X 
{
MK
3
, if and only if A j=

MK
3
X implies A j=
MK
3
. Further, Cn
MK
3
(X)=
def
f j
X 
{
MK
3
g.
As another example consider
Example 6.1. Let X = f(A _ B) ^ :(A ^ B)g, i.e. either A holds or B
holds. This set has two preferred MK
3
-models:
A
1
: I
1
(A) = f
I
1
(B) = f
I
2
(A) = f
I
2
(B) = t
A
2
: I
1
(A) = f
I
1
(B) = f
I
2
(A) = t
I
2
(B) = f
The following is a more complex example.
Example 6.2.
X = fA;A! B;A! :Bg
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The set X has a unique preferred MK
3
-model A = (f1; 2; 3g; V ) with
V = f I
1
(A) = > I
2
(A) = > I
3
(A) = t
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = f I
3
(B) = >g
Hence, (A ^:A) and (B ^:B) is a consequence of X . This is reasonable,
because both A and B can be suspected to be paraconsistent.
Now consider Y = X [ f:A ! Cg. The set Y has two preferred models:
A
1
= (f1; 2; 3g; V
1
) and A
2
= (f1; 2g; V
2
) where
V
1
= f I
1
(A) = > I
2
(A) = > I
3
(A) = t
I
1
(B) = t I
2
(B) = f I
3
(B) = >
I
1
(C) = t I
2
(C) = t I
3
(C) = tg
V
2
= f I
1
(A) = t I
2
(A) = t
I
1
(B) = > I
2
(B) = >
I
1
(C) = t I
2
(C) = fg
Here we have that A
2
6j=
MK
3
:A which means that we cannot conclude A ^
:A from Y , i.e. we cannot conclude that A is unknown.
Whether one considers the above result to be intuitive or not, depends on
how we wish the additional formula :A ! C to be read. One possibility is to
resolve material implication and to read it as a disjunction. This yields that we
claim: C holds or A is consistently known (:A! C = ::A _C = A_C).
If we choose this reading, then Cn
MK
3
operates correctly.
If, however, we want to read it like an inference rule, then :A 62 Cn
MK
3
(Y )
is not intuitive, because Y still contains the contradiction between A;A ! B
and A ! :B. The solution is then to consider a strongly preferred model like
we did in Chapter 5.
I have the impression that reading! as an inference rule is not very convinc-
ing in the presence of inconsistency. For example, consider X = fA;B ! :Ag.
The set X has exactly one preferred model A = (f1g; V
1
) and V
1
(A) = t,
V
1
(B) = f . Hence, X 6
{
MK
3
B. If we read B ! :A as an inference rule we
would unnecessarily add a new contradiction. Hence, we prefer to read the im-
plication as a disjunction which, in the above case says: :B is consistently known
or :A holds (:B) _ :A.
6.2 Properties
6.2.1 Basic Closure Properties
Proposition 6.1. Cn
MK
3
is a cumulative and nonmonotonic pre-closure oper-
ator which satises the AND-property, i.e.  ^ 	 2 Cn
MK
3
(X) if and only if
; 	 2 Cn
MK
3
(X).
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Theorem 6.1 (Preferred Model Existence). If X has an MK
3
-model then
X has a preferred MK
3
-model.
Proof. The proof is not very complicated but requires two subproofs by struc-
tural induction, which are similar to Theorem 5.1. Let M j=
MK
3
X . We rst have
to show that there is a 4-maximal model A of X . Consider the chain
M4N
1
4N
2
4 : : :
and let N
i
= (N
i
;W
i
). Dene N =
def
S
N
i
and W =
def
S
W
i
and let N = (N; V ).
Clearly, N
i
4N. We have to show that N j=
MK
3
X . Let  2 X . If  is atomic, we
are done. For the inductive step we have to distinguish several cases:
 = ' . For every N
i
there must be a state  2 N
i
such that N
i
j=
MK
3

'. By
construction ofM and the induction hypothesis we haveN j=
MK
3

' and hence,
N j=
MK
3
'.
 = '
1
_ '
2
By induction hypothesis.
 = :' For every N
i
and every  2 N
i
we have N
i
6j=
MK
3

'. Suppose that there
is some world  2 N such that N j=
MK
3

'. By the construction of N and
the induction hypothesis we have that there must be some model N
i
of the
above chain such that N
i
6j=
MK
3

' and hence N
i
cannot be a model for ' { a
contradiction.
Hence, by Zorn's Lemma there is a 4-maximal model A of X . Next, we have to
show that there is some C such that C < A is <-minimal.
We have to show that every chain
A > B
0
> B
1
> B
2
> : : :
has a lower bound. Let B
i
= (M
i
; V
i
). Dene M =
def
T
M
i
and V =
def
T
V
i
and
let B = (M;V ). Clearly, B < B
i
. It remains to show that B j=
MK
3
X . Let  2 X .
The base case where  is atomic is again immediate. For the inductive step we
distinguish again the following cases:
 = ' . For every B
i
there must be a state  2 M
i
such that B
i
j=
MK
3

'. By
construction of B and the induction hypothesis we haveB j=
MK
3

' and hence,
B j=
MK
3
'.
 = '
1
_ '
2
By induction hypothesis.
 = :' For every B
i
and every  2M
i
we have B
i
6j=
MK
3

'. By the construction
of M and the induction hypothesis we have that B 6j=
MK
3

'. Hence, B j=
MK
3
:'.
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We conclude by Zorn's Lemma that there is a model C of X such that C < A is
<-minimal. r
The following proposition relates MK
3
to properties of System C (cf. 2).
Proposition 6.2. Let X be a set of formulas.
1. If ;  
{
MK
3
 and 
{
MK
3
 then 
{
MK
3
	 (Cutty).
2. If $  is an MK
3
-tautology and 
{
MK
3
	 then  
{
MK
3
	 (Left Logical Equiv-
alence) .
Proof.
Ad 1) Let A j=

MK
3
. We then know by 
{
MK
3
 that A j=

MK
3
 ^  and since every
preferred model of  ^  is preferred model of 	 we have that A j=
MK
3
	 . Thus,
! 	 .
Ad 2) Immediately. r
6.2.2 MK
3
-Tautologies
A formula  is anMK
3
-tautology if and only if  holds in allMK
3
-structures. The
set ofMK
3
-tautologies does, however, not coincide with the set of S5 tautologies.
As a counter-example consider the single world structure A = (f1g; fI
1
(A) =
>g). A is a model of fA;:Ag. Clearly A! A is valid in A but (A! A) is not.
Even though this matches our intuition about the -operator, it invalidates the
Rule of Necessitation (NEC).
The invalidity of NEC implies that there is a dierence between the set
of MK
3
-tautologies and the MK
3
-consequences of the empty set. The following
proposition shows how Cn
MK
3
(?), MK
3
-tautologies and S5-tautologies relate to
each other.
Proposition 6.3. Let T
S5
be set of S5-tautologies, T
MK
3
the set ofMK
3
-tautologies.
Then,
1. Cn
MK
3
(?) = T
S5
2. T
MK
3
 T
S5
3. T
S5
= E where E is the smallest set which contains T
MK
3
and which is closed
under NEC.
Proof. The rst two points are quite easy. To show (1) simply note that since the
empty set is consistent we have that the structure A which contains a maximal
set of states and no atomic variable takes the value > in any state of A is
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the 4-maximal S5 model for the empty set. In other words, A is equivalent to
the maximal two-valued S5-Kripke-structure. With (1) it follows easily that (2)
T
MK
3
 T
S5
.
As for (3), consider the syntactical generation of all S5 tautologies:
 
0
=
def
Ax
S5
 
i+1
=
def
 
i
[ f	 j ;! 	 2  
i
g [ (*)
f j  2  
i
g (**)
T
S5
=
def
[
 
i
We proof by induction on the stage i of the construction of T
S5
that  
i
 E
for every i. It easy to check that the set Ax
S5
of S5 axioms is valid in every
MK
3
-structure. Hence,  
0
 E. Assume that the proposition holds for every
i < n. To see that  
n
 E, note that rst, MP is a sound rule of proof and
second, E is closed under NEC. Hence, ; ! 	 2  
n 1
implies 	 2 E and
 2  
n 1
implies  2 E. Thus, T
S5
 E. The inclusion E  T
S5
follows from
E  Cn
MK
3
(?). Hence, T
S5
= E. r
6.2.3 Normal forms
We know that every formula  2 L
M
is semantically S5-equivalent to some
formula in ordered MCNF. We shall now show that a similar result holds for
MK
3
. The proof is similar to the S5-case; see also [Hughes and Cresswell, 1968],
p.50.
Denition 6.5. Two formulas ;
0
are said to be semanticallyMK
3
-equivalent,
if and only if for every structure A and state  we have: A j=
MK
3

, A j=
MK
3


0
.
Corollary 6.1. ;
0
are semantically MK
3
-equivalent if and only if  $ 
0
is
an MK
3
-tautology.
The condition that $ 
0
is a tautology is sometimes referred to as syntac-
tical equivalence.
Proposition 6.4. For each formula  2 L
M
there is some formula 
0
such that

0
is semantically MK
3
-equivalent to  and 
0
is in ordered MCNF.
Proof. We have to show that for every  2 L
M
there is a formula 
0
having the
form 
0
= D
1
^ : : : ^D
n
where each D
i
has the form
 _
1
_ : : : _
k
_ 
1
_ : : : _ 
l
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where ; 
1
; : : : 
k
; 
1
; : : : ; 
l
are nonmodal.
We rst show that any modal formula ' is semantically equivalent to a so-
called rst-degree formula. A rst-degree formula is a formula which no modal
operator is in the scope of another modal operator. Once we have shown that
every formula can be reduced to an equivalent formula having modal degree at
most 1, it is easy to show that each formula can be transformed in MCNF.
Formally, the modal degree m() of a formula  2 L
M
is dened as follows:
m()=
def
0; for  2 L
m()=
def
m() + 1
m( ^ 	)=
def
max(m();m(	))
m( _ 	)=
def
max(m();m(	))
m(! 	)=
def
max(m();m(	))
m(:) =
def
m()
To reduce every formula to formula of degree atmost 1 consider the following
MK
3
-tautologies:
1. ( _ 	)! ( _ 	)
2. ( _	)$ ( _	)
3. ( _ 	)$ ( _ 	)
4. ( ^ 	)$ ( ^ 	)
5. ( ^	)$ ( ^	)
We show that 1) is valid. The proofs for 2) { 5) are analogous. Consider
A j=
MK
3
( _ 	). Thus, for all  we have A j=
MK
3

( _ 	). This means that we
have two cases:
A j=
MK
3

 , for all , or
A j=
MK
3

	 , for all  with A 6j=
MK
3


Given the above tautologies it is easy to show by induction on the modal
degree m(') that we can reduce  to an equivalent formula of degree at most 1.
The rest follows from [Hughes and Cresswell, 1968]:
1. If  contains no modal subformulas, then  is already in MCNF.
2. If ' is a rst-degree formula which is equivalent to , we take each formula of
the form  or  as an indivisible unit and reduce this formula to CNF by
methods of classical propositional logic. Finally, we replace each occurrence
of : by : and : by :. The resulting formula is in MCNF.
r
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6.2.4 P-Stable Sets
Let us now see how we can adapt the concept of a stable set, used in Chapter 5,
to contradicting information. One requirement was that a stable set should be
closed under classical consequence. We can replace classical consequence by K
3
consequence for the paraconsistent case. The next requirement was that if A is
contained in a stable set, then A must also be a member of this set. Since
A means in the context of MK
3
that A is consistently known, we have to
guarantee we only add A if we are absolutely sure that A is not involved
in any contradiction. Particularly, we do not accept A when we are given
X = fA;A ! B;A ! :Bg. Here we cannot guarantee that A is consistent
because we can think of a state  in a preferred model of X in which A takes
the value >.
Denition 6.6 (P-Stable). A set X is said to be paraconsistently stable, or
short p-stable, if
1. Ax
S5
 X
2. ;! 	 2 X and : 62 X implies 	 2 X
3. ;! 	 2 X and ! 	 is a tautology which satises NC implies 	 2 X
4.  2 X and : 62 X implies  2 X
5. : 62 X implies  2 X
6. For no formula , both  and : are a member of X .
Point 2) and 3) are nothing but the Cautious Modus Ponens whereas 4)
corresponds to a cautious version of the Rule of Necessitation. The last point
ensures that each p-stable set has an MK
3
-model.
Proposition 6.5. Let X be a set of formulas, A a preferred model of X. Then
T
A
=
def
f j A j=
K
3
g is stable.
Proof. Easy. Simply check that each condition in Denition 6.6 corresponds to
a sound rule of inference. r
Like ordinary stable sets, p-stable sets are completely characterised by the
nonmodal formulas they contain.
Proposition 6.6. Let X;Y be two stable sets which contain the same nonmodal
formulas, i.e. X \ L = Y \ L. Then X = Y .
148 CHAPTER 6. COMBINING K
3
AND MK
Proof. The proof is similar to the one given in [Meyer and Van der Hoek, 1995]
for stable sets. We shall show by induction on the modal degree m() of a
formula  that
 2 X ,  2 Y
The modal degree m() is dened as in the proof of Proposition 6.4. For non-
modal formulas, the proposition follows immediately. Assume that the induc-
tion hypotheses holds for all  with m() < n and suppose we are given  with
m() = n. For every modal  there is an equivalent formula 
0
in ordered MCNF
(cf. Denition 5.6) which is of modal degree atmostm() (see[Hughes and Cresswell, 1968],
p.117f. for details).
Assume that  is in ordered MCNF , i.e.  is a conjunction D
1
^ : : : ^ D
n
where each D
i
has the form
:	 _'
1
_'
2
_'
k
_ P
where 	; '
i
; P are nonmodal. Hence for every disjunct  in D
i
we havem() < 1
and therefore
 2 X ,  2 Y
It is easy to see that for any stable set X we have
 _ 	 2 X , 2 X or 	 2 X (i)
: _ 	 2 X , 62 X or 	 2 X; or (ii)
;: 2 X or 	 2 X
With the help of (i) and (ii) and the induction hypotheses we have C
i
2 X ,
C
i
2 Y , for all C
i
and hence  2 X ,  2 Y . r
6.3 Relationship to Belnap's Approach
How do MK
3
and Belnap's L4 relate? L4 can be axiomatised by the following
sequent style calculus LL4 which has been taken from [Wagner, 1994].
Axioms: All sequents of the form  ` .
Rules:
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X `  X ` 	
(^   S)
X `  ^ 	
X;; 	 ` Y
(^  A)
X;  ^ 	 ` Y
X ` 
( ^  S)
X ` ( ^ 	)
X ` 	
( ^ A)
X ` ( ^ 	)
X;  ` Y X; 	 ` Y
( ^ A)
X; ( ^ 	) ` Y
X ` 
(  I)
X ` 
X ` 
(  E)
X ` 
X `  X; ` 	
CUT-like
X ` 	
X ` 
Monotonicity
X;	 ` 
We can verify that each rule except for Monotonicity is valid forMK
3
. Dene
the nonmonotonic fragment of LL4 to be all rules of the above calculus except
Monotonicity.
Observation 6.1. The nonmonotonic fragment of LL4 is contained in MK
3
.
Actually, Belnap does not consider the logic L4 to be nal. He develops
his ideas further and we shall see how this development relates to MK
3
. After
having dened the notion of entailment for L4 Belnap begins to investigate
how unknown information can be handled appropriately. As a starting point, he
shows that there is a sentence which is not faithfully represented in any set-up
s. For example, if `either the Pirates or the Orioles won' is marked True in any
set-up then either `the Pirates won' or `the Orioles won' is marked True. Thus,
any set-up would lead the computer to answer YES either to question, Did the
Orioles win?, or, Did the Pirates win?
Belnap's solution is to use a collection of set-ups to represent the sentence
`either P or O'. Thus, the computer's state of mind when representing the above
sentence consists of two set-ups:
s
1
(P ) = t s
2
(P ) = u s
3
(P ) = t s
4
(P ) = f
s
1
(O) = u s
2
(O) = t s
3
(O) = f s
4
(O) = t
In order to answer questions like, Did the Pirates win?, Belnap computes the
greatest lower bound of s
1
(P ) : : : s
4
(P ) with respect to the following lattice:
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 
 
 
@
@
@ 
 
 
@
@
@
b
f A4 t
u
A collection of set-ups is called epistemic state
2
. If E is an epistemic state,
then the truth-value of a formula  in this epistemic state is dened as
E() = ufs() j s 2 Eg
where u denotes the meet in the lattice A4. If we take E = fs
1
; : : : ; s
4
g we have
that E(P ) = E(O) = u, i.e. if we put the query, Did the Pirates win?, then the
computer answers, I don't know.
The above shows a great similarity toMK
3
. First note, that if we restrict the
lattice A4 to t; f; b the resulting semi-lattice is identical to one on which K
3
's
preference relation is based (cf. Chapter 2). Moreover, there is great similarity
between the way Belnap denes the truth-value in an epistemic state E and the
way how K
3
-entailment is dened. If E() = f then this means that  is at
least false in every set-up s of E. This relates nicely to the observation that if
: 2 Cn
3
(X) then  is at least false in every preferred three-valued model of X .
Whether we try to minimise the information given in X by considering preferred
models or by forming uf: : : g is all the same.
Does this mean that whenever an epistemic state representing X judges a
formula  to be unknown thenMK
3
judges  to be unknown? The answer is `No,
not in the general case'. This is because any set-up s determines the truth-value
of a compound formula according to Belnap's truth-tables. Since these tables
dier slightly from Kleene's, both systems are dierent. For example, we have
that Belnap's computer says B is unknown when given A;:A _ B, since the
following set-ups determine the computer epistemic state:
s
1
(A) = t s
2
(A) = b s
3
(A) = b
s
1
(B) = t s
2
(B) = t s
3
(B) = u
If we take E = fs
1
; s
2
; s
3
g we have E(A) = t and E(B) = u. But, B 2
Cn
MK
3
(fA;:A _ Bg). However, if we feed the computer only with literal input,
then both logics are equivalent:
2
Please do not confuse an epistemic state in Belnap's sense with a state or possible
world of a Kripke-structure. Possible worlds are sometimes also referred to as epis-
temic states. An epistemic state in Belnap's sense, however, is more similar to Kripke
structure, since it is a collection of interpretation functions.
6.4. RELATED WORK 151
Proposition 6.7. Let X be a set of literals, E the epistemic state representing
X. Then
E(L) = f implies :L 2 Cn
MK
3
(X);L 62 Cn
MK
3
(X)
E(L) = t implies L 2 Cn
MK
3
(X);:L 62 Cn
MK
3
(X)
E(L) = u implies :L ^ L 2 Cn
MK
3
(X)
E(L) = b implies :L;L 2 Cn
MK
3
(X);L;:L 62 Cn
MK
3
(X)
Proof. It is easy to verify that E(L) = f if :L 2 X (remember that X is a set
of literals). Since Cn
MK
3
is inclusive we have L 2 Cn
MK
3
(X). The other cases are
similar. r
Thus, Belnap's logic andMK
3
have dierent opinions on what the truth-value
of a compound statement should be. If there aren't any compound statements,
Cn
MK
3
can be seen as a conservative extension of Belnap's logic.
6.4 Related Work
I shall now relate the logicMK
3
to two other systems: Wagner's Vivid Logic and
Lakemeyer's and Levesque's Knowledge Representation Service. As we shall see,
Vivid Logic
3
shares many aspects with our idea of reasoning about paraconsis-
tent and unknown information; both logics base on Belnap's logic L4. It turns
out that MK
3
has almost all desirable properties of a vivid logic; if it lacks a
property then on purpose.
Whereas the language of vivid reasoning is the propositional, non-modal
language L plus an additional connective   which expresses another form of
negation, Lakemeyer's and Levesque's system is at least from a formal point of
view very close to ours. They use a modal language and a Kripke-style semantics
with three-valued interpretation functions. The underlying ideas and intentions
do however strongly dier from ours.
6.4.1 Vivid Logic
Wagner characterises a vivid logic as a formal system which has the following
properties:
3
Wagner stresses that Vivid Logic is not a xed system; for convenience, however, I
shall use the terms vivid reasoning and Vivid Logic interchangeably.
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Two Kinds of Negation These two kinds are referred to as weak and strong nega-
tion. A form of weak negation is negation-as-failure which means that  A is
accepted if A cannot be proved. Strong negation means that the falsity of A
must be directly established; it is therefore also called constructible falsity.
Non-Explosiveness This is a stronger form of paraconsistency. Whereas paracon-
sistency simply means that there is a sentence  such that fA;^Ag 6` ,
non-explosiveness means that if  is any non-tautology, then for every X
there is a variant 
0
of  such that X 6` 
0
. For example, Johansson's Mini-
mal Logic (cf. [Johansson, 1937]) is paraconsistent but not explosive, because
we have fA;:Ag ` :, for all  but in general fA;:Ag 0 .
Constructivity Let X be a set of atomic and negated atomic formulas. A conse-
quence relation ` is said to be constructive if the following holds:
X `  _ 	 implies X `  or X ` 	 (Constructible Truth)
X ` :( ^ 	) implies X ` : or X ` :	 (Constructible Falsity)
Wagner observed that neither Classical Logic nor Johansson's Minimal Logic
nor Heyting's Intuitionistic Logic is constructive.
Restricted Reexivity Reexivity is restricted to consistent formulas, i.e. X [
fg `  if  is consistent w.r.t. X . Wagner remarks that this does of course
require an appropriate notion of consistency. In our case, a sensible notion
of consistency is to say: if  takes the value t in every preferred K
3
-model of
X , or  hold in every preferred MK
3
-model of X .
Whether the above principles hold for MK
3
depends on the type (i.e. modal
or non-modal) of a formula. For example, since  ^ : has no model, we
have that MK
3
is in general not paraconsistent.
Remark 6.2. Cn
MK
3
is not paraconsistent.
This coincides perfectly with our intuition about the modal operators: the
formula  2 Cn
MK
3
(X) means that  is consistently provable from X . Whereas
fA;:Ag, A is nonmodal, means that both A and :A have been told we cannot
have that for example A is consistently provable from X and not consistently
provable from X . This is similar to saying A has been told and has not been
told. Thus, if we are talking about knowledge or modal operators it makes sense
that the tertium non datur as well as EFQ holds.
On the other hand, the sublogic K
3
is not only paraconsistent but also non-
explosive.
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Proposition 6.8 (Non-Explosiveness of Cn
3
). Let  be non-tautological,X 
L in inf such that there is some A 2  with A 62 X or :A 62 X. There is a
variant 
0
of  such that 
0
62 Cn
3
(X).
Proof. By induction on the degree of . The base case follows easily from the
prerequisite that there is at least one A 2  such that A 62 Cn
3
(X) or :A 62
Cn
3
(X). Assume that the proposition holds for all  with degree at most n. We
distinguish two cases:
 has the form :': Assume to the contrary that for all ' 2 L we have :' 2
Cn
3
(X). Hence, :A;::A 2 Cn
3
(X), for every A 2  { a contradiction.
 has the form '
1
^ '
2
: Immediately by the induction hypotheses.
r
The requirement that there is at least one A such that either A or :A is
a member of X excludes the case of degenerated X (for example X = L or
X = fA;:A j A 2 g.
Corollary 6.2. Let X be a set of non-modal sentences. Further assume that all
prerequisites if Proposition 6.8 hold. Then there is a variant 
0
of  such that

0
62 Cn
MK
3
(X).
The restriction that X contains only propositional sentences is also made by
Wagner: he requires that the database does not contain weak negation (p.20).
Since weak negation is in fact a modality, the above restriction does not aect
the comparison betweenMK
3
and Vivid Reasoning.
In the light of Remark 6.2 and Proposition 6.8 it could seem that whereas
K
3
satises an important principle of vivid reasoning the addition of modal
operators made vivid reasoning impossible. This is, however, not true; it depends
on whether we look at modal or nonmodal formulas. A principle which holds for
modal but not for nonmodal formulas is Constructive Truth:
Remark 6.3. If  _	 2 Cn
MK
3
(X) then  2 Cn
MK
3
(X) or 	 2 Cn
MK
3
(X).
Again this coincides with our intuition about the -operator; if we claim that
 is consistently provable or 	 is consistently provable, then we must of course
be able to prove  or to prove 	 .
The following table extends the table for vividness criteria given in [Wagner, 1994].
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Logic Constr. Truth Constr. Falsity Paracons. Non-Explos.
Classical
Heyting
p
Johansson
p p
Kleene
p p
Belnap
p p p p
Nelson
p p p p
K
3
p p p
MK
3
4
p
5
p
5
p
6
p
6
Here, `Belnap' denotes Belnap's L4; `Kleene' denotes Kleene's strong-three
valued logic without a second designated truth-value. Having only one designated
truth-value implies that the `Kleene' logic has no tautologies. This yields that
we do not have for every X that X ` A_:A and moreover, Constructible Truth
is satised.
Contrary to the `Kleene' logic, A_:A is a tautology in K
3
and this is a desired
property. Thus, it is not very surprising that K
3
does not have the property of
Constructible Truth. It is, however easy to see that if X contains only literals
and  _ 	 is non-tautological then X _ 	 implies X or X	 . That is
K
3
satises a weakened (but not very restricted) form of Constructible Truth.
There are two other properties of vivid reasoning which have not been men-
tioned in the above table: two-kinds of negation and restricted reexivity. First
I must say that I nd restricted reexivity not very convincing in the absence of
any modal operator expressing some notion of consistent knowledge. Consider
the following example: Max adds A to the database X . Some hours later Moritz
adds :A to X which contains now both A and :A. Now Max, who is a very
fearful person, wants to check the next day whether he really entered A and puts
the query ?-A. Since the inference relation is not reexive the answer is No. Max
enters again A and checks whether the database has accepted this sentence by
asking ?-A. Since X still contains A as well as :A the answer is again No.
This episode shows that dropping reexivity while simultaneously allowing
paraconsistency is not very user-friendly when only a propositional language is
given. If Max and Moritz' database system supported a -operator, then Max
could ask ?-A to see what's wrong with A.
The last point to be discussed are the two forms of negation. Wagner argues
that a database needs two-kinds of negation: weak negation, which holds if A is
not provable and strong negation which holds if :A is provable. We can use the
4
Note, that if we had restricted the database X to contain only nonmodal sentences
then MK
3
would have the same properties as K
3
. Thus, the price we have to pay to
allow arbitrary databases X  L
M
is that we loose some vividness properties.
5
Only for modalised sentences as in Remark 6.3.
6
Provided that X contains only non-modal formulas.
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modal operators  and  to express weak negation. For the logic MK this has
already been observed in [Lifschitz, 1991]. In the case of MK we can dene
 =
def
:
and in the case of MK
3
we can dene
 =
def
: ^ :( ^ :):
In order to make these operators work correctly, we can, for example, ensure
that the database X has at most one preferred model.
Summarising we can say that MK
3
has many important properties of vivid
reasoning. Only two properties do reasonably not hold or hold only in a weak-
ened form: Constructive Truth and Restricted Reexivity. This shows that, even
though we made drastic changes to Belnap's original denitions, MK
3
retains
almost all philosophical aspects of L4's vividness. This is especially important
because Belnap's logic is not merely a system having aspects of vividness but
the basis for vivid reasoning (cf. [Wagner, 1994], Chapter 2).
6.4.2 Logical Omniscience: Lakemeyer's and Levesque's Tractable
Knowledge Representation Service
In [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 1988] the authors present a logic, which is at least
from its formal basis very close to MK
3
. The main purpose for their logic was
to express a notion of only-knowing. For example, if the system has been told a
single fact `John likes Mary or Sue'
7
and we ask the system whether it believes
that `John likes Mary' we wish that the answer is NO, because the system
only knows that John likes Mary or Sue. The problem sounds quite simple and a
logic likeMK or a trick like the closed-world assumption yields a solution. Any of
these approaches has the drawback that the agent becomes logically omniscient.
Logical omniscience means that the reasoner knows e.g. all S5 consequences of
his set of initial beliefs. This point of view is regarded by many logicians to
be too idealistic. As an example for this extremely idealistic behaviour consider
for example the tautology  ^ ( ! 	) ! 	 , which says that the agent's
knowledge or his belief are closed under implication.
Lakemeyer and Levesque do not only consider a perfect reasoner to be too
idealistic a model for a real reasoner but give another important argument for
skipping logical omniscience: rejecting perfect reasoning can make the reasoner
7
The example is taken from [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 1988].
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become tractable in the propositional case. This means that computing whether
the agent believes  requires time polynomial in the size of the database.
As a consequence of giving up logical omniscience many classical modal and
propositional tautologies are no longer valid in Lakemeyer's and Levesque's sys-
tem:
LO 1 A _ :A is no tautology. This is basically a consequence of choosing a
4-valued valuation
8
similar to Belnap's logic.
LO 2 :(A ^ :A) is satisable.
LO 3 A! (A _ B), i.e. disjunctive weakening does not hold.
Note that 2) is also invalid forMK
3
. In addition, there is another criterion of
logical omniscience which is invalid for MK
3
:
LO 4 if  is a tautology then  is valid. We have seen that there are structures
in which, for example, (A! A) is invalid.
In [Meyer and Van der Hoek, 1995] there are further criteria given:
LO 5 If ! 	 is a tautology then ! 	 is also a tautology (Closure under
valid implication).
LO 6 If $ 	 then $ 	 is also a tautology (Belief of equivalent formu-
las).
LO 7  ^	 ! ( ^ 	) is valid (Closure under conjunction)
LO 8 ! :: is valid (Consistency of beliefs)
LO 9 (! ) is valid (Belief of having no false beliefs)
Van der Hoek and Meyer state that LO 1-9 are undesirable when `modelling
a (human or articial) agent's belief'. And this is exactly the point where for
example Lakemeyer's and Levesque's approach diers from ours. Instead of mod-
elling a human or articial agent we dened a formal system which is not fallible
the way humans are. Thus, we wish to stay closer to Belnap's `How a Computer
Should Think' than to model agents.
8
Instead of using truth-values, the authors use sets T and F which are similar to the
set P
+
P
and P
-
P
used in Chapter 3. Contrary to our requirement that P
+
P
[ P
-
P
= D
they do not require that T [F = , i.e. there could be atomic formulas A which are
neither contained in T nor in F . This is exactly the meaning of Belnap's truth-value
u.
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6.5 Conclusion
We have seen that MK
3
is { given the premises of Chapter 1 { an alternative to
Belnap's L4. It has tautologies as desired, is able to express if : : : then sentences
and its inferential behaviour is still very close to Belnap's L4. Of course, MK
3
is in general no longer paraconsistent. If, however, we restricted the database
to contain only nonmodal sentences ( or any other suitable language restriction
which forces the database to have anMK
3
-model) then we could ensure that there
are no contradicting modal formulas. The contradicting propositional formulas
can be handled as in the logic K
3
.
CHAPTER 7
Closure
Don't worry, I don't intend to tell you all the summaries which appeared at the
end of each chapter again. Please, do consult these chapters if you are looking
for a technical summary. At this point, I would like to discuss the pure practical
aspects, or the usefulness as Belnap puts it, of the logic developed.
What has been achieved? We have dened a logic, MK
3
for reasoning about
unknown and inconsistent information. We have shown that MK
3
is very close
to Belnap's original ideas while also being able to represent implicational knowl-
edge. An important point { at least one stressed by Belnap quite often { is
the usefulness of his logic. What about the usefulness of MK
3
? We have shown
that the sublogic K
3
is extremely useful, because it does not only have many
desired mathematical properties but its computational complexity is not worse
than that of classical logic. Of course, the situation changes the very moment
we are considering modal aspects. It is well-known that the PSPACE complete
problem of Quantied Boolean Formulas (QBF) can be reduced to the question
whether a modal formula  is an S5-tautology. We have seen that S5-tautologies
coincide with the set Cn
MK
3
(?). Hence, entailment inMK
3
is PSPACE hard. This
is the price we have to pay for having a logic which is able to express a notion
of consistency.
Anyway, I think that MK
3
is useful (besides, I don't believe that `useful'
means `computable in polynomial time'). I have several arguments defending
this point. To me it seems that an important point of any Question/Answering
systems is robustness, in the sense that the system never enters a state in which
it becomes useless to the user. For any logical inference system this means that
paraconsistency is a must. The second point is transparency. A system should
not only have a clear well-founded (theoretical) basis, it should also be as close
as possible to what the user is used to. In our case, we suspected the user to be
used to classical logic. The discussion on the valid patterns of inference (i.e. the
sequent-style system), the system's reasoning is that of classical logic except for
that case where one of the formulas involved might be paraconsistent. The logic
MK
3
is thus useful because it answers according to the rules of classical logic
whenever possible.
Of course, MK
3
is not paraconsistent. That is, any input of the form A,
:A could bring the system to collapse. Whenever we allow the user to enter
formulas involving modal operators, robustness cannot be guaranteed. As a prac-
tical solution I would suggest to allow the user to put queries involving modal
operators but not to feed the database with such formulas. Only a small group
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of dedicated users should be allowed to enter formulas like e.g. A! B. Sounds
strange? I don't think so. I mean, in any technical system we can reduce a risk
of any kind but we cannot exclude it (hey, not even UNIX is fool-proved because
the system operator can post your login names together with your password to
a newsgroup).
The above approach of access control is a standard technique used by oper-
ating system or database management systems (DBMS). Ullman states: `Access
Control: The ability to limit access to data by unauthorized users, and the ability
to check the validity of data' ([Ullman, 1988]). Other authors use the term access
level to handle privileges in a database system (cf. [Elmasri and Navathe, 1989]).
I don't want to take the comparison between logic and deductive databases
too far. This is mainly because no matter how useful a logic might be, at the
moment it seems to be a too complex thing to be considered for a real world
application. Anyway, logic is a funny thing to play around with and who knows
whether any of the logics developed in Computing Science will ever nd their
way to a product, like Oracle. All we can do is wait and see. For a quite a long
time nobody could nd any practical application of number theory. This branch
of mathematics was also considered by mathematicians to be quite exotic. Then
it turned out that number theory is a theoretical basis for cryptology. Attendons
la n de l'histoire; maybe this will happen to logic as well.
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